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ARAB STATUS IN CYRENAICA UNDER THE ITALIANS

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I

VERY little has been written about Italian colonial policy and practice in Libya by other than Italians, and the Italians mostly wrote during the Fascist period and were uncritical.¹ This article refers to only one of the two Libyan provinces, Cyrenaica, and is chiefly concerned with the single feature of policy towards the Arab population as shown in the various Royal Decrees and Laws defining its civic status.

In their own way, according to British ideas not a very satisfactory way, the Italians were doing no more than other colonial powers had done before them. They were wresting a country from its inhabitants by force of arms, peopling it with their own nationals, and exploiting it for their own economic and strategic ends. Like the others, they had finally to seek a *modus vivendi* by which their nationals could live side by side with the subjugated and dispossessed natives.

To understand the general in the development of Italian colonial policy in Cyrenaica it would be necessary to make a comparative study of policies in other Italian colonies and in the colonies of other European Powers. To understand the particular in this development it is, of course, important to know about local conditions in Cyrenaica itself, and it is no less important to know, in outline at any rate, the political circumstances in which the metropolitan country found herself at the time. In the present article I can only sketch the metropolitan background very roughly.²

It is unnecessary to discuss the reasons for the Italian seizure of Libya. Italy's strategic interests in the coast of Africa opposite her shores are obvious and it is easy to understand Italian feelings about them. The Italians "knew it was no Eden" and they occupied it "simply in order to be able to breathe freely in the Mediterranean—to avoid being stifled amidst the possessions and naval bases of France and Great Britain."³ That Italy delayed so long before invading Libya was largely due to the distaste for colonial ventures which her people had developed after their defeat at Adowa in 1896. No government wished to rouse the storm that would certainly have arisen in the country had it embarked on a new venture

¹ Elizabeth Monroe, *The Mediterranean in Politics*, Oxford, 1938; Martin Moore, *Fourth Shore*, London, 1940; Knud Holmboe, *Desert Encounter*, London, 1936; all unsatisfactory. Jean Despois, *La Colonisation Italienne en Libye*, Paris, 1935. Italian writings are voluminous. A few are listed at the end of this paper and in footnotes.

² Almost any history of modern Italy may be consulted for detail, e.g. G. F. H. Berkeley, *Italy in the Making*, Cambridge, 1932-40 (3 vols.); Giovanni Giolitti, *Memorie della mia Vita*, Milano, 1922 (2 vols.); G. Megaro, *Mussolini in the Making*, London, 1938; Cecil J. S. Sprigge, *The Development of Modern Italy*, London, 1943; Macartney, M. H. H., and Cremona, P., *Italy's Foreign and Colonial Policy*, Oxford, 1938.

³ Ambrosini, *I Problemi del Mediterraneo*, Roma, 1937, p. 23.

in North Africa. When Giovanni Giolitti, political boss of Italy from 1903 to 1915, finally made up his mind to take the risk it was partly because his hand was forced by the French occupation of Morocco¹ and by fear lest Germany might occupy Libya before the Italians could get there.² It was also partly because Giolitti wished to oblige the Nationalist party, for "this tight-rope walker, this hopelessly mediocre Piedmontese," as Mussolini called him, maintained parliamentary power by judicious and impartial administration of sops to the various interests represented in the Chamber. The Nationalist party, small but with powerful conservative backing, stood, among other things, for colonial expansion. Italy declared war on Turkey on September 29, 1911, and quickly invaded the Ottoman territories of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and the Dodecanese Islands. The only trouble about satisfying the Nationalists was that it meant alienating the Socialists, the great majority of whom condemned the war, though only a small militant minority among them made any serious efforts to stop it. Criticism of the conduct of the war was, however, general among Socialists, Radicals, and Republicans.

The Italians had expected little opposition and were disagreeably surprised to find that the Arabs assisted the Turks and did so, particularly in Cyrenaica, with the blessing of the Sanusiya religious order to which almost all the Bedouin—and it was they who stood up against the Italians—adhered. In October 1912, the Turks, involved in difficulties in the Balkans, made peace with Italy, leaving the Arabs to resist the invader as best they could and, in Cyrenaica especially, they resisted with such determination that the Italians, exhausted by their efforts in the European war, were glad of a truce; and they would not even have got a truce if it had not been for British pressure on the Sanusi. Their failure must be attributed mainly to lack of fighting qualities, though corruption and incompetence at home doubtless enhanced the deficiency.³

Giolitti, who stood for non-intervention during the war of 1914-18, lost office amid general execration in May 1915, and Italy declared war on Austria. Opposition to the war in Italy, opportunism in the ministries, military incompetence, desertion from the armed forces, and all-round defeatism and selfishness led, after repeated military failure, to the disaster of Caporetto in October 1917. In the midst of these troubles Giolitti's successors, Salandra and Boselli, were anxious to end the expensive and unsuccessful diversion in Libya. Hence the truce with the Sanusi of April 1917, known as the *Modus Vivendi* of Acroma.

Disunity in Italy in the years of war was nothing to the chaos of the post-war years. To war-weariness was added disappointment with the terms of peace. Italy had entered the war for spoil allocated to her by the secret Treaty of London (1915) and failing to get at Versailles all she had been promised at London she felt she had lost the peace. Orlando, who had succeeded Boselli, fell from power

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³ "Have you ever seen a lamb become a wolf?" Mussolini asked Ciano when mortified by the succession of defeats which marked the pageant of his country's arms during the recent world war. "The Italian race is a race of sheep. Eighteen years are not enough to change them. That would require 180 years, or perhaps 180 centuries." *The Daily Telegraph*, July 25, 1945.

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in consequence and his place was taken by the luckless Francesco Nitti. Rancour over the peace terms was the least of his troubles. The Socialists, who held the largest number of seats in the Chamber, would not support him and he would not bargain for the support of the Catholic Populars, the second largest party; so he was unable to obtain a parliamentary majority and had to govern by decree. The Socialists were hopelessly divided among themselves, and in the country, where political issues were being fought out rather than in parliament, the lead was taken by revolutionary factions who had borrowed their aims and tactics from Moscow. There were riots, factories were seized by the workers, and, in general, it may be said that a state of incipient civil war prevailed. In the midst of these disturbances Gabriele d'Annunzio entered Fiume in defiance of the government and of liberal opinion throughout Europe. Nitti fell and Giolitti returned to power, only to give up the hopeless effort to restore order and good administration in July 1921. No one succeeded during the following year where he had failed. Meanwhile the Fascists had been growing in power, and in October 1922 Mussolini began to restore unity and order to his distracted country and to end the sixty years' experiment in parliamentary government during which "corruption, jobbery, administrative incompetence, and astute political party-manipulation make up a dreary tale that is invariably confirmed by every historian of United Italy."¹

To have renewed the colonial war in Libya during the troubled years of 1917-22 would have created such an outcry in Italy that none of the post-war administrations, which were always up to their ears in difficulties, could have faced this extra embarrassment. The home governments, no less than the local governor at Benghazi, were therefore prepared to go to almost any lengths to avoid a further outbreak of hostilities. Hence the so-called Period of the Accords, during which the Italians signed a succession of agreements with al-Sayyid Muhammad Idris, the Sanusi leader, the outcome of which, if not their content, was disadvantageous to Italian prestige and interests. The agreements recognized that in fact there were two sovereignties in Cyrenaica, Italian in the coastal towns and in the administrative centres on the plateau and Sanusi in the rest of the country. Both Arabs and Italians were convinced of the other's bad faith in the past and bad intentions for the future.

When Mussolini came into power he had no thought-out or consistent policy, so he adopted that of the Nationalists. One of the children of this union of nationalism and socialism was the immediate renewal of the war in Libya, though Mussolini had first come into prominence as the loudest of all the hostile critics of Giolitti's original occupation of Libya in 1911. Fighting had already, in 1922, broken out again between the Arabs and Italians in Tripolitania and it was vigorously continued by the new Fascist government, who were anxious to break organized resistance in Tripolitania before beginning what they knew from earlier experience would be the heavier task, the conquest of Cyrenaica. They therefore continued the policy of their predecessors of temporizing with al-Sayyid Muhammad Idris.²

On March 6, 1923, the Italians began again their efforts to crush the Bedouin of Cyrenaica and to destroy the Sanusiya order which put itself at the head of their resistance. By a proclamation of May 1 of that year the Governor

¹ Review of *Italy and Fascism* (Luigi Sturzo) by Harold E. Goad, *J. R. I. of I. A.*, 1927, p. 120.

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of the Colony, Bongiovanni, declared null and void all agreements entered into with the Sanusi. It took them ten years to overcome Bedouin resistance in spite of superior numbers, trained colonial troops, and all the arms of modern war; and during the long struggle it is probable that about half the Bedouin population of the country died either in fighting or in concentration camps while the flocks and herds on which they lived were decimated.¹ The country lay desolate under the heavy hands of Badoglio and Graziani. *Solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant.*

It was not until 1932 that the Italians were able to turn their full attention from arms to colonization. They had intended from the beginning of their colonial war in Libya to colonize the country to its maximum capacity and had fantastic notions of what this capacity was.² Giolitti had tried to win support among the peasants of southern Italy for the invasion of Libya in 1911 by evoking in their imagination a picture of an America just across the sea. That the Italians had not colonized the country during the twenty years of their partial occupation was due, therefore, not to an aversion to settlement but to insecurity. Even after Bedouin resistance had been broken colonization was on a very small scale, concessionaires or private company settling, till 1938, when mass colonization, state-planned and state-executed, *la colonizzazione demografica*, was initiated with the first batch of 20,000 colonists sent from Italy to Libya. Further emigration was planned and it was expected that ultimately there might be some 40,000 agricultural colonists settled in Cyrenaica alone. Settlement on the scale it was undertaken and in the manner it was carried out was only possible under a socialist government which could expropriate lands where it pleased, irrespective of rights of ownership, and settle on them masses of people, without regard to expense or economic returns, to attain its own social and strategic ends.

These migratory swarms of peasants, officials, traders, and hangers-on of all kinds threatened the very existence of the Arabs, who saw themselves being either forced into the desert regions to eke out their lives there as a scarcely tolerated class of shepherds or sinking to the level of landless wage-earners in the country districts and unskilled labourers in the towns. The Italians at the time intended this to be their fate³ and it might well have been if events in Europe had not

¹ The placing of the entire Bedouin population of Cyrenaica in concentration camps in 1930 enabled the Italians to take a fairly accurate census of the total population of the country: 139,193 Muslims (80,000 nomads or *transumananti*, 22,800 tents), 4,005 Jews, 13,074 Italians (Address by Graziani to the Fascist Institute of Culture at Benghazi on November 23, 1931, printed at Benghazi, p. 25). There were probably at this time about 30,000 refugees, almost all Bedouin, in Egypt. Lo Bello, "Le Vicende," etc., *Rivista Coloniale*, 1925-26, p. 9, estimates that in 1911 the population of Cyrenaica was 300,000.

² See, for example, Franco Spada, *La Colonizzazione della Libia*, Bologna, 1914 (Reprint of a study published in April 1912).

³ Typical of the attitude of Fascist writers of the period is: "Occorre adunque popolare queste regioni (Cyrenaica) con uomini della nostra razza, con nostri coloni ed affrettare tale fenomeno: il beduino della Cirenaica che è in condizioni di anarchia e di miseria morale e materiale, è assolutamente incapace di costituire una civiltà suscettibile di progresso, ed anche solo di fiancheggiare, evolvendosi rapidamente, le realizzazioni della nostra civiltà: esso vivrà ai margini di questa con la sua cooperazione di mano d'opera nei lavori pubblici, (costruzione di strade, di ferrovie, ecc.) nella coltivazione e nello sfruttamento di quelle zone più interne, dove per ora è difficile se non impossibile il fissarsi di nostri coloni." (Giuseppe Daodiace, "Latinità e Colonizzazione nell'Africa del Nord," *Rivista delle Colonie e d'Oriente*, Feb., 1927-V, pp. 13-14.) Even more extravagant is Filippo Lo Bello (*op. cit.*, p. 31): "La Cirenaica e la Tripolitania, assai vicine alla madre patria, sono contrade suscettibili di forte popolamento mediante immigrazione di nostra gente. Esse, pertanto, potranno divenire due province completamente italiane e spezzare, in avvenire non molto lontano, la continuità islamica dell'Africa settentrionale; con ciò l'Italia avrà reso un grande servizio a sé stessa ed all'Europa,

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caused misgivings in Rome. In 1935 Italy, in the face of sanctions and the indignation of the world, had conquered for herself an empire in Ethiopia, and she had hopes of adding to her overseas colonies, or at any rate to her sphere of political and economic interests, at the expense of France and England and of the Arab countries generally. In view of the Franco-British attitude in this matter she felt it expedient to placate her native peoples and to efface the highly unfavourable impression her past treatment of the Arabs of Libya had made in other Arab and Muslim lands. Imperial commitments indicated a more liberal policy, at least in name, and Balbo was entrusted with the difficult task of putting it into practice in Libya against a background of slaughter and repression. What the final outcome would have been cannot be known because Italy entered the World War in 1940 and had more pressing problems to engage her attention. Most of the colonists remained in Cyrenaica during the first and second British occupations but were withdrawn shortly before our decisive break-through at al-Alamein in 1942.

We can thus distinguish four main phases in the development of the colonial situation in Cyrenaica: (1) 1911-16, political stability and corruption in Italy, inconclusive war with Turkey and afterwards with the Bedouin; (2) 1916-22, war in Europe, political unrest in Italy, precarious peace based on the *status quo* in Cyrenaica; (3) 1922-32, Fascist rule in Italy, renewal of war against the Bedouin, their subjugation and repression; (4) 1932-40, Europe prepares for war and Mussolini creates an empire, demographic colonization, and reconstruction in Cyrenaica. The development can be stated in a single sentence: the Italians wanted to occupy and colonize Cyrenaica; for twenty years they were unable, partly owing to war in Europe and to political chaos in Italy, to conquer the country from its Bedouin inhabitants, and when at last by ruthlessness and devastation they had gained control they proceeded as quickly as possible to exploit its strategic and economic resources regardless of the rights and feelings of its population, and continued to do so till fear of the consequences made them adopt a more conciliatory policy.

II

The ups and downs of Italian fortunes in Cyrenaica are reflected in the various decrees which defined the juridical status of the Arabs.¹ In giving a brief account of these decrees it must be kept in mind that whilst they referred to the whole Arab population they really affected only the Arabs of the towns and even in the

poichè provocherà l'inizio del ritorno dell'Islamismo verso l'Oriente. La Libia tutta non conta più di un milione di musulmani: un milione di italiani finirebbero per assorbirli completamente valorizzando definitivamente tutto il paese." In recommending the adoption of this policy of complete "*refoulement*" Lo Bello wrote as a member of the early colonist element who were disgruntled at the more moderate and, as they regarded it, pro-Arab policy of the Colonial Office at Rome.

Dr. Paolo D'Agostini Orsini Di Camerota writes in the same vein (*L'Italia nella Politica Africana*, Bologna, 1926): "*Particolarmente dunque la Libia deve essere da noi considerata in funzione di colonia di popolamento, con tutti i mezzi atti che vedremo e nel fine precipuo di farne una terra italiana, l'unica, la sola terra che la razza bianca, potrebbe o potrà conservare a sè nel Nord Africa*" (p. 132).

¹ *Legge Fondamentale per La Cirenaica*, 31 ottobre 1919; *Legge Organica per L'Amministrazione della Tripolitania e della Cirenaica*, 26 giugno 1927; Alberto Stern, *Il Nuovo Ordinamento Fondamentale della Tripolitania e della Cirenaica* (of December 3, 1934), Extract from the *Rivista delle Colonie Italiane*, 1934, No. 12; *R. Decreto Legge*, 9 gennaio 1939-XVII, n. 70, "*Aggregazione delle quattro provincie libiche al territorio del Regno d'Italia e concessione ai libici musulmani di una cittadinanza italiana speciale con statuto personale e successorio musulmano*" (*Bollettino Ufficiale della Libia* n. 7 del 21 febbraio 1939-XVII). *Giornale di Bengasi* and *Corriere di Bengasi* for the relevant dates in 1939.

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towns only those few persons, mostly officials, who actively collaborated with the Italians; and that till 1932 the Italians had no certain or complete control outside the towns. From the earliest years of their occupation they had to consider what were to be their relations with those natives without whose help they could not hope to build up a political and administrative system in the colony.

At the beginning of the Italo-Turkish war the Arabs were in law enemy (Turkish) subjects, though the Italians alleged that they were suffering under Turkish oppression and therefore their natural allies. They were soon disillusioned on this point. By a Royal Decree of November 5, 1911, Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were declared to be under the full sovereignty of the Kingdom of Italy. This appears to have been a violation of international law since Italy and Turkey were still at war. That did not trouble the Italians, who by further decrees set up separate governments for the two colonies and defined their administrative and judicial functions. After Turkey had made peace the status of the Cyrenaican Arabs was fixed by the Royal Decree of April 6, 1913, which declared all born in the country, wherever resident, to be *sudditi italiani*, provided they were not Italian citizens or foreign citizens or subjects. They retained their Muslim personal law but were subject in other respects to whatever regulations the Italians saw fit to impose on them. They were permitted to hold posts in the armed forces and administration of the colony, and persons desirous of acquiring Italian citizenship might apply for it if they possessed residential qualifications, though by taking it they became subject to Italian personal law. These early decrees were more in the nature of administrative than constitutional law. A constitution, in the continental sense, was promulgated in 1919 after the Italians had signed a truce with the Sanusi.¹

The agreements entered into with the Sanusi between 1917 and 1922 and the efforts made by the Italians during those years to build up a democratic system of government in Cyrenaica were, as we have seen, largely due to defeatism and political unrest at home, but they sprang also from a genuine belief in peace and Wilsonian principles among the men at that time in power in Italy. It is possible that the Governor of Cyrenaica, Giacomo de Martino (July 1, 1919–November 23, 1921), himself believed in them. Early in his term of office the Royal Decree of October 31, 1919 (corresponding to the Royal Decree of June 1, 1919, for Tripolitania), called the *Legge Fondamentale per la Cirenaica*, was promulgated. The natives of the country who were not *cittadini italiani metropolitani* were defined as *cittadini italiani* and thus received status equal to that of an Italian but not identical with it because the Arabs kept their Muslim personal law.² They also enjoyed guarantees of personal liberty, inviolability of domicile and property, the right to compete in military and civil careers and professions, even in the Kingdom of Italy, electoral rights (a local parliament was set up at Banghazi), the right of petition to the national parliament, and rights of sojourn and emigration.³ Respect of religion and local custom was guaranteed, liberty of the press and right of meeting were recognized, citizens could not be conscripted for military service, no fiscal tribute could be imposed which was not the same for all or without con-

¹ In the negotiations leading to the *Modus Vivendi* of Acroma of 1917 al-Sayyid Muhammad Idris refused to accept Italian sovereignty and it is not mentioned in the terms of the truce. Recognition of sovereignty is implied in later agreements though not specifically stated in them.

² Articles 1–5.

³ Art. 5.

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sent of the local parliament, revenue from taxes was to be used for Cyrenaican purposes exclusively, the Arabic language was compulsory in the teaching of certain subjects in the schools and in certain official publications, and no precepts contrary to Islam were to be taught.¹ An adult Arab could acquire metropolitan citizenship if he fulfilled certain conditions.² The decree revoked the earlier one of April 6, 1913, relating to Italian subjects, and other decrees and laws, though not formally abrogated, seem to have lapsed by substitution save in so far as some of the administrative machinery created by then remained of necessity in operation.³

This Basic Law of 1919 was as unwise as it was generous. Some of the Bedouin may have enjoyed the elections, but to have formally handed over the country to the Arabs was detrimental to Italian prestige for it was a confession that the Italians were unable to control it themselves. Moreover the Chamber of Deputies, which was to the Bedouin a glorified *mi'ad* or Shaikhs' gathering, was expected to run the country with machinery with which they were totally unacquainted. Arabs being what they are and circumstances being what they were in 1919, the constitution could hardly have been other than a failure. Indeed it is not surprising that Fascist writers later poured scorn on these well-meant efforts of plutocracy.⁴ They were particularly shocked by the grant of Italian citizenship to the Arabs, especially as they were exonerated from compulsory military service at the same time. Under Federzoni, the first Fascist Minister for the Colonies, policy was in this matter, as in others, completely reversed. All agreements with the Sanusi were torn up and into the waste-paper basket with them went the local parliament and the constitution of 1919. In its place was issued by the Royal Decree of June 26, 1927, the *Legge Organica per L'Amministrazione della Tripolitania e della Cirenaica*. In a sense this was a new, and Fascist, constitution, though its constitutional content was subordinated to its administrative and judicial content. Whereas the 1919 law started by defining citizenship and its rights and duties and then went on to frame administrative functions and machinery in the light of these, in the 1927 decree the question of citizenship was given secondary importance and was not mentioned till Article 29. The form of the decree, its tone, and its language were consistent with the new corporate structure of Fascist Italy. By it the Arabs ceased to be *cittadini italiani* and became *cittadini italiani libici*, they lost the right to free exercise of military and civil careers outside the colonies, electoral rights (parliament had in any case been abolished),⁵ the right to petition

¹ Articles 6-9, 11-12, and 42.

² Articles 34-35.

³ Art. 43. Also Stern, *op cit.*, pp. 8-9.

⁴ All post-1922 writers *passim*; e.g. Stern, *op. cit.*, p. 7: "Soltanto nel 1919, a pace conclusa, agli albori della rinascita dell'Europa e negli affanni di una irrequieta ricerca di assetto nazionale, le colonie cominciarono a risorgere dall'oblio in cui la madre patria le aveva gettate; ma il clima patrio già infetto e pericoloso, agitato dai moti socialisti, dalle chimeriche battaglie per la perfetta eguaglianza sociale, spinse le sue folle anche sulla terra africana."

⁵ Under the Royal Decrees of June 26, 1927 and August 31, 1928, a *Consulta Generale* was established with non-official Italian and Arab members nominated by the Minister for the Colonies. The Arab members were chosen from notables of the sedentary population and from tribal Shaikhs of the Bedouin. The Council was to meet once a year and it was obligatory to submit certain financial matters for its deliberation. However, the Governor could ask its opinion about other affairs if he wished to do so. It had only consultative functions. It had no legislative or executive powers. It does not seem ever to have functioned. Similar consultative bodies on which Arabs were represented had from time to time been appointed from the earliest days of the Italian occupation (Gaibi, 1928): they had no importance.

to the national parliament, *etc.*, and there was no mention of the liberty of the press, of the right of meeting, of freedom from military conscription, and of the protection of the Arabic language in public instruction. Metropolitan citizenship might still be applied for under certain conditions. Application of this decree was several times postponed and it appears never to have come into operation.

Bedouin resistance in both Tripolitania and Cyrenaica still caused the Italians much trouble even as late as 1929 and on both military and political grounds it was deemed advisable to place the two countries under single direction. This was done by the Royal Decree of January 24, 1929, which placed the two colonies under Maresciallo Pietro Badoglio del Sabotino (January 9, 1929-January 31, 1933), and by the Royal Decree of December 3, 1934, *Ordinamento Organico per L'Amministrazione della Libia*, which divided the single colony into four *Commissariati provinciali*, deputy-governorships, with seats at Tripoli, Misurata, Banghazi, and Darna, and a *Territorio militare del sud* to administer the Libyan Sahara (Art. 11). The other articles of the 1934 decree were designed chiefly to meet the new conditions arising, or likely to arise, from colonization by nationals. In no important respect did it alter the status of the Arab population or what rights it still possessed. In the first enthusiasm of turning Libya into a metropolitan colony the Arabs were of secondary interest to those who made the laws.

In 1935 Italy found herself in a none too friendly world with the added cares of an imperial power. If she was to take her place in the coming struggle in Europe she would have to pay more attention to the feelings of her colonists and native peoples. But apart from these considerations the attitude of the Italians in control of Libya had changed considerably since the final days of Bedouin resistance. For the first time they felt themselves safe, and fear, with its children hatred and cruelty, ceased to be the sole guide to policy and action. They could now without loss of face pursue a more humane, as well as a more constructive, programme.¹ The first essential seemed to be to identify with their interests those of the more vocal and educated section of the Arab population, many of whom had already shown a willingness to collaborate with their new rulers. If they were to be an asset in the future they would have to be given a small stake in the administration of the country. Balbo emphasized this requirement in his programme of development: "*Elevarlo il livello culturale e sociale degli arabi libici significa creare la condizione necessaria per consentire a questi arabi di collaborare in maggior numero e più espressamente al Governo della Libia nelle cariche pubbliche e nei pubblici impieghi. Se tale collaborazione è tuttora limitata e se la partecipazione di musulmani a cariche onorifiche e a posti di responsabilità è ancora scarsa, ciò è dovuto alla penuria di elementi capaci e di sicuro prestigio, non certo ad una preconcetta refrattarietà da parte del Governo.*"² Mussolini had promised, during his tour of Libya in 1937, some changes to the benefit of the Arabs as a reward for the services of their volunteers in Ethiopia and these were introduced by the Royal Decree of January 9, 1939, which set out to flatter the state-employed intelligentsia.

To encourage the colonists already in the country and those about to emigrate the decree declared Libya to be an integral part of the Kingdom of Italy, its four provinces becoming the ninety-seventh, ninety-eighth, ninety-ninth, and hun-

¹ Aldobrandino Malvezzi, *La Politica Indigena nelle Colonie*, Padua, 1933, pp. 338-342. Also Debates in the House of Deputies for the years 1930-38, especially Reports of the General Budget Commissions to the House of Deputies for the same years.

² Italo Balbo, "La Politica Sociale Fascista verso gli Arabi della Libia," *Relazione Presentata all'Ottavo Congresso "Volta,"* p. 15. Address delivered at Rome in October 1938.



OF LIBYA AFTER 1934



NEPTAURICULIA

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dreth provinces of the Kingdom. The military status of the Libyan Sahara remained unchanged.¹ The incorporation of Cyrenaica in the Kingdom of Italy gave great satisfaction to the colonists, who no longer had to feel that they had left their motherland for inhospitable shores. The *Colonia* had become *Terra Italiana*. The *Quarta Sponda*, Italy's Fourth Shore, had become a political fact. At the same time, to quiet any uneasiness which the incorporation of their country in the Kingdom of Italy might create among those Arabs whose services the Italians needed, they were offered a new special citizenship which took the place of the right of acquiring metropolitan citizenship allowed in the earlier decrees. That the Italians had attached importance to the assimilation of a small élite of natives is shown by the continued inclusion of the right of acquiring metropolitan citizenship through all the decrees and laws from the invasion of Libya in 1911 till the present decree, both in pre-Fascist and in Fascist times. It had been found, however, that the Arabs had not availed themselves of the privilege. Only fourteen nominations had been made between 1927 and 1938, all of townsmen and only half of them Arabs. Apart from the imposition of a tax on the granting of the citizenship, increased in 1936 by 20 per cent. to 5,000 lire, employees of the administration could not feel that any advantages they might derive from it could compensate them for loss of status before the religious courts in matters of personal law, such as marriage and divorce, and of customary inheritance, a loss considered shameful even by wholehearted collaborators. Moreover, the new special citizenship, *cittadinanza italiana speciale*, was more in accordance with the policy of parallel development of Maresciallo Italo Balbo (Governor-General of Libya from January 1, 1934, to June 28, 1940) than acquisition of metropolitan citizenship.

The new special citizenship could be acquired, without prejudice to Muslim personal law, by persons who had reached the age of eighteen, provided they had a good record, had in some way or other served the state, and could read and write Italian. No fee was exacted for the grant of special citizenship. The status carried with it certain privileges: the right to bear arms, the right to be inscribed in the A. M. L.², the right to a military career in Libyan units, the right to become Mayor (*Podestà*) in Libyan communities and Adviser (*Consulore*) in mixed Italo-Arab communities, and the right to come under the *Ordinamento sindacale-corporativo*, an ordinance by which the Fascist guild system had been adapted to suit colonial conditions, and to take some part in the activities of these *organizzazioni sindacali*.³ These rights could be exercised only in Italian African territories and no Arab could, in any case, occupy posts or practise professions which would necessitate Italians serving under him.⁴

¹ Balbo, *op. cit.*, p. 4, "Il Sahara libico" è un paese di carattere spiccatamente coloniale." He considered the people of it incapable of the development expected of the Arabs of the north, whose development was merely retarded, and prescribed a policy of paternalism for the region.

² *Associazione musulmana del Littorio*, an Arab Blackshirt organization, corresponding to, and directly dependent on, the P. N. F. (*Partito Nazionale Fascista*). It was a logical development from the G. A. L. (*Gioventù Araba del Littorio*), the Arab Fascist youth organization corresponding to the G. I. L. (*Gioventù Italiana del Littorio*). The G. A. L. was started in 1936.

³ These syndicates or guilds were peculiar to the Fascist State. There were guilds of *Industriali*, *Commercianti*, *Lavoratori* of various kinds, *Artigiani*, *Professionisti* and *Artisti*. Art. 3 of the Royal Decree says "Ai cittadini italiani libici è esteso, con gli opportuni adattamenti da stabilirsi con apposito decreto Reale, l'ordinamento sindacale-corporativo vigente in Libia, limitatamente alle provincie che fanno parte integrante del Regno d'Italia." Art. 6 gives "il diritto di disimpegnare funzioni direttive nelle organizzazioni sindacali di cui all'articolo 3 ed essere chiamati a far parte del Comitato corporativo della Libia e dei Consigli provinciali dell'economia corporativa."

⁴ Art. 7.

The reception of the new decree was enthusiastic by the colonists and by Arab employees of the Administration. It may be doubted, however, whether the sentiments expressed by the Mudirs, the Qadis, and some of the richer merchants, in the telegrams of thanks they sent to Mussolini and Balbo, were felt. It was tacitly assumed to be a condition of continued employment that special citizenship should be applied for. The first batch of diplomas included ninety Cyrenaican names, almost all of native officials and pensioners of the urban centres. The very few Bedouin names in the list of recipients were of urbanized officials. The decree could not have been of the slightest interest to the Bedouin. Conscription for compulsory military service followed shortly afterwards.¹ Of their bounty the Italians had given to the Arabs of Cyrenaica a *Patria*, *L'Italia Fascista*, and they were expected to show their gratitude by fighting for it. On June 10, 1940, Italy entered the war on the side of Germany.

Thus in 1911 the Arabs of Cyrenaica became enemy subjects and were declared to be Italian subjects. In 1919 they became Italian citizens. When the Italians renewed operations against them in 1922 those who resisted were declared to be *ribelli*. Under the Fascists they lost in 1927 the Italian citizenship they had been granted under the democratic regime of 1919 and became instead Italian-Libyan citizens. In 1939 they were granted the privilege of applying, if they had the necessary qualifications, for a special Italian citizenship, a status half-way between that of the ordinary Arab of the country and that of the Italian colonists. There were therefore in Cyrenaica in 1940 three categories of citizenship, that of the *cittadini metropolitani* (Italian settlers and officials), that of the *cittadini italiani speciali* (a small intermediate urban class of educated Arab officials), and that of the *cittadini italiani libici (musulmani)* which comprised almost the entire native population of the country.² These changes in the *status civitatis* of the Arabs were, as we have observed, to a considerable extent determined by the development of the political situation in Cyrenaica itself to which they were a response. The Royal Decree of 1913 was an optimistic anticipation of easy victory; the Royal Decree of 1919 an acknowledgment of political and military failure; the Royal Decree of 1927 and the Royal Decree of 1929 were signs that apathy and compromise had given way to determination to fight the Bedouin if necessary, and even by preference, to the point of extermination; the Royal Decree of 1934 marks the end of all resistance and envisages the settlement of Italian colonists on the best lands of the country, and the Royal Decree of 1939 signals the realization of the first part of this programme and at the same time makes a bid for co-operation of the Arab intelligentsia. But to an equal extent the changes in civic status were, as has been noted, determined by political changes in Italy. The Royal Decree of 1913 was a colonial declaration such as any European power would have made at that time in similar circumstances. In 1919 Italian politics were defeatist, demagogic, socialistic, and coloured by Wilsonian internationalism, and the Royal

¹ The native peoples of the Italian colonies were not subject, by the Royal Decree of August 5, 1927, to compulsory military service (*Organisation Politique et Administrative des Colonies*, Bruxelles, 1936, p. 111). The Royal Decree of July 22, 1932, making military service in case of mobilization obligatory for the sedentary population of Tripolitania does not seem to have been extended to Cyrenaica.

² At the time of writing the Arabs have reverted to their 1911 status of enemy subjects, since England recognized the Italian domination of Cyrenaica *as de jure*, but they are in rather a peculiar position in that they became our allies during the war and fought against the Italians as part of the British Forces in the Western Desert; and His Majesty's Government has given a promise that the Italians will not return to Cyrenaica.

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Decree of that year was a stew of these ingredients. The Royal Decrees of 1927, 1929, and 1934 are typical Fascist pieces of legislation with emphasis on statal requirements rather than on citizenship and the rights of the individual and show a strong bias towards administrative centralization and bureaucratic hypertrophy. The Royal Decree of 1939 bears the stamp of empire.

III

But if the relations between the Italians and the Arabs, mirrored in these dull laws and decrees, were influenced by the changing political situations in Italy and in the colony itself they also constituted a social problem *sui generis* such as confronts all European peoples who colonize countries occupied by native peoples, irrespective of time or place or of local or metropolitan conditions. When Europeans and natives find themselves in large numbers in the same country the relations between them have in some way to be organized within a common political and economic structure and some common interests and values have to be established, even if each people keeps to its own way of life in most things. Racial fusion between Italian Catholic and Arab Muslim was clearly impossible.¹ Cultural assimilation to any high degree was equally improbable. Both Italians and Arabs were civilized peoples with a history and culture of their own and neither were ever likely to adopt the religion, language, law, and customs of the other. It was obvious that some other solution would have to be found.²

In the early days of the Italian occupation, when the few nationals other than the military kept to the towns, the problem did not arise, at any rate in an acute form, and had they continued to settle in the towns in small numbers as businessmen, traders, professional men, artisans, and officials there might have been little friction between them and the Arab population, for the relation between the two communities would have been to some extent symbiotic.³ The Italians would have had a function in Cyrenaican society which the Arabs could not at that time, and perhaps in some respects could never, have performed for themselves. But once they started to colonize the country districts and to work the lands hitherto worked by the Bedouin no other solution was feasible than the one Balbo advocated and was attempting to carry out when Italy entered the war in 1940—the policy of parallel development. In his view the Arabs should be encouraged and

¹ Intimacy of this kind between Italians and subject races was, in any case, forbidden in all their colonies and it was claimed that such unions had never taken place. *Vide* the speech by the Assistant-Secretary of State for Italian Africa, H. E. Attilio Teruzzi, in the Senate on April 14, 1938.

² At the beginning of the occupation of Libya Italian writers had pointed out the unlikelihood and undesirability of *la colonia di assimilazione*; e.g. Spada in 1912, *op. cit.*, pp. 22–23; “*Ma nessuno assorbimento completo può sperarsi dalle radici profondissime che da secoli si sono abbarbicate con gli elementi spirituali nell'animo di un popolo . . . Noi non dobbiamo imporre una somma di riforme radicali agli indigeni che ne renderebbero, negli effetti, negativa l'applicazione, obbedendo passivamente. Noi dobbiamo invece prospettare soltanto un'organizzazione di vita sociale superiore, mettendone in chiaro rilievo i risultati vantaggiosi. Il paragone sarà stimolo assai più efficace di qualunque coercizione legalizzata . . . Avremo così due popolazioni non antagonistiche né confuse, ma coordinate su di un medesimo piano, come due parallele.*”

³ In 1920, during the Period of the Accords, it is reckoned that the total population of Cyrenaica may have been about 145,000, of whom 95,000 were Bedouin and 50,000 sedentaries. In the towns and administrative and military posts there were 9,000 Italians, mostly military. Out of a total population at Benghazi of 30,000 there were 2,500 Italian officials, trades, artisans, etc. Out of a total population at Darna of 11,000 there were about 1,300 Italians, of whom 700 were military. There were also Italian detachments and a few civilians at al-Marj, Tubruq, and other places. (Leonardo Ricci, “Centri Abitati e Tribù Nomadi,” *La Cirenaica* (many contributors), Milano, 1922–23.

compelled to develop on similar lines to those of their Italian compatriots. They would then have a structural place in the Fascist state and in the end would share common political sentiments and a common political ideology with the Italian colonists. "*Noi avremo in Libia non dominatori e dominati, ma italiani cattolici e italiani musulmani, gli uni e gli altri uniti nella sorte invidiabile di essere gli elementi costruttori di un grande potente organismo, L'Impero Fascista. Roma dimostra, così, di essere, ancora e sempre la grande e seconda Mater gentium.*"¹

This plan was clear in the Royal Decree of 1939, which was one of the steps taken to put it into operation, and the conciliatory language of the decree was in harmony with the action of the government along the whole social front. New wells were dug, stock was improved, model farms and villages were built, there was reafforestation, educational and medical services were expanded, and so on. The Italians under Balbo showed themselves to be genuinely interested in improving the material welfare of the Arabs to a level not too far below their own and consistent with the widely propagated notion of a common *Patria*. Side by side with metropolitan agricultural villages Arab agricultural villages were to be built, metropolitan schools were to be balanced by Arab schools, the hospitals were to have Arab wards as well as Italian wards, there were to be colonial battalions and Libyan battalions, colonial Fascist organizations and Arab Fascist organizations, and the government would build mosques as well as churches. Each people was to advance in the same direction by parallel paths, though the Italians would always be dominant. A solution of this kind appeared to be the more pressing when Cyrenaica became part of the Kingdom of Italy, for the Italians then felt the more that they could not allow the Arab population to have a totally different set of institutions to their own.² Arab social structure would have to be transformed.³ It was hoped that when this had been done both Arabs and colonists would accept a situation they could not alter and tolerate each other in the realization that though their immediate interests might sometimes clash co-operation was to the final advantage of both. It was believed also that any jealousy the Arab might feel about the disparity between the political status and economic privileges of the two peoples would be overcome by the natural aptitude of all Italians for meeting other peoples as social equals. It is said—and the Italians themselves say it—that the Italian is a good mixer.⁴

The trouble about parallel lines is that they meet at infinity and not before. In social relationships some contact, and therefore some assimilation, is necessary. The Italians realized this and allowed in their policy for a certain degree of cultural

¹ Italo Balbo, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

² By the Royal Decree of 1939 they put themselves in a position similar to that of the French in Algeria. Till this time it had been the opinion of Italian writers on colonial affairs that the French had made a mistake in incorporating Algeria into the Republic.

³ Balbo, *op. cit.*, p. 5. "*L'opera svolta dal Governo Fascista a beneficio degli arabi è quindi di tale portata politica e morale da trasformare la struttura sociale della popolazione; da creare anzi le condizioni necessarie per una più diretta partecipazione di questa popolazione alla nostra vita civile.*"

⁴ "The Italians in ordinary circumstances show such a capacity for toleration and generosity of spirit and such a marvellous power of adaptation that they are able easily to find the solution of those endless problems which are the result of different races having to live together and which to other nations seem insurmountable. The Englishman is hampered by his instinctive, physical repugnance to the coloured man; the Frenchman wants to mould others too much in his own image. The Italian lives and lets live, has no 'phobias,' no preconceptions, no fanaticism, no missionary spirit, no proselytising mania" (A. Malvezzi, *op. cit.*, p. 236; quoted in translation by Dr. Bernard Allen, "Professor Malvezzi's book on Italian Colonial Policy," *J. R. Af. Soc.*, October 1935).

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fusion and for participation on a minor scale of a few Arabs in the public life of the Italian community. One of the means by which they aimed at bringing about this basic minimum of assimilation, and the only one considered in this paper, was the creation of a small Arab élite of civil service intelligentsia. This élite had to be very small to begin with, for suitable material was, as Balbo wrote in the passage quoted earlier, hard to find in Cyrenaica, but it might have been expected to expand as well as to reach a higher level of culture when its privileges and prestige had become apparent. In the meanwhile it would perform its essential function, without which the administration could not carry out its duties efficiently, of acting as a bridge between the metropolitan state bureaucracy and the Arab population.

This nucleus of partly Italianized Cyrenaicans, the mule-class who were culturally neither truly Arabs nor truly Italian, was already coming into being by 1940. In 1939-40 the Italian government employed about a hundred Arab administrative officials.¹ Two of these held the senior rank of Advisers (*Consiglieri*) and were attached to provincial headquarters, thirty-five held the rank of *Mudir* (a Turkish title retained by the Italians) and were posted to district headquarters, and about sixty held the rank of *Katib Mudir* and worked under *Mudirs* or were posted to headquarters of sub-districts.² Parallel to the Arab administrative organization was the religious organization of Qadis of various grades.³ The *Mudirs* and the *Qadis* of the various grades formed the whole of the native civil service of Cyrenaica, its Arab administration and judiciary.

The administrative officials had no real executive or judicial authority. Their duties were limited to collecting information about the Arab population and passing on to it the instructions of the government. They were treated as servants in the domestic rather than in the public sense and they were ill-paid.⁴ Never-

¹ This figure excludes state employees of very low rank, the *uscieri*, sweepers, door-keepers, office-messengers, and so forth, and the large number of Arabs in the police and in military or quasi-military organizations under Italian officers and N.C.O.s. It includes only the officials down to, and inclusive of, the sub-Mudirs (*Katib Mudir*) given in the "*Inquadramento del Personale Amministrativo Libico*" (*Bollettino Ufficiale* of October 21, 1939, and August 1, 1940).

² By the *Ordinamento Organico del Personale Amministrativo Libico* of August 8, 1938, the Libyan administrative personnel was classed in two categories: (1) Advisers on Arab Affairs, Secretaries for Arab Affairs, and Mudirs of three grades; (2) Secretaries of Mudirias of five grades. Up to the time of the Italian evacuation of Cyrenaica the Secretaries for Arab Affairs appear to have acted as ordinary Mudirs and there seem to have been only three grades of Secretaries of Mudirias appointed. The Italians doubtless intended to bring personnel up to establishment in course of time, unless the extra grades were for Tripolitania only. These officials exercised their political and administrative functions in respect of the native population only (Art. 2). Recruitment and promotion were by examination, except to the grade of Adviser, which was by nomination (Art. 4-23).

³ Under the *Ordinamento Organico del Personale giudicante e di Segreteria dei Tribunali Sciaraitici della Libia* of December 4, 1937, there were two divisions of religious office: (1) Qadi, (2) Judge of the High (Sharia) Court. Under this ordinance the establishment for the whole of Libya (Tripolitania and Cyrenaica) was 1 Mufti, 4 Judges of the High Court, 35 Qadis of three grades, 47 Naib Qadis of two grades, and 56 Secretaries of the Sharia Courts of three grades. About 50 posts must therefore have been about Cyrenaica's quota. The posts of Mufti and Grand Qadi were found only at Tripoli.

⁴ Initial salaries per annum were as follows: Advisers, L.16,000, Secretaries for Arab Affairs, L.12,000-14,000, Mudirs, L.6,500-10,000, Secretaries of Mudirias, L.3,000-8,500. On January 2, 1940, the Lira was 78.00 to the Pound. The rate of pay was approximately the same as for religious functionaries of corresponding rank which is laid down in the 1937 ordinance *per annum* as: Judges of the High (Sharia) Court, L.16,000, First Class Qadi, L.16,000, Second Class Qadi, L.11,000, Third Class Qadi, L.9,000, First Class Naib Qadi, L.7,000, Second Class Naib Qadi, L.5,500, Secretaries to the Courts (sharia) L.4,000-L.9,000.

theless they had more influence than the Italians may have credited them with and certainly more than they wished them to have, for they alone knew the language and the people of the country. In a country like Cyrenaica nine-tenths of what goes on between native officials and the native population never enters office files and never reaches the ears of the European officials. The European is very largely in the hands of his native advisers, officials, informers, police, and personal servants who form a cordon around him isolating him from the people. From this entourage he gets a blurred and distorted impression of native life, for if his employees have to earn their pay by spying on their own people they also deceive their superiors to their own advantage and in the interests of their people. These remarks apply less to the *Qadi* class because by the nature of their profession they were less subject to interference, having no direct Italian overseers, and had less scope for influencing either the Italians or their own people.

Since the Italians had to build out of these civil servants the nucleus of an intermediate class who would act as a link between the state and its Arab subjects it is of interest to note some of their characteristics. I take for this purpose the administrative officials. The great majority of them were townsmen of Banghazi or Darna and the remainder were mostly born in the smaller trading centres. The Italians seldom employed Tripolitani in an administrative capacity in Cyrenaica, for they were doubtless aware that if the Cyrenaican Bedouin distrusts townsmen in general he dislikes Tripolitanian townsmen in particular.¹ There were a few men of Bedouin origin, as one can tell by their names, among these officials, but few, if any, could claim to have been brought up Bedouin. The older officials had been educated in Arab or Turco-Arab schools and a few in Turkey, while the younger ones had been mostly educated in Italo-Arab schools, a few going on to higher education in Italy. The standard of knowledge of the best educated of them was low.

They can be divided into three types. A minority belonged to respectable urban families of Turkish days, often with a record of civil service under the Turks such as the Banghazi families of Bin 'Amar, Bsaikri, Biju, Anaïsi, and the Darna families of Bannani, Darbi, Dillal, and Jarbi. Such families were used to a higher standard of culture and comfort than was usual in Cyrenaica and had no means of playing the part expected of them in public life other than by taking bureaucratic employment. They served the Italians as they had served the Turks because they had neither choice nor inclination to do otherwise. Like most cultured Cyrenaians they were in sympathy with the Sanusiya order and, in spite of their age-long antagonism to the Bedouin, in their hearts they probably backed them against the Italians. They could hardly have backed them in any other way because the Italians from the first occupied the towns and they were quite incapable of standing up to the daily hardships in the fighting camps of the Bedouin. The majority belonged to a different type. Most of them, born between about 1890 and 1905, had a record of close and active collaboration with the Italians as informers, spies, guides, interpreters, leaders of "friendlies" (*Capi Banda*), and supervisors and overseers in concentration camps (*Capi Campo* and *Capi Fila*). Many may be regarded as social misfits who sought to compensate for their mal-

¹ The townsmen of the four towns of Cyrenaica, Banghazi, Darna, al-Marj, and Ajadabiya are not considered by the Bedouin as Tripolitani, though they are almost all descended from Tripolitanian immigrants, some quite recent immigrants, from Misurata, Zliten, Yefren, and other western centres. Many are Karaghla, descendants of mixed marriages between Turkish Janissaries and Arab women.

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adjustment by leaving their homes to join the new masters of the coastal towns. Being themselves townsmen, they had in any case little liking for the Bedouin against whom the Italians were fighting or for their Sanusiya leaders; for the struggle was really between the Italians and the Bedouin for the comparatively rich plateau which rises sharply from the northern coast of Cyrenaica, and the townsmen were neutral. When the war was over the Italians felt under an obligation to these men, their old, and only, friends, and rewarded them with administrative posts for which most of them had few qualifications. It is not surprising that later they sometimes found them an embarrassment and frequently had to investigate charges, for which there were often adequate grounds, against them for moral misconduct and financial irregularities; and they had to admit that the Bedouin for preference avoided their company. The third type were the younger men, born since about 1905, brought up in the towns under Italian rule, and educated in Italo-Arab schools. These young men, who were beginning to rise in the civil service in the years before the war, spoke excellent Italian and read and wrote the language better than Arabic. In many ways, whilst remaining Muslims, they adopted Italian ways of acting and speaking. Like the "Effendi" elsewhere, they showed a marked preoccupation with their own affairs and little inclination to use their superior education for the benefit of their own people in the towns, while their lack of understanding of, and their repugnance to, the Bedouin made them regard a posting to one of the country districts as undeserved exile. In course of time these "Italianized Effendis" would have filled all Arab administrative posts in Cyrenaica and would have identified themselves culturally with the Italians as far as it is possible for a Muslim to do so. This is the end the Italians aimed at and it is undoubtedly the end they would have achieved.

Up to 1940, however, few of their officials, even among the younger ones, had any liking for them and fewer still were loyal to them. They might join Fascist clubs and syndics and apply for special Italian citizenship but they did so passively, without conviction that these things would mean anything more to them than payment of subscriptions; for, while always placing their own interests first, they remained at heart Arab and Muslim. Also, they saw that in the end what the Italians were doing could not be any less disastrous to themselves than to their fellows, whether Bedouin or urban labourer. Swarms of Italians were settling like locusts not only on the lands of the plateau but also in the towns, and within the towns their numerous children would inevitably take possession of all well-paid posts in the administration. Therefore, while they might continue to serve the Italians as they, or their type, had served the Turks, so long as it was in their interests to do so, they would not hesitate to betray them when it was not. Beyond question, when Italy entered the war the élite, no less than the common people, hoped that England would drive the Italians out of Cyrenaica. Naturally, they did not express their feelings openly, for the Italians were always on the alert for *disfattismo politico*, but the great majority of them very readily co-operated with the British during their first two occupations of Cyrenaica and some showed themselves so openly anti-Italian during these periods that they thought it wise to retreat with the British forces to Egypt, to pay court there to the exiled Sanusi leader, al-Sayyid Muhammad Idris. Ten of the senior Arab officials, including both Advisers on Arab Affairs and several other men whom the Italians had trusted the most and had served them the best, fled to Egypt. The Balbo school may have been surprised. I am sure the Graziani school were not; and one can say

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in favour of the Graziani way of thinking that it would be a delusion to suppose that if the fortunes of war had been different the official class would have shown any more loyalty to the British than they had shown to the Italians, the Turks, or the Sanusi.

IV

This paper is not intended to show more than how the colonial situation in Cyrenaica tended to change in reaction to political changes in Italy from 1911 to 1940; how its changes are reflected in variations of colonial policy, of which alterations in the civic status of the Arabs are a measure; and how the Italians regarded the problem arising from large-scale colonization by their nationals.

Many books and articles have been written about the different approaches of the different European powers to their colonial problems, and much of what has been written lacks appreciation of the basic fact that, regardless of the divergent terms in which countries and political parties define their colonial policies, there is a marked similarity in what they all do. It would not be expected, considering the many differences in the colonial set-ups of, for instance, South Africa, Kenya, Algeria, Tunis, and Libya, that relations between Europeans and Natives will be everywhere exactly the same, but one cannot fail to observe how similar they are. Beneath the surface of words, memoranda, and policies, behind such expressions as assimilation, association, parallel development, segregation, direct and indirect rule, and with local variations due to the uneven breadth of racial and cultural cleavages, fundamentally the same process has taken place and is taking place.¹

The history of Cyrenaica under the Italians exemplifies this general process. (1) The colony is conquered by superior arms, the leaders of the native population are killed, exiled, or in some other way suppressed. (2) That part of the colony most suitable for European settlement is colonized by immigrant nationals and the natives are segregated in the less attractive part. (3) The powers of the state, military, administrative, legislative, and judicial, are kept in European hands and the Europeans are given higher social status and economic privileges. (4) Native laws and custom are preserved where they do not conflict with the aims of the ruling power or the needs of its colonists, but where native institutions appear to be incompatible with the purposes of the colonial power or the welfare of its nationals an effort is made to "transform" or "adapt" them. (5) The ruling power raises the level of civilization and culture of the native population by agricultural, zootechnical, medical, and educational services. (6) The patterns of social relations within the native community tend slowly, sometimes very slowly, to take the form of European patterns as political, economic, and finally even kinship and family institutions begin more and more to conform to a European type; while in such important cultural features as language, religion, and personal law the two peoples remain apart. The policy of parallel development or association means therefore absence of assimilation only in a cultural sense, not in a structural sense. The process had, in any case, hardly begun in

¹ Even their policies have been remarkably similar. The "Parallel Development" of General Smuts and the Hilton Young Commission and "*La Politique d'Association*" of French writers are much the same as the Italian policy of the "*Due Parallele*." Balbo might have written Smuts' unfortunate Rhodes Memorial Lectures of 1929 (*Africa and Some World Problems*, by General J. C. Smuts, Oxford, 1930), except that Smuts' "Separate parallel institutions," would on the African side be indigenous, whereas Balbo with better logic realized that they would not be indigenous.

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Cyrenaica, even among the sedentary population. It had not started among the Bedouin who have everywhere proved highly resistant to changes of the kind. But Balbo had declared his intention of making it happen if he could. (7) Owing to cultural differences, particularly in language, relations between the European administration in its various branches and the native population have to be indirect, by proxy, and this becomes possible by the formation of a class of men who have undergone some degree of cultural assimilation. These *évolués* have part of their social relations with the ruling Europeans and part with their own people and are both a nucleus from which cultural assimilation spreads and a means by which the transformation of native institutions takes place.

In Cyrenaica the changes which had taken place by 1940 were of no great significance. After crushing armed resistance the Italians had had only eight years in which to colonize and administer the country districts on any scale, though they had been in occupation of the towns for close on thirty years. In 1940 Italians and Arabs were still both pursuing their traditional way of life very much as if the other had not existed. Given another fifty years the Italians might have forced all but the most nomadic of the Bedouin into the Fascist framework, though it is most unlikely that there would ever have been any solidarity between the two peoples. No European power has yet succeeded in creating moral solidarity between natives and its own nationals where both are in considerable numbers.

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BALANCE AND PLANNING

By ARTHUR E. SMAILES

IN speeches and writings on the subject of planning and post-war reconstruction a constantly recurring theme is the desirability of achieving balance, for example between agriculture and industry, between town and country, and within the fields of agriculture and industry. The allusions to "balance," however, are so frequently vague that one may be excused for reiterating Dr. Joad's favourite prefatory phrase, "It all depends upon what is meant." The word "balance" has become part of the stock-in-trade of politician and would-be planner, but rarely is its meaning made explicit. Again and again it is used without indication of what it represents in concrete terms and without elaboration of how the Utopian state it describes may be attained. It is evident that it can be used as safely as any other catchword that commands universal approval simply because we all find it an acceptable description of the goal of the policy we favour and of the advancement of our private or sectional interests. Who could disagree, for example, with the late Government's declaration of its post-war agricultural policy as being the maintenance of "a healthy, well-balanced agriculture"?¹

There is, of course, an obvious explanation of the tendency to give "balance" to this mystical significance and make it serve in and out of season to describe a Utopian condition. The predilection for the term is indicative of the strength of the contemporary reaction against the state of affairs inherited from a century of *laissez-faire* and individualism run amok. If there is any description that does not apply to the pre-1914 order it surely is "balance." A well-nigh complete ascendancy of considerations of economic gain over social cost, and an obsession with immediate profits regardless of conserving resources for posterity, have so far marked the modern industrial age. It has seen an extreme massing of people into huge urban agglomerations which now spill over into the countryside, with the rural community completely impotent to hold either its territory or its children. At home the multiplication and growth of single-industry towns, even single-industry regions, in the new lands overseas the development of single-crop systems of agriculture, were alike characteristics of the nineteenth century that are the very negation of "balance."

Yet however much we may deplore the sacrifice of social values and the extreme swing towards specialization and concentration, many of the consequences must be accepted as established facts. The old balance which has been upset by the technological revolution of the past two centuries is quite incapable of being restored. It is outdated, and a nostalgia that yearns for a return to it is futile. Much current talk about balance between agriculture and industry and between country and town appears to be infected with this lack of realism, since what were balanced relationships in the pre-machine age are often quite inapplicable and meaningless now. A new equilibrium appropriate to the new civilization must be sought. There are implications of the vast improvements in man's technical efficiency which we cannot escape, even if we were justified in wishing to do so. One of the most important is that agricultural progress has destroyed for ever the old balance between the proportions of the total population engaged in agricultural as compared with non-agricultural pursuits.

The more efficient agricultural production becomes the smaller the share of

¹ Minister of Agriculture, November 26, 1940.

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the working population it requires, and the larger the proportion of people who may be withdrawn from agriculture to engage in other forms of production or in services. Nor should it be forgotten that this trend is a prerequisite of any general advance in the material welfare of mankind; the drift from the land is both cause and symptom of a rising material standard of life. A figure of 12 per cent. of the total occupied population has been given as adequate under the present agricultural conditions of the Western world to produce the food-supply and vegetable raw materials needed by the whole population. But, as Astor and Rowntree point out,¹ it is impossible to lay down on *a priori* grounds any limit to the extent to which this proportion may eventually be reduced. Those who desire to see the trend reversed by State adoption of special measures to maintain or increase the proportion of agriculturists must realize the inevitable consequences in a lower output per man in agriculture and a smaller supply of non-agricultural goods and services than would otherwise be possible. And the urban dwellers who would have to share the burden should consider whether their sacrifices would be warranted in the common interest.

An unlimited urbanization fortunately does not inevitably follow from this trend in the relation between the agricultural and non-agricultural elements of the population. Its effect in relation to urbanization is permissive, not determining. Increase in agricultural efficiency is certainly a condition precedent of urbanization and the massing of people into towns has in fact been its concomitant. To attribute destruction of the old balance between rural and urban populations to this cause, however, is to emphasize only the factor that has released one side of the scales. It ignores the equally significant weighting of the other side. That people no longer tied to the soil should have congregated in urban masses is due to equally important changes in the technique and organization of manufacturing. The large-scale application of power to manufacturing broke down once and for all its association with the rural countryside and the agricultural population; more than this, in the steam-power phase, the efficient application of power required the massing of workers in large groups. And because of the operation of what Marshall used to call "external economies" these concentrations grew in snow-ball fashion, till to-day corrective measures are urgently called for in the interests of the well-being of our society. Fortunately the way lies open as a result of more recent changes in technology, especially the use of easily transmitted electric power and developments in transport.

Loosening the structure of population distribution, however, does not require an increase in agricultural employment for its fulfilment. Employment in agriculture and contact with the countryside are to be distinguished. A well-planned distribution of non-agricultural occupations and homes holds out prospects of a common solution both for the problems of our overgrown cities and our depopulated countryside. By dispersal or, more accurately, by sub-centralization of industry the number of people associated with a given area of land can be adjusted to a level consistent with the economic provision of the services and amenities required by a rising standard of life; and this in spite of continued diminution in the number of workers engaged in agricultural production.

It cannot be assumed, however, that a desirable measure of redistribution of the population engaged in non-agricultural pursuits will reverse the tendency for an increasing proportion of people to live in towns. We should realize that it is

¹ *British Agriculture*, p. 50 (Pelican Special).

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not the fact of urbanization but the form it has taken that is to be deplored. That 80 per cent. of our people are urban dwellers is not itself a symptom of an unhealthy society, though the concentration of some 40 per cent. in as few as seven conurbations may be deplored. What is really significant, however, is the type of urban environment in which such a large proportion of people live to-day. The Victorian debasement of the town is what has made it the epitome of the ugliness, drabness, and monotony of our contemporary civilization. Yet urbanism, rightly developed, holds out unrivalled opportunities for the enrichment of the life of the individual and its fulfilment in community. And the very real social and economic advantages of town life could be obtained without sacrifice of refreshing contacts with nature in the countryside. The lingering idea of the need for a certain balance between the numbers of the rural and urban elements of the population rests upon an out-of-date conception of cities as insatiable consumers of men, requiring constant replenishment from rural communities. By any objective standards, however, the townsman to-day compares favourably with the countryman; and what difference there remains between the relative capacity of urban and rural communities to provide children to replace themselves relates to differences in their social habits and standard of living rather than to different health conditions.

These matters have been dealt with at some length in order to show that measures of balance that may have obtained in the past between agricultural and non-agricultural and between rural and urban populations cannot now apply. If by "balance," however, we are thinking not of parity of size between two or more constituents but rather of that harmonious relationship between them which makes for their perfect integration, this optimum must obviously be related to a particular phase of technology and to a particular form of social organization. To lose sight of this elementary fact is to lose the capacity to distinguish between impossible or highly undesirable and the right goals of effort in planning.

The economic and demographic settings, however, are not the only frames of reference to which any concept of balance needs to be related. Unless given a geographical context too, "balance" is at best meaningless, at worst dangerously misleading. It is even arguable that balanced relationships can be defined only in terms of specific communities in their unique geographical settings. Certainly the relevant extent of territory and size of community will differ according to the particular aspect of balance that is being considered. For the application of any particular expression of economic or social balance there must be an appropriate scale of community-in-area.

For the local community, the group of people who live and work close enough together to share the daily social intercourse of work and leisure in home, church, and other neighbourhood institutions, the balance to be looked for should have as its foundation a diversity of occupations. No standardized recipe of ingredients and amounts can be prescribed for occupational balance, but it is not difficult to recognize lack of balance where it occurs and to point to communities¹ whose lopsided occupational structure brings with it economic and social disabilities that are only too apparent. On the other hand, a diversified occupation structure confers upon the local community social benefits over and above the insurance

¹ A fuller account of ill-balanced communities in England and Wales has been given by the present writer in *Case Studies in National Planning* (Kegan Paul, 1943), and a secondary aspect of occupational balance, that between male and female employment, is dealt with in the *Journal of the Town Planning Institute*, Vol. XXVIII, No. 4 (May-June 1942).

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it provides against the economic blights to which the single-industry community is so specially susceptible. It is a safeguard against ultra-narrowness of interest and outlook. The interplay of different points of view born of different callings promotes a balanced community outlook, and is conducive to a healthily varied social and cultural life, with a range of activities adequate to the needs and tastes of each individual. A social atmosphere in which members of different social grades are brought into close personal relationships is again surely of special importance for growing children; and the variety of occupational opportunities within range of the individual home multiplies the chances of each adolescent boy and girl finding a suitable vocation.

It may be going too far to claim that such balance is within the province of attainment of each and every local community in Britain. There are many communities, especially on our coalfields, whose extreme lopsidedness presents problems of peculiar difficulty; but even here we believe that conditions could be substantially improved by a judicious planning, a re-location of service and other light industries.

A broad occupational basis and representative social structure is a form of balance which seems to be a reasonable goal for the local community. It is manifestly impossible, however, to strike a balance between agriculture and industry within so limited a field. Simply because the space requirements of the two activities are so radically different in relation to the numbers of people they support, their synthesis requires a frame of a different order. Agriculture is much too diffused an activity to be able to redress the balance of employment at the sites of modern industry. Once factories are established in a rural area industrial urban communities are introduced which dwarf the agricultural group in their neighbourhood.

Nor do agriculture and industry seem capable of being interwoven by means of part-time or seasonal employment. The Scott Committee have put on record that their careful investigations failed to discover any industries (as distinct from rural handicrafts) which successfully dovetail with agriculture in this way. The combination of agriculture with mining that is sometimes suggested as a remedial measure for the serious single-industry problem presented over considerable areas of our coalfields is equally impracticable. Farming could never employ within a given area more than an insignificant fraction of the population density characteristically associated with modern efficiently organized mining undertakings. It is sufficient to note that there are on the average more than two hundred miners per square mile over the Northumberland and Durham coalfield as compared with barely twenty agriculturists per square mile in Cambridgeshire or Norfolk¹ to realize that here is a disparity too great to be reconciled.

If a dovetailing of agriculture and industry in the local community is regarded as unattainable the question arises whether and in what way it is possible to transcend the dualism presented by rural and urban populations. Within what frame of reference can agriculture and industry, town and country be synthesized into a balanced whole? The solution seems to lie in a developed regionalism. The ideal in planning regions should be not to separate and so oppose essentially industrial and essentially agricultural tracts, but to delimit regions in such a way that each obtains an appropriate share of urban industry and of agricultural countryside, and to develop intra-regional relationships between the two. Thus

¹ These are among the most intensively cultivated and fertile parts of Britain, and the corresponding figures for Northumberland or Durham are only half as high.

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the dichotomy, so far from being the cause of irreconcilable tensions, can be used for the enrichment of the life of the regional community and the mutual benefit of its constituent groups. By framing regions so as to encourage the development of such complementary relationships recognition is also given both to the cities' need of the countryside and to the countryside's need of cities. In place of the regrettable fusing of town and country into nondescript "rurban" tracts which has been taking place at an alarming rate, there can be a true marriage in which neither town nor country loses its distinctive character but each serves to complete the other. The amenities which the countryside provides for the urban populace—fresh air, open spaces, contacts with nature—are balanced by the centralized services made available in towns for the ruralite, e.g. facilities for shopping and commercial entertainment, post-elementary education, and health services. The development of a "service" agriculture in the rural hinterland to provide fresh foods for the urban populations is balanced by that of "service" industries in the towns to supply the regional market. Lest it be thought that this savours too much of a self-contained economy let us point out that both service agriculture and service industries are regarded as adjuncts to the region's basic types of production. These latter will take advantage of the special physical and human aptitudes of the region, and will depend upon inter-regional and even international trade relations.

The appropriateness of an area smaller than the nation State as the setting for these balanced relationships has so far been neglected, but it has much to commend it in the national interest, quite apart from its incidental strategic merits. Between the prosperity of an axial belt within which the expanding mobile industries are becoming increasingly concentrated and the depression of outlying areas of old-established fixed industries, and between sprawling conurbations and impoverished rural backwaters, there are disparities which are ever becoming more pronounced. If these irrationalities and inequalities are to be corrected a planned re-location of "footloose" industries and population in terms of some such regional scheme seems imperative. It could be the framework both for a more balanced distribution of industry over the country and for a "healthy and well-balanced agriculture" based upon a national policy of nutrition.

In conclusion, reference must be made to the danger that on the national scale "balance" may become a euphemism for economic nationalism in its most extreme form. For if the economic horizon be limited to the State or even to a group of States a "balanced" economy must be synonymous with autarky. It is true that the simple clear-cut differentiation of function between State economies dominated by the production of manufactured goods and those dominated by the production of primary commodities belongs to a phase in the development of the modern world which has now been left behind. The British farmer has no reason to expect to be at such a disadvantage in the home market as compared with overseas producers as he has been in the past, nor has the British manufacturer any more reason to expect ever again to enjoy such advantages in overseas markets. We cannot anticipate a return to the trade relations of last century, based as they were upon production of cheap food by reckless "soil-mining" of the newly won lands within a rapidly expanding agricultural frontier and the production of manufactured goods for the whole world in a few areas which were the first to adopt power-machine techniques. Changed conditions make it necessary to envisage for the post-war world the establishment of a much greater degree of internal balance within countries or groups of countries, and up to a point this

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is to be regarded as a healthy tendency. Both cheap land and industrial monopoly were temporary features, but their passing need not be followed by a swing of the pendulum to the other extreme, leading to the creation of a number of more or less closed trade-areas. Such is the pattern of producer-consumer associations which appears to be envisaged with approval by Colonel Walter Elliot in an article,¹ but it offers no satisfactory solution of world problems. It is right to point out the inadequacy of looking at human associations merely as producer-consumer associations, and to lay stress upon the importance of all-round development as against extreme specialization. But to regard this as an argument in favour of autarky is to substitute one extreme for the other. Recognition of the evils of pursuing the division of labour to its extreme length underlines the need for a sense of balance in planning the pattern of producer-consumer associations, not for autarky, which is a perversion of balance.

The attractions of autarky are illusory, even when it is considered in terms of major political associations. We are thinking here not only of existing territorial groupings such as the U.S.A., the Soviet Union, or the British Commonwealth and Empire, but also of even more extensive associations like the Western Hemisphere, or a federation of European States with their colonial empires, which have been advocated as potential fields of autarky. The future of our civilization, however, depends upon our ability quickly to achieve an integration of all local, regional, national, and even imperial or continental forms of balance within an ultimate world frame. There can be little ground for satisfaction with anything short of this, and it is a spurious realism that seeks the creation of autarkies. The only true realism is one which recognizes, alike in its economic and its political arrangements, the mutual interdependence of all peoples. Our neighbourhood has now become the whole world, and we deny the fact at our peril. If mankind turns its back upon this immediate and urgent task of attaining a global economy, with realization of the full benefits that can be derived from the geological, climatic, and biological differentiation of the earth, then the outlook is bleak indeed. The price will have to be paid both in a lower world standard of living and in the certain recurrence of war. The world has become too small, the needs of civilized man too complex and far-flung, for societies to live amicably unless they can share free access to the totality of the earth's resources.

¹ "Specialists or Amateurs," *New Statesman & Nation*, November 20, 1943.

TWO NOTES ON COMMUNAL RESPONSIBILITY

By DAVID DAUBE

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THE following observations are based on material from the Old Testament. But most of the conclusions reached bear on other early literatures. In the first note, attention is drawn to a case where communal responsibility is rejected, yet the corporate idea is still so strong that communal responsibility is replaced not by individual responsibility but by communal merit. The second note is intended to show that of the large number of cases usually taken under the heading of "communal responsibility" by no means all deserve this description. There are cases which, though at first sight looking like communal responsibility, yet reflect an entirely different notion, which is here termed "ruler punishment." Briefly, in the case of communal responsibility, the community as a whole is deemed to be tainted by and answerable for the crime of any member (for example, a city may be answerable for a murder committed in its midst); while in the case of ruler punishment, the community suffers, not as answerable for the crime of a member, but as the property of a guilty ruler (for example, a sinful king may be punished by the plague decimating his people).

It is hardly necessary to point out that these two notions belong to very different religious and political settings; that their history is not the same; and that it is essential to be clear about the distinction in dealing, say, with the family curse in Greek sagas or the evolution of the concept of original sin in Christianity.

Problems of Bible criticism are touched as little as possible. The main purpose of these notes is to demonstrate the existence and meaning of certain ancient notions hitherto not (or insufficiently) recognized. How exactly they appear at various dates and in various sources is a further question, no doubt well worth investigating but not here raised.

I. SODOM AND GOMORRAH

The first great text on communal responsibility that a reader of the Bible comes across is the story of Abraham's intercession for Sodom and Gomorrah.¹ God, we are told, threatened to destroy these vicious cities. But Abraham urged Him that even if there were only ten pious souls living there, the two places ought not to be touched.

There is a remarkable feature in this episode. Abraham saw the injustice of communal responsibility; he saw that to exterminate the good with the bad would be wrong. Yet he did not infer that the proper thing to do would be to judge each person by his deeds. What he asked was not that God should kill the wicked inhabitants of those towns and leave the righteous unhurt: it was that, if any righteous inhabitants (ten, to be precise) could be found, the towns should be spared altogether. In short, he replaced communal responsibility, not by individual responsibility, but by what may be called communal merit. To the idea that the righteous as well as the wicked members of a community might be punished for the sins of the wicked, he opposed the idea that the wicked as well

¹ Genesis xviii. 20 *sqq.*

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as the righteous members of a community might be saved by the excellence of the righteous.¹

That this concept was clearly shaped in his mind, not only vaguely adumbrated, is evident, in particular, from the first half of the dialogue; from Abraham's prayer, "Peradventure there be fifty righteous within the city: wilt thou . . . not spare the place for the fifty righteous that are therein?" and from the assurance by God, "If I find in Sodom fifty righteous . . . then I will spare all the place for their sakes." As is to be expected, commentators have attempted to interpret away, or at any rate modify, the apparent extravagance of Abraham's demand. Rashi, for example, paraphrases some words used by Abraham thus: "And though thou mayst say the good must not save the bad, why wilt thou kill the good?"² But these efforts (however justifiable on theological grounds) serve only to render more conspicuous the absence, from the actual Biblical account, of the principle of individual responsibility and the presence of that of communal merit.³

The point will become clearer by comparing another narrative in which God is entreated not to consume innocent and guilty alike, namely, the story of Korah's revolt against Moses and Aaron.⁴ When God announced His intention to wipe out the whole people except Moses and Aaron, these two "fell upon their faces and said . . . Shall one man sin and wilt thou be wroth with all the congregation?" This, indeed, was a request that the rebellion be dealt with on the basis of individual responsibility. Moses and Aaron besought God to strike at no one but the really blameworthy. But they did not introduce the notion of communal merit: they did not suggest that, as there were many more or less innocent, even the guilty should go unharmed.⁵ Similarly, individual responsibility, not communal merit, is the gist of commandments like "The fathers shall not be put to death for the children, neither shall the children be put to death for the fathers: every man shall be put to death for his own sin."⁶ "Every man," the injunction runs, "shall be put to death for his own sin"; it does not run, "The sinners shall live for the good works of the pious."

¹ Neither here nor anywhere else in this article do I mean to suggest that the communal principle was at any time applied to every kind of community or offence. It would, however, lead too far afield to go into the question of its scope.

² To quote a very different author, Romanelli also, in his *Massa' ha-'Arab* 14, alludes to Abraham's argument as in favour of individual responsibility, preservation of the good and punishment of the bad. He describes how Mulay Yesid entered Tetuan as ruler in 1790 and planned to have all Jews killed; but one of his councillors warned him: "That be far from thee to slay the righteous with the wicked. Shall not the judge according to the law of Mohammed do right? Let thy hand be upon them that rebel against thee."

³ It is true that, in the end, as we learn from Genesis xix. 12 *sqq.*, it so happened that God did specially consider a few individuals. But no reference to this course is to be found in the fundamental, conscious discussion on the problem between God and Abraham. Moreover, it should be noted that if Lot and his family had not left Sodom, they, too, would have perished, as, in fact, his prospective sons-in-law did. After Korah's revolt also, those who wished to avoid destruction had to go away from his and his men's tents (Numbers xvi. 23 *sqq.*).

⁴ Numbers xvi.

⁵ This is not saying that Moses and Aaron must necessarily have held views unlike Abraham's. That their request was not the same may well be accounted for by there having been, between the facts of the case of Sodom and those of the case of Korah, several important points of difference; I shall not, however, here specify them since this would involve too lengthy an analysis of the details of the two narratives.

⁶ Deuteronomy xxiv. 16.

How are we to explain Abraham's attitude? The answer (or part of it) seems to be that he wished to make God give up His plan, and chose the most natural and easy way of formulating his wish. God told him: I will raze these cities to the ground—they are vicious. Whereupon he replied: Preserve them—there may be a few good men. This was proposing the simplest alternative.

Was it? Was the pardoning of all really the most plausible course when the punishing of all appeared unwarranted? Yes, it was, if one assumption continued to be made (and here we come to the crucial factor), the assumption that, for better for worse, a community must be treated as a whole, no discrimination between its various members being possible. Abraham continued to make this assumption. He argued with God, not because He was trying entire cities instead of individual persons (that fundamental objection did not yet occur to him), but for the sole reason that His terrible sentence might affect some men who deserved better. Should there be a god-fearing remnant in the doomed towns, their annihilation would be an injustice. Therefore, should there be such a remnant, in order to avoid wronging it, the decision must be reversed—for the whole of the towns: instead of condemnation of Sodom and Gomorrah, there must be acquittal of Sodom and Gomorrah.

Probably, communal thinking was so deep-rooted that Abraham could think in no other way;¹ the method of judging a city as one unit so unreservedly accepted that he never questioned it as such. He noticed what deplorable results this system might produce: but he did not discover its real flaw, the ultimate source of those deplorable results. So he criticized the results while, essentially, approving of the system; or, to put it differently, he retained the current, traditional method, only he applied it in a new way leading to new conclusions. While he expressed horror at the idea that "the righteous should be as the wicked," his own proposal implied neither more nor less than that the wicked should be as the righteous. Fettered by the communal principle, he was unable to take the direct step from communal responsibility to individual responsibility: but keenly sensitive to the claims of the righteous, he substituted communal merit for communal responsibility. In a sense, it was a manner of progress to be described as *imitation par opposition*.

I am not maintaining that it was merely in this manner, and no other, that communal responsibility was overcome or the idea of communal merit acquired prominence; nor even that this must have been the starting-point. The very fact, for example, of Abraham's being allowed to speak for his brothers of lesser standing is strong indication that communal merit, in one form or another, played some part long before he asked God to rest on it the particular verdict on Sodom and Gomorrah. What does seem plausible (though even this no more than plausible) is that, in some ancient theologies at least, Abraham's way of arguing was the first to be taken in consciously trying to get rid of the unjust consequences of communal responsibility and in setting up communal merit as a general, desirable basis for decisions.

It may be well to refer to a somewhat analogous case from a very different province. Shakespeare's Shylock relied on the strict letter of the law. It was pointed out to him how cruel and unreasonable would be the execution of his design: yet he would have his bond. Portia did feel that to let him proceed would

¹ But I should like once again to call attention to what I have said in the second footnote of this article.

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be abetting a crime; she failed to infer, however, that there are contracts which a court simply ought not to enforce, and that the contract in question was one of them. She solved the difficulty by recognizing the bond but interpreting it just a little too scrupulously: a pound of flesh indeed, but not a single drop of blood. Again, we have before us an instance of *imitation par opposition*. It did not occur to Portia to question the established, rigid rules that any bond is sacred, whatever its content, whatever the circumstances. She realized that this rule might be the cause of unjust results. But she did not reject it as such; she only saw to it that no wrong was done, she only applied the old principles of strict law in such a way (it was, true enough, a most artificial way¹) as to make them yield fresh and better results. Thus, her judgment does not mark a direct step from a system of strict law to one of liberal, flexible law. Essentially, she still adhered to the former; and, in fact, she herself declared that she was beating Shylock on his own ground:

"For as thou urgest justice, be assur'd
Thou shalt have justice more than thou desirest."

It is, incidentally, this discrepancy between the method she employed and the result she arrived at which must be considered the true cause of the prolonged controversy about the value of her verdict. As is well known, Portia's judgment has received as much praise from some as blame from others.² Both parties have submitted brilliant arguments, and it looks as if the feud might go on for ever. As a matter of fact, both parties are right. Portia wished to save Antonio, in spite of the bond; but she still thought in terms of a formalistic, strict law, and must therefore use, as best she could, the means provided by that regime to attain her end. Hence it comes that when we concentrate on the result (as most of those did who have praised her), we are satisfied; while when we concentrate on the method (as those did who have blamed her), we may find it ingenious but shall never find it sound.

It may be recalled that the first, famous part of the sentence was followed by a second part. This was based on a decree of Venice providing that an alien who sought the life of a citizen, unless the duke pardoned him, was to be put to death and his property to be confiscated. Had Portia founded on this decree also the first part of her decision; that is to say, had she, instead of "upholding" the bond, simply decided that, in view of this decree, the contract was illegal and Shylock, not the merchant, had forfeited his life for making it; her judgment would indeed have to be regarded as directly setting aside the Jew's formalistic view of the law.

¹ For, obviously, to decide that the contract gave the Jew no drop of blood was an interpretation, not genuinely literal, but sophistic and chosen with the object of helping one party and crossing the other.

² For example, R. v. Ihering, disapproving, comments thus (*Kampf ums Recht*, 22nd ed., pp. 59 sq.): "But a lawyer who criticizes the plot cannot but say: the bond was void since it stipulated for something immoral; the judge should from the outset have rejected it on this ground. Once he did not reject it, however . . . it was a miserable trick . . . to pronounce the same man entitled to a pound of flesh from the living body but not entitled to the blood that must be shed to get the flesh . . . Who can help feeling that, with him (the Jew), the law of Venice has been outraged?" J. Kohler, on the other hand, approving, says (*Shakespeare vor dem Forum der Jurisprudenz*, p. 90): "It is a process of universal significance that the dramatist unfolds before our eyes: it is the triumph of the purified sense of justice over the dark night reigning during the previous period: it is a triumph hiding itself behind specious arguments and assuming the mask of false reasons because these are still necessary; but it is a triumph none the less, affecting not only the particular issue under notice but the whole history of law."

But, then, had she done so, her judgment would not be nearly so intriguing as it is, and the play would be poorer by one of its most dramatic points. Actually, the second part of the sentence (the part based on the decree) is quite unexciting *qua* sentence, and derives all its interest from the consequences brought about by it: Shylock's plea that to lose his property would be as good as to lose his life, his enforced conversion, and so on.

I need hardly add, in conclusion, that if the story of Abraham's intercession reflects only the beginning of an advance as far as the evolution of legal methods is concerned, it embodies one of the greatest religious ideas ever conceived. The substitution for communal responsibility of communal merit, instead of individual responsibility, is a sign of a certain backwardness in regard to legal methods. But, from the point of view of religion, how magnificent is the idea that, far from the sinners drawing the pious to inevitable destruction, a handful of saints can render holy and save all the community. Certainly, few ideas have produced mightier effects in the course of Jewish and, indeed, non-Jewish history. The narrative discussed, with its combination of the primitive and the sublime, the one dependent on the other, illustrates well the mysteriously irregular path of human thought.

II. A DISTINCTION

In modern literature, the term "communal responsibility" is indiscriminately applied to two very different things, of which only one deserves that description. It may be well to begin by giving a few examples of the procedure that does deserve it. The Bible tells us¹ how Abraham asked God not to destroy Sodom if ten righteous people could be found there. "That be far from thee," he exclaimed, ". . . that the righteous should be as the wicked." Evidently, this argument was directed against communal responsibility. Had there been a number of god-fearing men in the city, and had God destroyed it all the same, it would have meant treating the whole community as answerable for, or tainted by, the sins of a section. Again, there is a law in Deuteronomy² to the effect that if a murdered man is discovered lying in a field, and the murderer cannot be found, the elders of the nearest town have to bring a sacrifice. This provision also is a landmark in the struggle against communal responsibility. Were the ceremony prescribed in it not possible, God might treat the whole community as answerable for, or tainted by, the crime committed by the one, unknown murderer. "Lay not innocent blood unto thy people of Israel's charge," is the prayer to be recited by the elders.

But now let us consider a group of instances that ought not, it is submitted, to come under the same heading as those discussed. When David was presumptuous enough to count his people, the prophet offered him the choice between three kinds of punishment: seven years of famine, having to fly before his enemies for three months, and three days of pestilence. The king chose the latter, and thousands of his men died.³ Whatever one's impression might be at first sight, the governing notion here was not communal responsibility (though, as we shall see later, it was not entirely absent). It would be wrong to say that the Israelites all, because they belonged to the offender's, David's, community, were regarded as

¹ Genesis xviii. 23 *sqq.*

² xxi. 1 *sqq.*

³ 2 Samuel xxiv., 1 Chronicles xxi.

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involved in the offence. At least, that cannot have been the idea that the prophet had in mind. One of the penalties proposed for choice, be it remembered, was that David should have to fly before his enemies for three months. This, presumably, would not have troubled his ordinary subjects at all, certainly far less than that terrible pestilence: it would have troubled him alone. As a matter of fact, that pestilence, too, however much it hurt the people, was intended as punishment, not of the people, but of the king. It was he, not they, who was to be chastised for his arrogance by their decimation. Supposing, in consequence of an earthquake, David had lost 70,000 silver coins instead of 70,000 men, or the plague had seized his cattle instead of his men, or even it had seized his slaves instead of free Israelites, it would never occur to us to speak of communal responsibility. For we should see quite clearly that there was David, the owner, and his coins or cattle or slaves, his property; and that his sin was not laid to his property's charge, but it was damaged simply in order that he should be impoverished. But, then, obviously, the mere fact that he was made poorer by a host of men instead of coins, sheep, or slaves did not alter the direction of the vengeance: it was still he whom God meant to hit. In the case of Sodom, if God had killed even the righteous Lot and his family, He would have killed them, not in order to grieve the wicked (they were not likely to care), but on the basis of the communal principle: the whole city is responsible for crimes perpetrated in its midst. Similarly, in the case of a murdered man being found in a field, if God were not prepared to accept a sacrifice and turned against the nearest town, He would turn against it, not in order to punish the murderer (he might not mind at all), but to punish the town, which, on the communal principle, is responsible for a deed done within its boundaries. The situation in the case of David's census was totally different. Here God intended to strike at the real offender, David; only that the particular punishment inflicted happened to consist in slaying his men and not, as it might well have done, in depriving him of his money, cattle or the like. Of course, there was a reason why God took away his men and not his money or cattle. He had transgressed by counting, and boasting of the number of, the former: therefore it was fit that it should be the former by whose loss he was brought low. But this is only one more detail to confirm the interpretation here attempted. David, the "owner," showed himself unduly proud of his men, his "possessions": it was David, the "owner," whom God confounded by falling upon them. Actually, there is direct authority in the text for this point, on which I am insisting, that the 70,000 men were destroyed, not as responsible members of a sinful community, but *qua* David's property, like cattle (this is the reason why I have adduced this story before any other). David himself drew the comparison when he asked God to put an end to the sufferings of the innocent: "I have done wickedly; but these sheep, what have they done?"¹

In short, David's census is an illustration, not of communal responsibility, but of individual responsibility: the sinner, David, alone was called to account. The

¹ True, what David mainly thought of, when he called his subjects "sheep," was that they were incapable of grave sins (sheep are regarded as innocent: Isaiah xi. 6) and that they were in need of protection (good rulers are compared to shepherds: Ezekiel xxxvii. 24). But the implication of this clearly was that God was here killing people peaceful and helpless like sheep merely in order to punish their "owner." In mediæval and modern Jewish literature, however, the verse appears where communal responsibility proper is to be combated. Romanelli, in *Massa' ba-'Arab* 14, says that when in 1790 the new emperor of Morocco expressed the wish to have all Jews killed, one of his councillors told him: "Let thy hand be against them that wrong thee; but these sheep, what have they done?"

special feature of the case is not any peculiar kind of responsibility, but a peculiar kind of punishment: he was punished, on this occasion, in a way that affected his people, human beings. We are not surprised when we find slaves being put on a level with any dead kind of property. But we ought to recognize that even relationships of less absolute power and subordination may give rise to situations and dealings very similar to those occurring in connection with slavery. The pestilence deprived David of 70,000 free Israelites just as a rich owner of slaves might be deprived of a vast number of slaves. If a label is needed for this type of retribution, we must call it, not communal responsibility, but punishment of a ruler by taking away or damaging his free subjects: or, for short, ruler punishment.¹

Two more events from the life of David may be mentioned, both connected with the affair of Uriah. The first is the death of the child whom Bath-sheba bore to her lover.² This was not communal responsibility, though it may look similar. The child was not killed because he belonged to a community with a sinner in its midst. Admittedly, there would be nothing startling in this: the idea that all members of a family are punishable for the unexpiated transgression of one occurs in many ancient narratives. But it does not in the narrative under notice. David, the actual offender, alone was made responsible. As God's messenger informed him, he himself would have perished had he not shown perfect humility; but his contrition moved God to mitigate His judgment and only to take away his child. All the time the child was ill, David fasted and prayed for him. Clearly, it was David, and no one but him (except perhaps, Bath-sheba, his partner in the crime), at whom the blow was aimed. He was deprived of the child he valued just as he might have been deprived of his most precious jewel. This, like the case of the census, was a case of individual responsibility: retribution was exacted from him who had committed the wrong. Only, as in the case of the census, the punishment was of a peculiar kind: the piece of "property" by the loss of which the wrongdoer was punished happened to be a human being, and a free one at that. In the case of the census, it was a king who was chastised by the destruction of thousands of his people: in this case, it was a father who was chastised by the destruction of his son. The correct heading for both cases is not communal responsibility, but punishment of a ruler by taking away or damaging his free subjects.

The other incident to be quoted is particularly instructive: it is the warning* by the prophet that as David had committed adultery with Bath-sheba, so others would with his wives—an announcement foreshadowing the seizure of the king's harem by Absalom.³ Was the prophet speaking in terms of communal responsibility? The question sounds absurd, and, as far as I know, nobody has suggested that, according to the prophet, David's women were being punished on that basis or, for that matter, being punished at all: it is too manifest that David alone was intended, and made, to suffer. Yet, had the prophet foretold him the death of his wives instead of their capture by a rival, "communal responsibility"

¹ I am afraid the expression "ruler punishment," torn from the context, might be ambiguous: but I am introducing it for the sake of brevity. As may be seen from the argument, I do not mean by it (what I suppose the term as such might signify) liability of a ruler, guilty or innocent, for acts of his people. It ought to be quite clear that I use it as denoting the case where the wrong committed by a ruler is repaid to him by a move against those under his rule, by taking away or damaging his free subjects.

² 2 Samuel xii. 13 *sqq.*

³ 2 Samuel xii. 11 *sq.*, xvi. 22.

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would no doubt be the unanimous verdict in modern literature. But would the position be really different? Certainly not. Either the prophet had in mind retribution on the principle of communal responsibility, the women being made to answer for David's sin as members of his family; in that case we must admit that it was they whom God meant to chastise, not only if they were killed, but even if they were carried off by the young prince. Or the prophet had in mind retribution on the principle of individual responsibility, David himself being made to answer for his sin; in that case, we must admit that it was he whom God meant to chastise, not only if his women were taken by the prince, but even if they were killed. In actual fact, the latter interpretation alone can be correct. In the eyes of the prophet, David and no one but he deserved to be called to account; only he was to be hit in that peculiar manner I have tried to describe, by the loss of a piece of living, human "property." Punishment was inflicted on the basis of individual responsibility; only it took the form that I have labelled as ruler punishment. It has been shown how a king might be punished by the destruction of his men, and a father by that of his son: here we may see how the owner of a harem might be punished by the seizure of his women.

There are two points rendering this case especially valuable. In the first place, as the women were not actually hurt, unlike the victims of the pestilence or Bathsheba's son, the explanation of the punishment as an application of communal responsibility is *a priori* ruled out. But I have pointed out that it would make no relevant difference if they had been hurt. The case thus furnishes clear evidence that there was a type of punishment which, though free persons other than the real offender were affected, had nothing to do with communal responsibility; but must be accounted for by the fact that a sinner might be punished by being deprived of human "property" (his men if he was a king, his son if he was a father, his wife if he was a husband) just as well as by being deprived of any other goods. Where this kind of punishment involved hurting the subjects (as it did in the first two instances discussed, but not in this third one), we ought not to be misled as to the essential meaning and direction of the blow, just as we are not misled where a man was humiliated by a decimation of his slaves. In the second place, the prophet's speech itself leaves no doubt that, for him, the women in the harem were that piece of "property" by the loss of which David, the owner, was to be chastised. As the king had taken Uriah's wife, the prophet declared, so his wives were to be snatched from him. He was to be punished, that is, in a way fitting the crime: his crime had consisted in robbing the other man of his treasure—his "one little ewe lamb," in the words of the parable (again, there is this comparison between a ruler's subjects and sheep¹); so, in return, he was to be robbed of his treasure, his wives. Obviously, this signified, not communal responsibility, but precise retaliation by taking from the offender what he has taken from the wronged man. It was the same idea that underlies ancient rules such as that if a man tears out another's eye, he is to lose his own.

The examples adduced so far are all from the domain of theology: in all of them it is a matter of God exacting retribution from a sinner. The following are from law proper, with society exacting retribution from a criminal. It will be seen that there, too, may be met that punishment of a ruler by taking away or damaging his subjects. As regards the parties concerned, naturally, in the

¹ Again, as in 2 Samuel xxiv. 17 and 1 Chronicles xxi. 17, the idea of innocent helplessness is predominant.

province of law, we shall expect no cases of a king being deprived of his men (as David was after his census): it is difficult to imagine an ordinary provision laying down that if a king does this or that, a few thousand of his people are to be killed. What we may expect are cases of a father being deprived of his son (as David was of the child borne by Bath-sheba) and a husband being deprived of his wife (as David was of his harem). Again, as regards the occasions on which this type of punishment is chosen and the way it is applied, we shall not, in law proper, expect it to be inflicted for arrogance (as it was in the case of David's census), nor shall we expect a man to have to lose his son for committing adultery (as David lost the child borne by Bath-sheba). What we may expect is to find this type of punishment serving the purpose of exact retaliation, the purpose of taking from the offender what he has taken from his victim; what we may expect, for example, is to find a husband being deprived of his wife because he has deprived another man of his (as David's harem was appropriated by Absalom because he had appropriated the wife of Uriah).

In the *mishpatim*, one of the earliest codes of the Bible, it is ordained that, given certain conditions, the owner of an ox which kills a free person shall be put to death; and the law adds, somewhat mysteriously, that this rule is to apply also if the ox kills a free person's son or daughter.¹ The mysterious addition is by no means an empty phrase. According to the Code of Hammurabi, if an architect builds badly and the house collapses and kills its owner, the architect is to be put to death: but if the owner's son is killed, it is the architect's son who is to be put to death.² As was pointed out some forty years ago,³ the provision about the son and daughter in the *mishpatim* is directed against this kind of practice. It is always the owner of the wild ox himself—thus we have to understand the text—never his son or daughter, who is to lose his life. This interpretation, it seems to me, is confirmed by the fact that the rule about son and daughter does not show the usual form of rules in the *mishpatim*. Whilst most other rules begin with *ki* or *'im*, "if" (the former being put at the opening of a section, the latter introducing special cases within each section), the rule about son and daughter begins with *'o*, "or." The most probable reason is that it did not belong to the original stock from which the greater part of the material of the *mishpatim* was taken, but constitutes an amendment, replacing a different regulation that was much closer to that of the Code of Hammurabi.⁴

Now when we ask what is the striking element in that older regulation, or in that still preserved in the Code of Hammurabi, the answer will have to be, not communal responsibility, but ruler punishment. It is not as if the law treated as answerable and tainted all members of the guilty person's family. If that were the case, clearly, there would be no reason why it should not be the owner of the ox, or the architect, himself, or his wife, who was to be killed for the offence;

¹ Exodus xxi. 29 *sqq.*

² Par. 229 *sq.*

³ D. H. Müller, *Die Gesetze Hammurabis und ihr Verhältnis zur mosaischen Gesetzgebung*, pp. 166 *sqq.*

⁴ The only other provision in the *mishpatim* beginning with *'o*, "or," is Exodus xxi. 36, which I have already shown to belong to a section added to the original stock: see "Codes and Cudas in the Pentateuch," *Juridical Review*, 1941, pp. 252 *sqq.* I have also pointed out in that article (p. 261 n. 1) that the assumption of various strata in a code of the Pentateuch is not necessarily in conflict with orthodox Jewish teaching. For it is nowhere denied that there are elements in the Pentateuch which can be found also in other systems and may go back to a period long before the final giving of the Torah.

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whereas, in point of fact, we are expressly told that it must be his son if he has caused the death of another man's son, and his daughter if he has caused the death of another man's daughter. Moreover, if there were communal responsibility, it would be difficult to see why it should not be applied where the person killed by the wild ox, or by the house that collapses, is a *paterfamilias*; whereas we are told that, in this case, it is the owner of the ox, or the architect, himself who is to be put to death. The conclusion is obvious. The only person regarded as answerable is the owner of the ox or the architect, that is to say, the actual offender. But, in order to achieve precise retaliation, if the victim is another man's son or daughter, the law punishes him by depriving him of the same piece of "property" of which he has deprived the other man—and this means the putting to death of a third human being, a third free person who, being under the *potestas* or *manus* of the culprit, is treated almost as if he were his slave. The son of the wrongdoer is destroyed, not as guilty, but as the guilty man's "property."¹ The essential idea behind this regulation is no other than that which governs the old rules of retaliation in cases like a torn-out eye or a cut-off limb.

There is perhaps a further provision in the *mishpatim* directed against ruler punishment; I mean the provision saying that if a man hurts a woman with child and she not only miscarries but dies or suffers serious harm herself, "thou shalt give life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth . . ." ² This direct address, "thou shalt give," is very unusual in the *mishpatim*; the usual form would be, "he shall give." As in the case just discussed, the uncommon form may be explained by assuming—that the rule which belonged to the original stock (and which spoke of the wrongdoer in the third person) has been ejected and replaced by a better; by the one, in fact, which we now have before us. The Assyrian code seems to lay down that if a man hurts a woman with child, under certain circumstances his own wife is to be hurt in the same way.³ It is true that the precise text of this law is not established; but the main idea recurs in another law of the code of which we do know the text in full, and which says that if a married man violates an unmarried woman, that woman's father may take his wife from him and offer her to anyone ⁴ (one is reminded of David's wives being given to Absalom for his adultery with Bath-sheba). Similarly, the Code of Hammurabi provides that if a man strikes a woman with child and she dies, his daughter shall be put to death.⁵ The injunction in the *mishpatim*, "thou shalt give life for life . . .", quite possibly abolished some practice like the Assyrian and Babylonian: from now, this may have been the point of the innovation, punishment was on no account to affect the wrongdoer's wife or daughter; whatever harm might have come to the woman whom he hurt, his women should not suffer for it.⁶ Yet it would not be correct to conclude that the earlier system, which resembled the Assyrian and Babylonian, and according to which the wrongdoer's wife or daughter might have to suffer, was based on communal responsibility. Under that earlier system no less than under the new it was the offending individual alone who was

¹ According to D. H. Müller, *op. cit.*, p. 168, what the rule under notice does is "to shift the guilt from the parents to the children" ("die Schuld von den Eltern ab und den Kindern zuzuwälzen"). This explanation is quite wrong, but only to be expected so long as ruler punishment is not distinguished from communal responsibility.

² Exodus xxi. 23 *sqq.*

³ Par. 49.

⁴ Par. 54.

⁵ Par. 210.

⁶ Cp. D. H. Müller, *op. cit.*, pp. 152 *sq.*

called to account. The point of the abolished system, as of the Assyrian and Hammurabi's, was that it aimed at strict retaliation and, therefore, required that the offender should incur the same loss (the loss of a wife or daughter, namely, or of his wife's health—the women of a man's household being here deemed very much the same as slaves) that he had inflicted on the other man.

The foregoing remarks may suffice to show that when we find the family or compatriots of an offender being hurt by the punishment following the offence, this may be due to either of two different things. It may be the result of a certain type of responsibility, communal responsibility (as when the whole town in the fields of which a murder has taken place is considered in some sense guilty), or it may be the result of a certain mode of punishment of a ruler by taking away or damaging his free subjects (as when a man who causes the death of another man's child is deprived of his own). The two things must not be mixed up with one another: ruler punishment is far from confined to cases where the principle of communal responsibility is applied. Actually, for the sake of clarity, all the instances I have given above have been so chosen as to illustrate this. That ancient rule, for example, according to which a man who causes the death of another man's child is to lose his own is definitely based on individual responsibility: he who has perpetrated the crime, the father, and no one but he, is to be punished. It is only in consequence of the particular mode of punishment inflicted that, in physical fact, a third party is hurt. It should be added, however, that, very naturally, ruler punishment is possible also where communal responsibility prevails. The destruction of the Egyptian first-born is a good enough example.¹ It is based, to some extent at least, on the idea of communal responsibility: all Egyptians alike are made answerable by God, not only Pharaoh and his active accomplices, but even "the captive that was in the dungeon." And the mode of punishment is that which is here termed ruler punishment: the Egyptians are punished by losing each his most valuable "property," his first-born son.²

Should any further support be required of the thesis here maintained (namely, that one has to distinguish ruler punishment from communal responsibility), it is to be found in a notion well known from ancient literature: the notion, that is, that when a ruler's subjects, even though they be free men, are unlawfully attacked, it is the ruler, not themselves, whose rights are being infringed. It was "out of the hand of Jehoahaz," the king of Israel, that the Syrians snatched some cities, not from the inhabitants of the cities themselves;³ it was Uriah, not Bathsheba herself, whom David wronged by stealing her; and according to the Assyrian law which I have quoted and which deals with the rape of an unmarried woman by a married man, it is the woman's father, not herself, who may offer the criminal's wife to the public. All that evidently has no connexion with communal responsibility: it is a natural thing in a system under which the people of a king, or a man's wife, or his children, are, up to a point, his "property," not unlike slaves. To attack that "property" is to attack the king, the husband, the father,

¹ Exodus xi. 39.

² In a sense, the case of David's census also is a combination of ruler punishment with communal responsibility. For it was not David alone who was being punished by losing his subjects, but David and his house. This is clear from the prayer by which he implored God to stop the pestilence: "These sheep, what have they done? Let thine hand . . . be against me and against my father's house!"

³ 2 Kings xiii. 25.

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much as to attack a herd of cattle or a slave would be to attack the owner. But this notion, with which all historians are acquainted (and of which notable traces remain in present-day law), is the exact counterpart of that of ruler punishment. Just as it may be the ruler, not his free subjects, whose rights are violated by an unlawful attack on the latter, on his living, human pieces of "property," so it may be he who is punished by disasters affecting them.

One question arises. Why, it may be asked, if the suggestion propounded is correct, should ruler punishment, punishment of a ruler by taking away or damaging his free subjects, differ, in one interesting respect, from punishment affecting ordinary property, money, cattle, or slaves? For it looks as if there were a difference. Where a man is punished by being deprived of some of his ordinary property, as a rule, it is handed over to the person whom he has wronged; from now that person is to own and enjoy it. A thief, for instance, who has stolen a sheep and slaughtered it will have to return four other sheep to the victim of his theft, according to the *mishpatim*.¹ In the cases reviewed above, on the other hand, where the "property" in question is the free subjects of a ruler (the people of a king, a man's wife or child), the "property" is not given to the person wronged to remain, safe and sound, in his hands, but it is damaged or destroyed: the unsuccessful architect of Hammurabi's code, for example, has not to transfer his son to the man the death of whose son he has caused—his son is simply killed. Why is that so?

The answer is easy to find. Of ordinary property, broadly speaking, one piece is as good as another. It is reasonable, therefore, that a man who has interfered with another man's property should make amends by replacing what he has taken or damaged, by giving another, or several other, sheep for that which he has stolen, and so on. Difficulties, however, are bound to crop up as soon as we come to irreplaceable goods. An eye, for instance, is not replaceable like a sheep: the damage done by tearing out a man's eye just cannot be made good. In such cases, ancient systems sought to meet the requirements of justice by providing that the wrongdoer, as he could not replace the victim's eye, should at least lose his own.² Here lies the solution to our question. The free subjects of a ruler, his men if he is a king, his wife if he is a husband, his son if he is a father, are nearly always regarded as falling in that category of irreplaceable goods. Consequently, if an architect causes the death of somebody's son, or if a man violates somebody's daughter, he cannot make amends by giving the father his own child or wife to occupy, from now onwards, the place of the destroyed or damaged "property." As in the case of a torn-out eye, since replacing the wronged man's "property" by the offender's is impossible, justice, in ancient times, was achieved by inflicting the same measure of destruction on the offender's as he had inflicted on the wronged man's: the architect's son was to be put to death, the wife of the debauchee to be offered to anybody. There are, however, noteworthy exceptions to the rule that free subjects are considered irreplaceable, and they furnish decisive confirmation of the view here advanced. The Hittites, for example, appear to have deemed free persons almost as replaceable as cattle or slaves: under the code of Boghaz-keui a man whose wife or child has been killed can demand no more, it seems, than that the murderer hand over to him

¹ Exodus xxi. 37.

² Cp. my *Formalism and Progress in the early Roman Law of Delict*, Ph.D. dissertation, Cambridge, 1935, Appendix 2 (*In Legem Talionis Observatiuncula*), pp. 165 sqq.

four members of his own household (besides the corpse).¹ This is ruler punishment, punishment of a ruler by taking away his free subjects: and, in this case, the "property" is neither destroyed nor damaged. One is, in fact, tempted to speak here of property without the use of inverted commas. The free subjects are here treated exactly like money, cattle, or slaves: the owner transfers them to the wronged family, by way of restitution in kind, as on a provision of the *mis-patim* a thief has to give four sheep for that which he has stolen. Indeed, the only difference, according to Hittite law, between punishment in case a free man has been killed and punishment in case a slave has been killed, seems to be that four persons have to be given for the former, and only two for the latter.² Yet the Hittite case is by no means unique. Where larger units than the family are concerned, in particular, free subjects may, in certain connections, be regarded as replaceable even in our age. It is quite conceivable even now that a monarch who has been deprived of a number of subjects through the unlawful incursions of a neighbouring prince should require the cession of the same or a larger number in compensation. In the Middle Ages at any rate, and right up to the French Revolution, that a feudal lord should be punished by having to give up (or that he should generally deal in) free subjects was far from unheard of.³ From these extreme instances of ruler punishment, with the ruler having to transfer his subjects like cattle or slaves, it is a far cry indeed to communal responsibility, the making answerable the whole of a community, all equally and as equals, for a crime committed by any member.

Having (as I hope) established the distinction between communal responsibility and ruler punishment, I hasten to add that, in many cases, it is difficult to decide which of the two ideas has produced the result recorded; more than that, in many cases it is undeniably both ideas that have been at work at the same time. I have said that God's wreaking vengeance on all Egyptians, even "on the captive that was in the dungeon," is an example of communal responsibility: the whole nation was treated as answerable for, and tainted by, the crimes committed against Israel and its Lord. But very probably, a secondary purpose at least of the decimation of the Egyptians was to strike at Pharaoh as their ruler, their "owner." Here, then, the two notions, that of communal responsibility and that of ruler punishment, are closely interwoven. Further, I have said that when David's men perished through a pestilence, the main object was to impoverish him, their king, for his arrogance. Yet there are signs that the notion of the whole people being under a curse as a result of the census, of they themselves being made answerable for the offence, is not altogether alien to this narrative. Curiously enough, these signs are stronger in Chronicles than in Samuel. It is only in the version of Chronicles that Joab, warning the king against the census, says, "Why will he be a cause of trespass to Israel?", or that we are told how "God was displeased with this thing; therefore he smote Israel."⁴ Thus, again, the ideas of communal responsibility and ruler punishment are here very near

¹ I 1.

² I 2. Cp. also I 10, according to which paragraph he who wounds a man has to supply a substitute for the time that the wounded man is unable to work.

³ See, e.g., H. Mitteis, *Lehnrecht und Staatsgewalt*, pp. 586 sqq.; and especially p. 586 n. 188, where the author warns us against assuming that a certain gift of vassals in the eleventh century could not have taken place unless the vassals were unfree.

⁴ I Chronicles xxi. 3, 7. But in Samuel as well as Chronicles the opening verse of the narrative speaks of Israel as the object of God's anger: 2 Samuel xxiv. 1, I Chronicles xxi. 1.

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one another. There are a great number of instances like this. Whereas in the narrative of Isaac at Gerar the idea of communal responsibility is relatively undiluted, Abimelech assuming that if any member of the nation had taken Rebekah, the whole nation would have been guilty,¹ in the similar stories of Abraham in Egypt and at Gerar the idea of ruler punishment also seems to come in, however faintly. The kings of Egypt and Gerar took Sarah, Abraham's wife, into their harems, believing her to be his sister only; whereupon God inflicted diseases on them and their households. It appears that these plagues were not sent merely in application of the principle of communal responsibility; it was not merely that the two nations were tainted by a sin in their midst. There was also the object of punishing the actual wrongdoers, the kings of Egypt and Gerar, by making their wives sterile, their "property" useless.²

I cannot here go into the many very complicated cases of this kind. At the risk, however, of confusing where I should wish to enlighten, I have to state a little more fully what is their nature and how they can be explained. It may be noticed that there are two ways in which communal responsibility and ruler punishment may be combined. The one, very simple, I mentioned above,³ and am not now concerned with. It is the case where men, made responsible as members of a community, are for some reason or other punished in that peculiar mode that I am calling ruler punishment, i.e. by having their free subjects damaged or destroyed. For example, when God slew the first-born in Egypt, the Egyptians, one may say, were called to account by Him as members of a sinful nation (communal responsibility), and their punishment consisted in the loss by each of them of his most valuable "property," his eldest son (ruler punishment). There is, however, another way in which communal responsibility and ruler punishment may meet (or better, clash) and it is this only with which I am here dealing; namely, the case where men are made responsible as members of a community, but, at the same time, we can discern within that community a ruler on the one hand and all the rest as his subjects on the other, the former to be the main loser by the misfortunes befalling the community. When God slew the first-born in Egypt, the Egyptians were called to account by Him as members of a sinful nation (communal responsibility). At the same time, however, Pharaoh occupied the place of ruler and the rest of the people were his subjects; and the death of the first-born was intended not only as punishment of the Egyptians *qua* members of a sinful nation (communal responsibility) but also as a blow against Pharaoh, the wicked ruler of the land (ruler punishment). It is in cases like this, where the same group is considered communally responsible and yet divided into ruler and subjects, the latter's disasters being regarded as so much damage done to the former's "property," that there is a real tension between communal responsibility and ruler punishment. Logically, these cases are most unsatisfactory; logically, we might argue that if the Egyptians were punished on the basis of communal responsibility, as members of a guilty nation, they cannot have been decimated, like cattle, as Pharaoh's, the wrongdoer's, "property"; and if they were decimated, like cattle, as Pharaoh's, the wrongdoer's, "property," they cannot have been punished as themselves guilty. But life and literature are not always governed by strict logic. The tension under notice, the clash of communal responsibility and ruler punishment, in general reflects a tension in the structure of the community concerned. To keep to the question of the Egyptians and

¹ Genesis xxvi. 10.

² Genesis xii. 17, xx. 9, 17 sq.

³ See p. 28.

Pharaoh, on the one hand, the Egyptians, as depicted in the Bible, were a community of free men, capable of making decisions, of performing good deeds and committing crimes, and so on. Judged from that point of view, they might well be made answerable, all of them, for what they did to the Israelites. On the other hand, they had a king, Pharaoh, who directed the policy of the country and to whom, in a sense, they belonged. Judged from this point of view, it was Pharaoh who deserved to be punished and, as a great king, might be most terribly hit by the loss of his "possessions," by a decimation of his free subjects. Surely, in an age like ours, there should be some understanding for this kind of complication.

As already remarked, I cannot here examine all cases of this type. One important group, however, I wish to draw attention to: the family curse, perhaps the most frequent case where we can have difficulty in deciding whether the basis of the result is communal responsibility or ruler punishment, and where quite often it is both. In modern treatises on the subject, the family curse is invariably taken to be an illustration of the principle of communal responsibility pure and simple. But the instances when this is the sole idea behind it are rare indeed. Unfortunately, the problems involved are too knotty to be here elaborated. Suffice it to say that the head of a house at any time, and especially the founder or would-be founder of a famous house, was regarded in ancient times as something of the ruler, of the principally interested "owner," of the house, even of the as yet unborn generations. Hence it comes that nearly always when a family curse is being announced to an offender, the idea of communal responsibility, of all members of the family being answerable for, and tainted by, his offence, appears side by side with the idea of ruler punishment, of his being punished, as the actually guilty individual, by the disasters to befall his sons and grandsons. When Eli was told that "there shall not be an old man in thine house for ever,"¹ no doubt both notions were at work: the idea that his whole family was tainted by the crimes committed by himself and his sons, and the idea that he, as the first great chief of the house, was to be punished by the misfortunes to visit his descendants. Again, when David, after his adultery with Bath-sheba, was warned by the prophet that "therefore the sword shall never depart from thine house,"² one of the underlying ideas may indeed have been that the whole family was answerable for what he had done; but, in this case, the idea of ruler punishment seems unquestionably to have been predominant—David, the first founder of what he hoped would be a famous line, was to be punished by the calamities befalling his successors.³ I need hardly add that what is true of the family curse is true also of hereditary blessing: and the very fact that it can be shown to apply to hereditary blessing in turn supports the observations made with regard to the family curse. Abraham, for showing himself willing to sacrifice Isaac, his beloved son, to God, was promised, "I will multiply thy seed as the stars of the heaven . . . and thy seed shall possess the gate of his enemies."⁴ This meant communal merit (corresponding to communal responsibility) inasmuch as the whole family was treated as sanctified by what one member had done. But it

¹ 1 Samuel ii. 32.

² 2 Samuel xii. 10.

³ A number of Jewish authorities, ancient and living, hold that the penalty of *Kareth* (which, according to the Torah, is inflicted by God for certain most grave transgressions) consists in the offender's house being doomed to eventual extirpation. I am convinced that an analysis of their remarks would show that the notion of ruler punishment plays a very great part.

⁴ Genesis xxii. 17.

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also meant "ruler reward" (corresponding to ruler punishment), reward of the present head of the house and its first founder, inasmuch as his "property," his house, was to be increased in order to please and repay him, as an individual, for his splendid act of faith.

There is a rough test (it is far from infallible) that sometimes enables us to see whether the infliction of a family curse rests on communal responsibility or on the idea of ruler punishment: we can, when we come across the announcement of a family curse, ask ourselves whether the curse would have been imposed even if the offence in question had been done by a minor member of the family. For example, would the prophet have cursed David's house even if an insignificant son of his had committed adultery? If the reply is "Yes," then, clearly, the idea of communal responsibility is predominant: for then, clearly, the idea is that the offence of any member of a family affects all equally. If the reply is "No," however, there is a presumption that the curse is meant mainly as a punishment of the offending individual, and that if third persons are affected it is only because he is treated as their "owner" and they, his subjects, as his "property," by whose destruction he can be most effectively struck. (The same test, of course, may be applied to cases of family blessing, such as that of Abraham. Would his house have been blessed even if any of his near relatives had performed a good deed, or was it not rather a blessing chiefly intended to reward himself, as an individual?) I believe the answer in the majority of cases would have to be something between "Yes" and "No," but nearer "No"; which implies that in the majority of cases we have at least to consider whether the notion of ruler punishment is not the main element, rather than that of communal responsibility.

The reservation that the ideas of communal responsibility and ruler punishment may form the joint basis of one result, or that it may be impossible to pronounce which of them forms the basis, does not mean that quite frequently it is not clearly this idea or that which is solely responsible. When a whole town is made answerable for a murder committed in its midst, it is definitely communal responsibility; when an architect who has caused the death of a child has to lose his own, it is definitely ruler punishment. In any case, the question whether, and how far, we have before us one idea or the other ought always to be put. For the two have very different histories and reflect very different religious, social, and economic factors. As the only object of these pages is to establish the distinction between them, I do not propose to pursue this subject any further. I shall only, in conclusion, call attention to a few items, chosen more or less at random, to show that the distinction is important not only as such but also as leading to further deductions. One thing to notice is that the two ideas have not got the same origins. It is conceivable, certainly, that, in some connexions, one of them may have evolved out of the other. It is possible, for example, though anything but likely, that the idea of all members of a family being answerable for what one of them does somehow grew from the idea that the *paterfamilias* may be punished by having his subject destroyed or damaged; and it is probable that, when a democratic community came under the control of a dictator, the idea of communal responsibility in certain domains changed into the idea that the ruler might be punished by having to lose his subjects. Be this as it may, in most cases the development of one idea from the other is out of the question. The communal responsibility of a city for a murder committed within its boundaries certainly does not go back to any kind of ruler punishment; and the punishment

of a man who has violated another man's wife by taking away his own does not go back to any kind of communal responsibility. The origins of the two ideas are different. As it would lead too far afield, within the scope of this article, to trace them, I shall say no more about them.

Similarly, the factors making for the abandonment, partial or complete, of the two ideas are not the same. True, the main element in all attacks directed against them is the same: the feeling, namely, that no man should suffer except for his very own sin. When David asked God to stop the pestilence, he was asking Him to stop ruler punishment; and his main argument was that his subjects were blameless and should not, therefore, be hurt: "Lo, I have sinned . . . but these sheep, what have they done? Let thine hand, I pray thee, be against me." The ceremony to be performed when a murdered man is discovered near a town is destined to avert communal responsibility; and here, too, the main argument is the innocence of those who, if communal responsibility were applied, would suffer: "Our hands have not shed this blood, neither have our eyes seen it," such is the prayer to be recited by the elders of the city. But, except for this idea that no man should be harmed unless it were for his own offence, it is very different factors which make for a weakening of the two notions of communal responsibility and ruler punishment; or, more precisely, it is different factors which bring to active life that idea of the injustice of suffering innocently in the two cases. Communal responsibility goes where the bonds holding together a unit are loosened (or, what is the same, where the individuals composing a unit acquire more and more independence), where the view of the contagiousness of sin recedes into the background, and also where a unit comes to be regarded as so impotent as no longer to be capable of responsibility. That the ceremony prescribed in Deuteronomy in case a murdered man is found near a city is possible shows that the city is no longer considered, in this connexion, as an indivisible unit (the bonds holding together the individual citizens are loosened) and that the crime of murder is no longer considered as absolutely corrupting all that come into contact with it (the view of the contagiousness of sin is disappearing): the guilty and innocent can now be separated from one another. If a democracy becomes a monarchy and the king alone is now made answerable where all citizens would have been answerable before, it is because the citizens are now insignificant, the king deciding for them and bearing the consequences of his actions (the community is no longer capable of responsibility). Ruler punishment goes where the power of the ruler over his subjects becomes less absolute (or, what is the same, where the subjects become his equals). When David entreated God not to continue killing his subjects for their ruler's offence, he was thereby recognizing his subjects as, in certain respects, real men like himself. He still called them "sheep," since they were incapable of acting for themselves, used to looking up to him as their master and protector, and, above all, not prone to the sin of arrogance for which the pestilence had been sent. He perceived, however, that they were not like inanimate property at all, but would bleed if pricked and die if poisoned.¹

¹ There is another passage in the Bible where God is asked to attack a man directly and not by striking at his subjects, Job ii. 4 sq. But the request there springs from a very different attitude. David asked God to punish him personally and not by slaying his subjects, because he no longer regarded his subjects like dead property. In Job, Satan asks God to torture the hero personally and not by slaying his family, because he knows that having one's body hurt is worse for most men than losing one's property, even the dearest: the idea that it is not right to treat free subjects as "property" and to hit the "owner" by damaging them is not here present at all.

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It is not my task here to set out when that happens that the bonds holding together a unit are loosened, the view of the contagiousness of sin disappears, a unit becomes incapable of responsibility, or the power of rulers over their free subjects grows less absolute. From what I have said, it is easy to see that there is little room for communal responsibility in private law, concerned as it is with the rights of the single individual, or in a non-religious (or secularized) and non-political sphere, since there the idea of *miasma*, the contagiousness of crime, would not be prominent. Communal responsibility persists longest in the religious and political sphere, with large units and emphasis being laid on the contagiousness of crime (in the political sphere, this idea, of course, assumes a less mystic form, but it would be rash to say that it is not a very real force). In contradistinction, ruler punishment may well occur in private law, or in a completely non-religious and non-political sphere.¹ Thus the decay of communal responsibility and of ruler punishment takes place at different times and in different ways. Ruler punishment may well persist where there is no trace of communal responsibility. In the Code of Hammurabi and the Assyrian and Hittite codes we have found several examples (the architect, the man who hurts a woman with child, the married man who rapes an unmarried woman, the murderer who gives a few substitutes to the wronged family), and in the *mishpatim* ruler punishment seems to be just abolished: yet there are few signs in all these of the idea that the whole community is answerable for, and corrupted by, the crime of one. Again, communal responsibility may well persist where no trace is left of ruler punishment. In Deuteronomy, communal responsibility in case of a murdered man being found near a town is just abolished, and it is still present in the rule that he who builds a house must make a battlement round the roof, "that thou bring not blood upon thine house if any man fall from thence."² Yet there are few signs in the laws of Deuteronomy of ruler punishment. With the history and background of the two ideas so different, it becomes essential to ask questions such as: Against which idea is the famous injunction "The fathers shall not be put to death for the children . . ." directed,³ communal responsibility or ruler punishment? Or against both? Which idea had the prophets in mind when they prophesied Israel's downfall to its wicked kings?⁴ Did they mean that the kings would be punished for their sins by their people's ruin (ruler punishment)? Or that the whole people would have to answer for the sins committed by its rulers (communal responsibility)? Or both? Which is the idea chiefly underlying the curse pronounced upon Adam? In the treatment of original sin by ancient and mediæval writers, when is the idea of communal responsibility predominant and when that of ruler punishment? These questions could be multiplied only too easily.

The thesis here advanced applies to non-Jewish sources as well as to Jewish. There is a vast amount of literature dealing with the family curse in Greek sagas, for example, and it all suffers from the defect that ruler punishment is not distinguished from communal responsibility: wherever a third person is hurt in

¹ I must apologize for using the terms "religious" and "political" in their traditional, popular sense. I am fully aware, of course, that a husband's *potestas* over his wife and children has religious and political foundations; and that, from this point of view, ruler punishment in private law is also religious and political.

² xxii. 8.

³ Deuteronomy xxiv. 16. Cp. 2 Kings xiv. 6, Ezekiel xviii. (in particular xviii. 19 *sqq.*).

⁴ e.g. 2 Kings xxi. 10 *sqq.*

consequence of the punishment of a crime, communal responsibility is the label most readily attached to the case. In a recent book on Aeschylus, the author says,¹ with reference to the curse lying on the house of Atreus, that originally "for those who think in terms of communal responsibility, a father is, so to speak, directly affected by the suffering of his son." The truth is that in the sagas of the house of Atreus, as in many others, there are two ideas playing each an important part: the idea that any member of the house is responsible for the sins committed by any other, and the idea that a father (and, particularly, the first founder of a house) may be punished by the destruction of his "property," his descendants. These ideas sometimes are almost blended into one; sometimes this may be in the foreground; sometimes that. But the distinction ought to be recognized—be it only in order that we may draw the right conclusions as to the structure of the group concerned. To leave the topic of family curse, the same author adduces the first book of the Iliad as an illustration of communal responsibility² (following, in this, the universally accepted interpretation). He is right, but he misses just a subtle element. For the army is visited by a pestilence not only because they must all suffer for the grave sin committed by some of them (though this is the main reason); but also (though this is here only a very secondary motif) because this decimation of the army is a terrible blow for the actual sinners, the sons of Atreus, the leaders of the war. The latter element comes from the domain of ruler punishment.

¹ B. Daube (my brother), *Zu den Rechtsproblemen in Aischylos' Agamemnon*, p. 156. The words are: "In solcher Denkform (referring to the most ancient view of *Kollektivhaftung*, communal responsibility) wird der Vater gleichsam direkt betroffen, wenn der Sohn leidet."

² *L.c.*

THE VALIDITY OF PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY RESULTS

By J. G. FERRABY

PUBLIC Opinion Research is now leaving its swaddling clothes and taking its place as a branch of social science. A survey of some of the theoretical implications of the present stage of progress of the science is therefore not out of place. Certain profitable lines of development will be suggested which have from the start been implicit in the methods used by Mass-Observation,¹ the organization with which the writer works. Recent developments have made it possible to relate these principles to the theory of Public Opinion Research as a whole.

All the problems of Public Opinion Research are summed up in the problem of the validity of survey results. The problem, briefly stated, is this. Opinion exists in the mind of the individual, and is expressed by words and actions. No words or actions, however, can form a complete expression of the opinion of an individual. Public opinion is the sum of all the individual opinions of the group considered. Any survey of public opinion must therefore necessarily make several approximations in order to present a report on public opinion in manageable form. The validity of the report is the resultant accuracy of *all* the approximations made.

The raw material is the attitudes existing in the minds of the population. The aim of the survey is to create in the minds of those reading the reports impressions which enable them to understand the nature of these attitudes. In order to do this, it is necessary first that a representative sample of the population should be selected; second, that the attitudes of the individuals making up the sample should be expressed in words or action; third, that these words and actions should be collected and analysed; fourth, that the results of the analysis should be presented in the form of a report; fifth, that the report should create impressions in the mind of the reader of the report. At each of these five stages there is the possibility, even the certainty, of error; or put in another way, each transformation from one stage to the next involves an approximation.

Before 1936 no attempt was made to limit the error in the first stage of the process. With the coming of modern methods of sampling, great attention was paid to this type of error, with astounding results. On clear-cut issues, such as the way in which people were going to vote, it became possible to prophesy to within about 3 per cent. how many votes each candidate would get. For a time this seemed to be considered sufficient, but gradually it began to be realized that when the matter is not one leading to clear-cut action such as voting for this or that candidate, the errors arising in the second stage of transformation became important. Simple approval or disapproval of a proposition, or the choice from given alternatives, gave information which was easily classifiable; but it told nothing of the intensity with which the verbally expressed opinion was held, the reasons for holding it, the extent to which it was related to other attitudes; in fact it told nothing of the attitude in the mind of the contact which led to the verbal expression actually recorded as his opinion.

¹ Mass-Observation is an independent organization founded by Tom Harrisson in 1937. It pays much more attention to qualitative material, such as the verbatim comments of the contacts, than is usual in Public Opinion Research. The present writer has worked with Mass-Observation for four years, but although this paper is based on the experience he gained in this work, the views expressed are his own, and not necessarily the official views of Mass-Observation.

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The tendency at present seems to be to explore the possible means of limiting this error. Some headway has been made, but no method has yet been found which is so far ahead of other suggested methods that research can be confined to the improvement of existing procedure, instead of the finding of new methods. When such a procedure is discovered, Public Opinion Research will take a step forward as decisive as that taken when modern sampling methods were just adopted. It may happen, of course, that different investigations will always require different procedures, and one alone will not be sufficient, but it should in time become possible to limit the accepted procedures to a few, from which choice can be made to meet the needs of particular cases.

This is where Public Opinion Research appears to stand at present. It is awakening to the fact that the discovery of modern sampling methods alone does not put an end to error. But it is not yet conscious of the full implications of the various approximations which are made.

It is still customary to express the results of Public Opinion Surveys mainly in the form of figures, reference being sometimes made to the statistical significance of the figures. But what is of ultimate importance is not the statistical significance of the figures; it is the validity of the impressions created by the report in the minds of its readers. For example, when Mosley was released in this country there was a wave of indignation which was a result of all the frustrations and restrictions of four years of war. To a large extent these focused on Herbert Morrison personally. A survey of attitudes to Morrison which allowed only the opinion "favourable" and "unfavourable" to be expressed would have given an entirely false picture of the real attitude to anyone reading the report. The statistical significance of the figures might have been .001, but nevertheless the validity of the impression created by the report would have been small.

The problem of validity has two aspects. On the one hand, it is necessary to increase validity by paying greater attention to the errors arising in the second, third, fourth, and fifth stages of transformation. And on the other hand, it is necessary to devise some sort of criteria by which the validity of results and final impressions can be judged.

It seems to the writer that no great progress can be made in either direction until there has been a profound change in the attitude of many workers in the field to the errors arising from the third stage of transformation, the analysing of expressed opinion. Even before the evolving of modern sampling methods, it was accepted as axiomatic that when any question was asked, it should be presented in a form admitting of a few clearly defined alternative answers. If this was not done, it was said, it was not possible accurately to classify the replies, so that the figures obtained would not be accurate.

This is true so far as it goes, but the method minimizes the third error only at the cost of increasing the second, the error arising from expressing attitudes in terms of words. It gives the appearance of accuracy without giving any real validity. It is suggested that, now the second error is being seriously investigated, the time has come to restore the balance, and when occasion arises to reduce the second error even at the cost of increasing the third. Already tentative experiments in the technique of classification of verbatim material are being made, and there is some hope that in time progress will be made in this direction. It will then be possible to obtain fuller information concerning the real attitudes of people to the problems investigated while still retaining some measure of control over the errors introduced by the classification of the material collected. In parenthesis

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it may be mentioned that such classification can be made for several variables independently; for example, the same material could be classified according to the intensity with which the opinion is held, the reasons for which it is held, the aspects of the problem to which most attention is given, and in other ways.

The fourth and fifth errors present a rather different problem. So long as figures only are considered desirable, the presentation of the results of analysis presents no difficulty. But figures have to be interpreted before they can create an impression in the mind of the reader of the report. The interpretation and presentation of the results of analysis therefore are a real problem. It has often in the past been considered sufficient to present only the numerical results, rather on the principle that if any mistake is made in interpreting the meaning of the information supplied, that is no concern of the report writer. But it is possible to collect material which will greatly assist the interpretation of any figures obtained, and it seems to the writer to be part of the investigator's duty both to collect such material and to present it in the form which will create as nearly as possible the right impression in the mind of the reader of the report.

Such material will usually consist of verbatim comments made by the contacts, perhaps also of observations and comments made in informal conversations; perhaps also of analysis of personal attitudes by a panel of correspondents; perhaps also of case-histories, or other items. There is a large variety of material of this type which can be collected to help the investigator to interpret the main conclusions of the investigation and to pass on his interpretation in as objective a form as possible to the reader of the report. If this is done, the selection of the material to go in the report introduces a source of error which was before negligible, since not only must the collection of this material be carefully planned, but also a subjective selection from it must be made for inclusion in the report. Against this new error, however, must be set the reduction in the much bigger error arising from faulty interpretation of figures in the fifth error. The writer believes that this reduction in the fifth error so far outweighs the increase in the fourth error that there can be no doubt as to the advisability of the procedure suggested. In the example already quoted, such material would have made it clear that any figures for the attitudes of people to Herbert Morrison after the release of Mosley were unusual in that the release of Mosley had acted as a symbol for many war frustrations.

It seems, therefore, that to increase the validity of survey results beyond their present state, two new approaches are necessary. The assumption that investigations must necessarily take the form of presenting a few alternatives from which the contact makes a choice must be abandoned, and the responsibility of the investigator for guiding the interpretation put upon the results by the reader of the report must be recognized. It remains to discuss the criteria by which the validity of results may be judged.

So long as the criteria for judging validity are assumed to be purely numerical, they present no difficulty. The criteria of statistical significance are arbitrary, but they are universally accepted. But true validity is not capable of numerical measurement. It is not possible to measure by figures the relation between the impression in the mind of the reader of the report and the attitudes in the minds of the individual contacts. This is an uncharted sea whose navigation may call for a reorientation of scientific approach.

Certain facts may be pointed out. Supposing that it is desired to investigate the popularity of Winston Churchill in the British Isles. The most straight-

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forward approach is to ask a question the replies to which can be classified as "favourable" and "unfavourable." When the difference between the figures obtained at two different periods of time is more than three times the standard deviation of the difference, the result is statistically significant, and the chance that the difference is due to sampling error is less than $1/300$.

Now suppose that instead of using this very straightforward method, we ask the question of only half the people contacted, and ask the other half instead whether or not they would like Churchill as Prime Minister after the war. This measures a different aspect of Churchill's popularity. Supposing now that we find over an interval of time there is a change in the figures arising from each half of the sample of twice the standard deviation. Each difference taken alone is not statistically significant, there being a chance of about $1/20$ that each difference is due to sampling error. But, in assuming that the first question measured the popularity of Churchill, we were in effect assuming that there was some measurable variable, "the popularity of Churchill," which was directly associated with the answers to the question. The chance that Churchill's popularity had varied would not be exactly the same as the chance that the variation in the figures obtained were not due to sampling error, unless the correlation between Churchill's popularity and the answers to the question were exactly unity. In actual fact, this can be seen subjectively not to be the case. There is no reason to suppose that Churchill's popularity is more closely associated with the replies to the first question than to the replies to the second.

It will now be shown that the second method, the use of two small samples each of which is asked a different question bearing on Churchill's popularity, is the more accurate.

In the first method we take as the limits of sampling error three times the standard deviation. Let the chance that this leads us to make a false inference be e . There is also another error to be reckoned with, the chance that a real change in the replies to the question do not signify a real change in the popularity of Churchill. Let the chance be p . p is independent of the size of the sample. Since the question has been chosen to throw light on the popularity of Churchill, it is legitimate to assume that p is small, and we know e to be small. Consequently the real chance of making a mistake is $e + p$, for we can neglect the chance ep that both causes will be producing an error at the same time.¹

In the second method, if we take a sample half the size of the first, the standard deviation is about 1.4 times what it is in the first method. Suppose we take as limit of sampling error only twice the standard deviation of the smaller sample, which is about 2.8 times the standard deviation of the first method. The chance of making a mistake through sampling error is approximately $17e + p$.

Now suppose the second question in the second method has as much bearing on Churchill's popularity as the first question, that is, p is the same in each case. The chance of making a mistake through considering the second question alone is also $17e + p$.

Further, suppose that replies to both of the questions indicate a change in the same direction in popularity of Churchill. The chance that a mistake has been made in *both* cases is $(17e + p)^2$. But e is equal to $.0027$. It can be shown easily that $(17e + p)^2$ is less than $e + p$ so long as p is less than about $9/10$. No one would dream of asking a question to examine the popularity of Churchill which in

¹ The argument is the same if the term is included, but for the sake of simplicity it has been left out.

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nine cases out of ten gave the wrong answer. Therefore it is safe to say that in every case the second method gives numerically more reliable results than the first.

Moreover, in the second investigation, not only was a numerically more accurate estimate of Churchill's popularity obtained; information was also obtained about another aspect of his popularity. It might have been found, for example, that the wish for Churchill to be Prime Minister after the war had decreased, whereas his immediate apparent popularity had increased. This would be a valuable addition to the knowledge gained from the investigation.

The mathematical argument can be given a much wider importance when it is discussed in non-mathematical terms. What it amounts to is that the consistency of the results of different investigations very considerably increases the validity of each of the results. Two smallish investigations of different aspects of a problem may give a more valid result than one largish investigation of one aspect only. Moreover, there is present the whole time the unseen error of the transformation of mental attitudes into verbal statements. Any method which reduces this error increases the validity of the results, even though it were to decrease the apparent accuracy of the figures obtained.

Just as the estimate of the association between the attitude it is desired to measure and the expressed opinion actually measured is a subjective one, so the estimate of consistency of different investigations is subjective. It is often, however, possible to check the estimate subjectively. It might happen, for example, that criticism of the government accompanied a rise in the immediate popularity of Churchill and a fall in the desire to have him as post-war Prime Minister. A subjective estimate of the situation could be that people were content with the government's prosecution of the war but not with their attitude to home policy, in which case the results would be consistent. Further investigations could then be made to discover whether this was so, *and these could be on a very small scale*. For probabilities have to be multiplied, not added, and three investigations which had a chance of even one in ten that they were not due to sampling error would divide the chance that the subjective estimate of the situation was wrong by 1,000.

Moreover, dissatisfaction with the government's home policy and satisfaction with its conduct of the war might easily be so strongly marked that it would become apparent the moment a few verbatim comments on the subject were collected. If it was strong enough to interfere with Churchill's popularity, this is very probable. And this introduces another way in which validity can be subjectively estimated.

Normally a change in attitude with time is brought about by practical events. If, therefore, the reasons why people have the attitude they do is investigated, any change in attitude should be reflected in a change in the reasons given. This change will very often be not a change simply in the frequency with which the reasons are given, but will be shown also by the introduction of entirely new reasons. When a change in attitude takes place and it is found that new reasons are given it can be subjectively estimated that the change in attitude is a real one and not due to sampling error. Even if no change is noticed in the figures for the various attitudes expressed, it is likely that there has been a qualitative change if there is a change in the reasons given. This is a case where the advantages of a subjective estimate of validity over a numerical test of significance is obvious.

But it is not only changes in reasons given which can be used in this way.

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Any evidence of qualitative change of attitude is adequate. Such evidence can often be obtained by recording the full verbatim comments of the contact. Consistency in verbatim comments or between numerical results and verbatim comments is therefore an important element in estimating validity.

When it is absolute values, not changes, which are being considered, such qualitative checks on validity can still be used. For they provide a basis on which the consistency of the results with other investigations can be estimated. For example, these remarks might show that sympathy with miners on strike was related to a belief that mines should be nationalized, although all other war-time strikes were disapproved strongly.

One other check on validity is worth mentioning. When similar or related investigations are repeated over a period of time, it often becomes possible to see a trend in the results obtained which is self-consistent. For example, small weekly investigations of the attitudes to fighting on a particular front may show a consistent trend, either up or down, over several weeks, and the verbatim comments, the daily news, and other factors may be consistent with such trends. This is a particular case of the consistency of different investigations, and it is subject to the same considerations as the examples already discussed. It is possible by using quite small samples to obtain consistent results, and this makes the more or less continuous coverage of particular items a practical possibility.

The methods of applying these checks on validity still need much working out. But the practical experience of Mass-Observation shows that they have vast possibilities. The greater resources of American workers in the field of Public Opinion Research should make it possible for them to develop the methods discussed at a far greater rate than is possible in Great Britain where Public Opinion Research is not yet recognized as a science.

SUMMARY

(1) An investigation of public opinion seeks to turn the attitudes in the minds of the population investigated into an impression on the mind of the reader of the report. In doing this, five stages of transformation are used. Each transformation is only an approximate representation of the stage before.

(2) The five transformations are: (i) The selection of a representative sample of the population. (ii) The expression of opinion in words and action. (iii) The collection and analysis of opinions. (iv) The presenting of the analysis as a report. (v) The formation of an impression in the minds of the readers of the report.

(3) The introduction of modern methods of sampling limited the errors of the first transformation. Attention is now being turned to the errors of the second transformation.

(4) Too great weight has hitherto been given to errors of the third transformation.

(5) Investigators should acknowledge responsibility for guiding the impressions aroused by their report, in the minds of readers of their reports. If this is done, the attention paid to errors in the fourth and fifth transformations needs adjustment.

(6) The aim must be to increase the final validity of the report even at the expense of accuracy of any figures obtained.

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(7) The chief test of validity is the consistency of the results of different investigations.

(8) The consistency of qualitative results is an even more important test than the consistency of numerical results.

(9) Checks on validity are in need of much research, and this can be more easily done in America, where Public Opinion Research is already recognized as a science.

A PRELIMINARY STUDY OF SOME SOCIAL ASPECTS OF AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS CYCLES

By KENNETH F. WALKER

I. AIM, SCOPE, AND METHOD OF ENQUIRY

THE social aspects of the business cycle have been an object of interest to social scientists for many years, and detailed studies have been made of the statistical data relating to Britain and the United States (cf. D. Thomas (6)). Although trade cycles in Australia have received considerable attention from economists, there has been no systematic investigation of their social consequences. This paper gives the results of a preliminary study of Australian data, and compares them with results reported for other countries.

In view of the preliminary nature of the enquiry it was confined to statistics readily available in official Australian publications. These statistics do not relate to the whole range of influences that business cycles might be expected to have on Australian social life, but a fairly complete picture may be obtained from them. Series were available relating to the following: births, marriages, extra-legal unions, divorces, deaths, infant and maternal mortality, expenditure on education by State Governments, admissions to hospitals, crime, drunkenness, suicide, and admissions to mental hospitals. In some cases the data extend from 1871 to 1939; the majority of series, however, commence early in this century.

An index of cyclical fluctuations in general economic activity was already available for 1870-1923 from the work of Wilson (8), and this index was carried forward to 1935. This index consists of an arithmetic average of the cyclical fluctuations of the following series:

- A. Wholesale Price Index.
- B. Export Price Index.
- C. Total Value of Exports.
- D. Total Value of Imports.
- E. Velocity of Credit (Sydney and Melbourne bank clearings divided by deposits not bearing interest in N.S.W. and Victorian banks).
- F. Percentage of Trade Union Members Unemployed (reversed).

A nine-year moving average was used to estimate trend. The index was found to correlate reasonably well with cycles in other countries (cf. Wilson (8, pp. 87-8)).

Cyclical fluctuations of each of the series of social statistics about a nine-year moving average were correlated with the business cycle index by the Pearson product-moment formula. The method of nine-year moving averages was chosen to estimate trend partly because it had been used by Wilson in constructing the business cycle index, and partly because more laborious, though possibly more accurate, methods were thought to be unwarranted in a preliminary study. It seems unlikely that more refined methods would increase the accuracy of the results greatly, in view of the high positive correlation (+.95) which Thomas obtained between results based on parabolic trends and the moving average method respectively, using American data (cf. Thomas (6, p. 64)).

Following Thomas, a correlation coefficient of .30 or more was considered

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significant for a small sample ($n = 18$ or more), while for a larger sample ($n = 55$ or more) a coefficient of $\cdot 20$ was taken to be significant, provided always that it exceeded its standard deviation.

In the following account of the results, although attention is confined principally to cyclical fluctuations, in some instances comment is made upon the trend of the social statistics, since this appears to be the first investigation in which a number of them have been reviewed.

2. MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY IN RELATION TO THE BUSINESS CYCLE

The coefficient of correlation between fluctuations in marriage rates and business cycles is given in Table 1. Coefficients have been computed on the assumptions that marriage rates lag two years, one year, and not at all. A marked relationship is evident, and although the correlation with marriage rates lagging two years is lower, it is still high enough to indicate that the influence of depression and prosperity on the frequency of marriage extends for at least two years.

These results agree with those obtained by Thomas for Great Britain over the period 1854-1913. She found that the coefficient dropped from $+ \cdot 67$ to $+ \cdot 45$ when marriage rates were lagged one year. For a group of American States, Thomas obtained a correlation of $+ \cdot 66$ for the period 1870-1920, while the coefficient for the period 1874-1916 was $+ \cdot 81$, using a different method of eliminating trend. Earlier studies reported similar results. Hooker found a correlation of $+ \cdot 86$ between the marriage rate in England and Wales and the amount of foreign trade for 1861-95 (4). A correlation of $+ \cdot 795$ between marriage rates and Sauerbeck index numbers for 1865-96 was obtained by Yule for England and Wales. Between the marriage rate and the unemployment index for 1870-95, the correlation was $- \cdot 873$ (9). Davies found a correlation of $+ \cdot 67$ between marriage rates and wholesale prices for U.S.A. for 1887-1906 (3). Earlier investigations, working without the correlation technique, came to similar conclusions (cf. Thomas (6, pp. 44-52)).

The association revealed by these correlation coefficients is presumably explicable in terms of the causal influence of prosperity and depression upon people's decision to marry. Thomas has suggested that the correspondence between the marriage rate and business conditions depends upon the degree of industrialization, the extent to which marriage would entail extra financial burdens on the husband, and the degree to which extremes of poverty and riches prevail. The degree of industrialization is claimed to affect the degree to which marriage rates are influenced by prosperity and depression because economic conditions in primary industry are said to be dependent on crops rather than on general business conditions. This hypothesis is not necessarily true for Australia, where the genesis of depressed primary industries has usually been a fall in export prices owing to a depression overseas.

If the influence of business conditions on the marriage rate is affected by the extent to which marriage would bring additional financial burdens to the husband, the association between business conditions and marriage rates might be expected to have been reduced in Australia in the last forty years or so. This period has seen a considerable extension of the employment of married women and an increase in the interval between marriage and the birth of the first child.¹ In so far

¹ In 1909, 61.3 per cent. of first children were born within one year of marriage, and 86.7 per cent. during the first two years. By 1941 these figures had declined to 39.8 per cent. and 71.3 per cent. respectively. Cf. Borrie (2, pp. 52-3).

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as the employment of married women is restricted in depressions, the association would be increased.

The gradual extension of social services in the last forty years would also presumably tend to reduce the degree of relationship between business conditions and marriage rates.

The long-term fall in Australian birth rates is well known and has been extensively studied. In the short run, there is a small positive correlation between birth rates and Australian business cycles for synchronous years. When a lag of one or two years is assumed, however, the coefficient is relatively high. These results agree with those obtained by Thomas for Britain and U.S.A. where the correlation for synchronous years was negligible, but was significant with birth rates lagged one or two years.

No doubt the correlation of birth rates and business cycles is in part a reflection of the correlation between marriage rates and business cycles. On the other hand, fertility is known to vary independently of marriage rates. Karmel (5) found a decline of 30 per cent. in fertility for 1923-42, after eliminating the influence of changes in the marriage rate. It would be reasonable to conclude, therefore, that fluctuations in prosperity do affect birth rates, although further research would be required in order to establish the extent of this influence.

Business cycles presumably influence birth rates through the effect of prosperity and depression upon the decision of married couples to add to their family, or to avoid any addition. Uncertainty of employment or income in times of depression are natural obstacles to larger families, though it is not suggested that the primary factors in the long-term decline in the birth rate are financial. It should be interesting to investigate the extent to which business cycles affect the birth rates for first, second, third, and subsequent children respectively.

In view of the marked effect of business conditions upon marriage rates, we might expect to find an inverse relationship between business cycles and fluctuations in the number of extra-legal unions. There are no reliable data on the number of extra-legal unions in existence. A very rough measure is the ex-nuptial birth rate, which is the number of ex-nuptial births as a percentage of total live births. The Australian figures show a marked decline in this rate since the beginning of the century. It is unlikely that extra-marital unions have become less frequent, and the trend probably reflects a more general knowledge and use of effective contraceptive methods.

There is no apparent relationship between business cycles and the ex-nuptial birth rate in Australia during the period 1905-35. This result does not correspond with that obtained for Great Britain by Thomas, who found a correlation of $-.39$ for 1854-1913, with the ex-nuptial birth rate lagging two years behind the business cycle index. The coefficient was $-.37$ with a three years' lag. It is difficult to suggest any reason for this lack of agreement.

Another index of the number of extra-legal unions is the number of first children born to married couples in the first seven months of marriage, expressed as a percentage of total live births. The percentage is much higher if births occurring in the eighth and ninth month are included, but premature births in these months are relatively common and their inclusion would distort the index. As it stands it may be presumed to show fairly accurately changes in the proportion of marriages that are contracted with the object of legitimizing the offspring of extra-legal unions. The index shows no marked trend over the period 1912-1935.

A reasonably significant negative correlation with the business cycle index is

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found when the index of legitimized births is lagged one year. The coefficients for the same year, or for a lag of two years, are not significant, but they are also negative. There is some indication here that depressions bring an increase in the proportion of marriages entered upon for this reason, and that the proportion falls in prosperity, as would be expected. Comparable data have not been reported for other countries.

The number of divorces and separations is the most convenient measure of breakdown in the family group. It is not by any means an accurate measure, for it does not include the desertions (only a proportion of which are legalized by divorce). Nor is it an accurate measure of the weakness of family ties, since many applications for divorce or separation are not granted, and the grounds on which divorce is granted vary from State to State. The cost of obtaining a divorce is another factor which limits the value of divorce figures as an index of marital disharmony. It is to be noted, however, that these inaccuracies, being relatively constant from year to year, are not so serious for the study of cyclical fluctuations.

The long-term trend in divorces per 10,000 existing marriages in Australia is definitely upwards, as in other countries. The trend is probably indicative of greater ease in obtaining divorce and of an important change in social and moral attitudes toward divorce. Since divorce rates are higher in cities, the drift to the cities may have been partly responsible for the rise.

High positive correlations with business cycles are found when the divorce index is lagged one or two years, and the coefficient for synchronous years is also positive, although not significant. The reason for the lag, it might be conjectured, is that divorce proceedings are launched a considerable time before the decision is given.

The obvious reason for the correlation is the high cost of divorce. The correlations for Australia agree with results for U.S.A., but contrast with those for England and Wales. Thomas found no relationship between business cycles and divorce in England and Wales, but obtained a correlation of + .70 for U.S.A. for the period 1867-1906. This result agrees with an earlier study of the American data by Willcox (7). Thomas explains the difference between the U.S.A. and England and Wales on the ground that in the latter country divorce is relatively rare and restricted to a small class of the population, whereas divorce is more frequent and more generally distributed among the American people. If this explanation is sound, the Australian divorce pattern is nearer to the American than to the British.

3. INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES AND ORGANIZATIONS IN RELATION TO THE BUSINESS CYCLE

Reliable information on the number and nature of industrial disputes was first collected in Australia in 1913. The total man-days lost is probably the most satisfactory index of the magnitude of industrial conflict, as it combines the number of workers involved in disputes on the one hand and the duration of the disputes on the other.

A high positive correlation was found between business cycles and time lost through industrial disputes for 1913-35 (see Table 2). We might expect such a correlation, since trade-union leaders know that employers are more likely to grant concessions when labour is relatively scarce and profits buoyant. There is also the greater strength of the unions themselves in prosperity when union funds and membership are at a maximum. A close positive relationship between business cycles and membership of trade unions for the period 1916-35 is evident from

Table 2. This suggests that trade-union dues are one of the things that workers economize on in times of depression. One reason for this may be that a successful strike is probably a trade union's best proof of its power, and such victories are more likely in prosperity, thus strengthening union membership in good times.

No relationship is apparent between membership of employers' associations and business cycles. Variations in membership are more likely to be related to semi-political factors than to economic conditions. There has been a very marked growth in the membership of the organizations in recent years.

4. SOME ASPECTS OF SOCIAL WELFARE IN RELATION TO THE BUSINESS CYCLE

Table 3 shows the correlation coefficients between the business cycle index and some series relating to social welfare. A significant positive correlation is apparent for the period 1901-34 between the business cycle index and expenditure per head on education by the six State Governments in Australia, when the latter series is lagged two years behind the business cycle index. Education provided by the State does not include all education but there is no reason to believe that private expenditure on education does not vary in the same manner and degree as public expenditure, and the index used is satisfactory for the study of cyclical fluctuations. The coefficients obtained show that State Governments trim their educational costs to the economic winds, as would be expected, although there is some delay before changed economic conditions make themselves felt. It is interesting to note the steady rise in State expenditure per head on education since 1901.

Hospital admissions per 100 show a striking upward trend since 1901. There is little doubt that this trend reflects better health services rather than an increase in the amount of illness in the community. There is also perhaps a tendency for doctors to insist on hospitalization for cases that would have been treated at home a generation ago, one of the most striking examples being childbirth.

The positive coefficient of correlation between hospital admissions and business cycles for the period 1901-35 is barely significant for synchronous years, and is not significant when hospital admissions are lagged. The correlation presumably reflects people's greater ability to meet the cost of hospital treatment in prosperity rather than an increase in illness in good times.

This result agrees with those of Bodmer (1) based on a study of sickness experience in France, Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Scotland for periods between 1925 and 1937. Bodmer concluded that the fall in recorded illness in depressions is accounted for by the worker's fear that he will lose his job if he goes sick and also his inability in depression to bear the drop in income caused by substituting sickness benefit for wages for a period. "The fictitious nature of the 'improvement' in health during economic depressions is amply illustrated by the rise in long-term sickness following on such depression." (1, p. 530.)

The crude death rate, like the crude birth rate, is much influenced by the age-composition of the population. The index of mortality, or standardized death rate, eliminates the effect of age-composition. Since 1902, the first year for which the index of mortality is available for Australia, the index has fallen steadily, no doubt reflecting improved health services and a healthier population.

In the short run the Australian data show a close correspondence between economic conditions and mortality for synchronous years over the period 1902-35. The coefficients are not significant when a lag of one or two years in mortality is assumed.

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These results agree with those obtained by Thomas for U.S.A. and for England and Wales. She found a correlation of $+ .57$ for America for synchronous years, $+ .49$ with death lagging one year behind the business cycle, and $+ .03$ with a two years' lag. The British data yielded coefficients of $+ .04$, $+ .31$, and $+ .24$ for synchronous years, and lags of one and two years respectively. Thomas excluded deaths from epidemic diseases from the British data though not from the American. On the other hand, Thomas used crude death rates, without any correction for age-distribution. It is possible that the elimination of such deaths from the Australian data would reduce the correlation somewhat, but it is not likely that it would be rendered insignificant.

In explanation of the positive correlation Thomas pointed to the rise in alcoholism in prosperity and to the greater emigration in depression, which would presumably reduce the number of healthy young people. The second factor hardly applies to Australia, and it is doubtful if the first is sufficiently influential to account for the correlation.

There has been a considerable reduction in infant mortality in Australia since 1901, an improvement that is probably the result partly of a generally higher standard of living and partly of a determination on the part of the community to decrease infant mortality in particular.

Short-term fluctuations in infant mortality followed the business cycle almost as closely as general mortality over the period 1905-38, and again the correlation loses its significance if a lag of one or two years is assumed in infant mortality.

Thomas obtained a similar result for America for 1870-1920, the correlation coefficient being $+ .42$ for synchronous years and $+ .43$ with infant mortality lagging one year. For England and Wales correlations of $+ .04$, $+ .28$ and $+ .26$ were obtained by Thomas for 1855-1913, on the assumptions of no lag, one year's lag, and two years' lag respectively. Thomas suggests that the more extensive employment of women in prosperity, by reducing the amount of breast-feeding, may contribute to the higher rate. The increase in alcoholism in prosperity might also augment the rate, but these factors do not explain the correlation satisfactorily.

Maternal mortality in Australia has not shown the improvement since 1901 that has characterized infant and general mortality. In the short run, also, maternal mortality reacts to changes in economic conditions differently from infant and general mortality. Table 3 shows a low positive but insignificant correlation for the period 1905-35 when no lag is assumed, and a significant (though not highly so) negative correlation with a two years' lag. There is some evidence here of a delayed effect of depression upon the health of potential mothers.

The results obtained by Thomas for England and Wales for 1855-1913 revealed a positive correlation between maternal mortality and business cycles. (The coefficients were $+ .24$, $+ .42$, and $+ .46$ with no lag, and lags of one and two years respectively). The reason for the disagreement is probably that the series used by Thomas related to the number of deaths in childbirth per 100,000 population and a good deal of the correlation between this index of maternal mortality and the business cycle index could be attributed to the high positive correlation which Thomas found between economic cycles and the birth rate. The Australian series avoids this interfering factor since it relates to the number of deaths in childbirth per 1,000 live births.

5. SOME ASPECTS OF SOCIAL PATHOLOGY IN RELATION TO THE BUSINESS CYCLE

The number of convictions for serious crime per 10,000 population is not an accurate measure of the amount of serious crime committed, for obvious reasons. Its limitations remain relatively constant from year to year, however, and it is useful for a study of cyclical fluctuations.

An insignificant correlation between the conviction rate and business cycles over the period 1905-35 was found for synchronous years, but high positive correlations were obtained when the conviction rate was lagged one or two years (see Table 4).

In her study of American data, Thomas found a correlation of -0.35 for synchronous years, and $+0.24$ when the index of crime lagged one year. Her more exhaustive investigation of British business cycles, however, showed coefficients of the same direction and of a similar order as those of Table 4. Thomas suggests that the positive correlation may be explained in terms of the connexion between business cycles and alcoholism.

In Australia convictions for drunkenness have declined strikingly since 1901. Although the extent to which the conviction rate understates the amount of alcoholism in the community is not known, the downward trend in convictions probably reflects a tendency towards less drunkenness.

A fairly high positive correlation was found between business cycles and convictions for drunkenness for the period 1905-35. The coefficient is very close to that of $+0.33$ obtained by Thomas for England and Wales for the period 1873-1913. With lags of one and two years respectively, she found correlations of $+0.54$ and $+0.45$. The per capita consumption of spirits in England shows the very high correlations of $+0.72$ and $+0.81$ for synchronous years and a lag of one year respectively.

There is an obvious financial connexion between higher alcoholism and prosperity. One might expect a greater tendency to heavy indulgence in times of depression, when frustrations mount, but if any such tendency exists, its effect is offset by the cost of liquor.

No significant correlation was found between suicides and Australian business cycles.

This result presents a marked contrast with those obtained by Thomas for America and Britain. Thomas found a correlation coefficient of -0.74 for one hundred American cities for 1900-20. In England and Wales the correlation was -0.50 for 1858-1913 when no lag was assumed, and -0.47 with lagging one year. The British and American results are in accordance with the expectation that the conditions leading to suicide would be more prevalent in depression than in prosperity, and it is difficult to offer any explanation of the discrepancy with the Australian results.

There has been a slight downward trend in the number of admissions to mental hospitals per 1,000 population in Australia since 1901. As in the case of admissions to general hospitals, this cannot be taken as indicative of a decline in the incidence of mental disease. Many cases of mental illness are cared for by relatives and do not enter hospital.

A close positive relationship between the admission rate and business cycles is evident from the correlation coefficient for synchronous years over the period 1905-35; there is no evidence of any association when the admission rate lags one year, while there is a barely significant negative relationship when the rate lags

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two years. The high positive correlation for synchronous years is to be explained principally in terms of the cost of maintaining a relative in a mental hospital, and the greater employment of women in prosperous times, which makes it less likely for anyone to be available to care for mental cases at home. The more hectic atmosphere of the boom may raise the actual rate of breakdowns slightly; it is not possible to test the validity of this hypothesis. Another contributing factor may be an increase in the number of alcoholic cases admitted in prosperous times.

6. SUMMARY

Some social aspects of Australian business cycles were investigated by correlating the cyclical fluctuations in various series relating to social phenomena with Wilson's index of Australian business cycles, which was carried forward to 1939 for the purpose.

Evidence was obtained of a marked influence of economic cycles upon the marriage rate and the birth rate. The influence of business cycles upon marriage rates is lagged one year, and it remains significant, though weaker, with a lag of two years. In the case of the birth rate, the relationship becomes more marked when birth rates are lagged one or two years.

No relationship is apparent between business cycles and illegitimate birth rates, but a reasonably significant negative correlation was found between pre-nuptial conceptions and business cycles. The relationship was not significant when the pre-nuptial conception rate was lagged one or two years behind the business cycle index.

High positive correlations between business cycles and divorce rates were found when divorce rates were lagged one or two years; the relationship is not significant for synchronous years.

A close relationship was found between days lost through industrial disputes and business cycles, and an even closer relationship appeared to hold between business cycles and trade-union membership. Membership of employers' organizations showed no relationship to business cycles.

Business cycles are significantly related to expenditure per head by State Governments on education, when the latter lags two years behind business cycles.

A barely significant positive correlation was obtained between hospital admissions and business cycles, for synchronous years; the relationship was not significant when hospital admissions were lagged one or two years. Mortality rates are closely and positively related to business cycles for synchronous years, but no relationship appeared when a lag of one or two years was assumed. A similar relationship was found between infant mortality and business cycles. Maternal mortality bore a slight but significant negative relationship to business cycles with a lag of two years only. Business cycles appeared to exert a marked influence on the number of convictions for serious crime, but only with a lag of one or two years. Convictions for drunkenness were also influenced by business cycles, in this case with no lag. Suicides were not found to be closely related to business cycles. Admissions to mental hospitals were found to bear a close positive relationship to business cycles, with no evidence of a lag.

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TABLE 1

MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY IN RELATION TO AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS CYCLES

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Correlation Coefficient</i>	<i>Standard Error</i>
Marriage Rate 1870-1936 (synchronous)	+ .352	.108
Marriage Rate (lagging one year)	+ .350	.108
Marriage Rate (lagging two years)	+ .210	.069
Birth Rate 1870-1935 (synchronous)	+ .183	.082
Birth Rate (lagging one year)	+ .332	.110
Birth Rate (lagging two years)	+ .329	.110
Ex-nuptial Birth Rate 1905-1935 (synchronous)	+ .061	.179
Ex-nuptial Birth Rate (lagging one year)	+ .003	.181
Ex-nuptial Birth Rate (lagging two years)	- .077	.179
Per cent. of Births Within 7 months of Marriage 1912-1935 (synchronous)	- .201	.142
Per cent. of Births Within 7 Months of Marriage (lagging one year)	- .254	.073
Per cent. of Births Within 7 Months of Marriage (lagging two years)	- .166	.148
Divorces and Separations per 10,000 Marriages 1905-34 (synchronous)	+ .161	.134
Divorces and Separations per 10,000 Marriages (lagging one year)	+ .375	.158
Divorces and Separations per 10,000 Marriages (lagging two years)	+ .273	.046

TABLE 2

INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES AND INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS IN RELATION TO AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS CYCLES

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Correlation Coefficient</i>	<i>Standard Error</i>
Working Days lost through Industrial Disputes, 1917-1935	+ .550	.166
Trade-union Membership as per cent. of Total Employees 1916-1935	+ .609	.148
Members of Employers' Organizations 1922-1939	+ .027	.278

TABLE 3

SOME ASPECTS OF SOCIAL WELFARE IN RELATION TO AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS CYCLES

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Correlation Coefficient</i>	<i>Standard Error</i>
Expenditure per head on Education 1905-34 (synchronous)	- .208	.010
Expenditure per head on Education (lagging one year)	- .060	.102
Expenditure per head on Education (lagging two years)	+ .336	.160
Hospital admissions per 100 Population 1905-35 (synchronous)	+ .175	.125
Hospital admissions per 100 Population (lagging one year)	+ .135	.147
Hospital admissions per 100 Population (lagging two years)	- .075	.179
Index of Mortality 1906-35 (synchronous)	+ .389	.153
Index of Mortality (lagging one year)	+ .061	.180
Index of Mortality (lagging two years)	- .085	.180
Infant Mortality 1874-1935 (synchronous)	+ .266	.037
Infant Mortality (lagging one year)	+ .162	.095
Infant Mortality (lagging two years)	+ .191	.081
Maternal Mortality 1909-35 (synchronous)	+ .121	.164
Maternal Mortality (lagging one year)	- .089	.191
Maternal Mortality (lagging two years)	- .276	.181

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TABLE 4

SOME ASPECTS OF SOCIAL PATHOLOGY IN RELATION TO AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS CYCLES

Variable	Correlation Coefficient	Standard Error
Convictions for Serious Crime per 10,000 Population 1905-35 (synchronous)	+ .101	.161
Convictions for Serious Crime per 10,000 Population (lagging one year)	+ .419	.148
Convictions for Serious Crime per 10,000 Population (lagging two years)	+ .416	.149
Convictions for Drunkenness per 10,000 Population 1905-35 (synchronous)	+ .291	.165
Suicides per 100,000 Population 1870-1935 (synchronous)	+ .149	.096
Suicides per 100,000 Population (lagging one year)	+ .063	.123
Suicides per 100,000 Population (lagging two years)	- .026	.122
Admissions to Mental Hospitals per 10,000 Population 1905-35 (synchronous)	+ .326	.161
Admissions to Mental Hospitals per 10,000 Population (lagging one year)	+ .080	.178
Admissions to Mental Hospitals per 10,000 Population (lagging two years)	- .219	.171

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ART AS SOCIAL SCIENCE

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THERE are few great philosophers, from Aristotle downwards, who have not developed some theory of art. The philosophical approach to art is traditional. It is largely idealistic as in Kant, Hegel, Fichte, Schelling, and Schopenhauer. With the advent of the historical method in the study of culture, historicism found its early exponents in the field of art, notably Vico, Herder, and Taine. But the historical and comparative methods have since been largely confined to the fields of law, economics, and religion. An outstanding exception is Ernst Grosse, who examined the evolution of art in relation to stages of economic development and associated the naturalistic art style with the phase of hunting and conventionalization with the agricultural phase. Although the treatment was too schematic, his emphasis on the economic and psychological bases of the development of art styles makes Grosse a path-finder in art history. Contemporary philosophers have also dwelt upon æsthetic value and experience and the place art occupies in the scheme of knowledge. One may only refer to a few names, like those of Bosanquet, Samuel Alexander, Bergson, Croce, Santayana, and Dewey.

A fruitful but neglected approach to art is the sociological. The sociology of art brings under its purview the social relations of the forms and motifs of art. Artistic activity is dominated by the sense of norms and values, and these are largely of social origin. On the other hand, art as individual creative expression clarifies and in some measure determines social values. As one manifestation of human aspiration and experience, art is woven into the scheme of values and general pattern of collective living and culture of the people. Art also remoulds the prevailing thought processes, values, and ideals of society.

The sociology of art is, accordingly, an objective study of art work as :

- (a) an expression of individual man's striving and fulfilment in the ideal plane that helps to explain social values and culture;
- (b) a vehicle of communication of prevailing social values reshaping the aims and destiny of the individual;
- and (c) a record and celebration of a culture or age, an unerring clue to the life of a civilization.

It is less directly concerned, however, with dates, titles, names, and biographies or with the sensuous values of works of art as individual, independent objects, which it would leave to art history. It confines itself to the social conditions of origin and operation of art work, to the background of regional, economic, and social factors and forces that determine the forms of art and largely condition its motifs and themes, and also to its meaning in a given culture with all its aspirations, frustrations, and fulfilments.

Thus it links up its enquiries with both art history and the investigations now being pursued by several social sciences, especially geography, economics, social anthropology, and comparative religion. Among the precursors of the sociology of æsthetics are Taine, Herbert Spencer, Guyau, Semper, Grosse, and Wundt. Strzygowski and Coomaraswamy, among the art historians, have followed the comparative methods in the study of art and delineated successfully the reciprocal influences of art styles and mannerisms among different peoples and epochs. Comparative art, unlike comparative religion, is, however, now in its infancy. Its

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further development rests entirely on the application of sociological methods in interpreting the art of the primitive, less advanced and civilized peoples and understanding the continuity of art tradition, values, and experiences. Contemporary anthropology (as in the hands of Hirn, Haddon, Boas, Scheltema, and Ruth Benedict) and experimental and social psychology now furnish valuable materials and methods for the comparative sociology of art as an indispensable aid to the interpretation of human history and civilization. From the comparative history of art and culture we can understand the recurrent forms and motifs of art through the epochs among different peoples and the manner in which environmental and economic conditions, religion, and social ideals and stage of development of tools and technical methods determine artistic activity. From the study of primitive and folk-art, myth, and ritual we can learn more of the first stirrings of the creative activity of imagination and the relation between art and the social process than from the æsthetic elaborations in great periods of culture. Finally, the psychology of the unconscious and *gestalt* psychology show us the mental mechanisms of artistic creation and apprehension as social psychology clarifies the personal and the social factors which bring the work of art into existence, as well as its consequences to life, personality, and society.

An invaluable but hitherto neglected field in social science is thus represented by fine art. To this belong the entire background and conditions of artistic activity and of the archetypes, symbols, and myths of art that reveal social values and meanings more clearly and immediately than any other cultural product in the life of a people. Between art and society there is a reciprocity which has no end. The unity, the rhythm, and the concord which the artist achieves in his art work evokes from society aspirations to achieve these in concrete human relations. The radiation of human love and sympathy eternally renews the vital flame of the artist's vision. The social inspiration of art can hardly be neglected as a formative factor in art tradition and development, on the one hand; on the other, society can never afford to disregard art as a technique of social control and guidance. Art is a subtle, attractive, and powerful tool in the hands of society for shaping and regulating human relations and life-goals. Government, education, religion, and recreation—all the organized group activities that seek to discipline individuals into certain approved and established norms of conduct are fashioned in the artistic mould without which rule and authority would have been intolerable, and instruction, control, and regulation of the common man baffling, if not futile, social tasks. Thus is art the ally of the forces of order and progress in society, reaching out to the individual in most accessible forms society's cherished aims and objectives that gain in colour, grace, and dignity. But art transcends man's social interests and aims like wealth, power, leisure, knowledge, stability, and happiness. It in fact records in the most certain and unequivocal manner the destiny of the individual and of society through its glimpses into the universal values, into the basal and universal forms of the mind itself, and into the more-than-human order and unity of the universe that religion can apprehend, but only art can make accessible to the common man. Not before we clearly recognize the function of art as a significant mode of apprehension of man, society, and the world process, parallel with science and philosophy, can we estimate its organic place and rôle in the history of civilization.

Various fundamental instincts and desires are at the basis of artistic creation. One or other of these has been stressed by different thinkers. Thus Nietzsche, emphasizing the desire for self-assertion as the root of art, describes art as "intoxi-

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cation, the feeling of enhanced power; the inner compulsion to make things a mirror of one's own fullness and perfection." Havelock Ellis argues that it is the deep urgency of the impulse to possess which stirs the creative artist: "He creates because that is the best way, or the only way, of gratifying his passionate desire to possess. Two men desire to possess a woman, and one seizes her, the other writes a 'Vita Nuova' about her; they have both gratified the instinct of possession, and the second, it may be, most satisfyingly and most lastingly."

Modern psychologists now tell us, however, that man's fundamental instincts hardly work in isolation, but are found blended with one another in an intimate way. Some are in the foreground, others are in the background, of consciousness. Some are directly, others are indirectly, implicated in art. Instincts, such as sex, gregariousness, self-assertion, and possession, are involved indirectly. But the instincts of play and constructiveness represent the core of artistic expression and valuation, and are expressed directly by art. That central core of play and constructiveness is enriched from all levels of the psyche.

From the unconscious there well up in the child's mind the ambivalent desires of love and destruction. As the child develops in his sexuality, these vary in intensity and are directed towards objects, both internal and external. Thus the young would draw on the floor, manipulate, model and destroy plastic clay, hum tunes and dance. They would take part in various activities of production, and manipulation of the environment which would be regarded as biologically useless activities for animals. The dual opposites of love and hate, creation and destruction, reparation and mutilation, that flood the phantasies of the young elaborate themselves in the unconscious and are externalized not merely in art but also in social life. As the unconscious urges and wish phantasies are brought to consciousness, these blend with many other impulses and inhibitions. Art represents a complete fusion and synthesis of the instincts and desires, and especially a reconciliation of man's life and death instincts, of love and destruction. Out of constructive work in art arises a wholeness in man's internal life as well as in external relations, which is the very essence of his success in adaptation. Man's sense of beauty and wholeness, which is manifest in his aesthetic and mystic apprehension, is ultimately rooted in his imperative need of reconciling the ambivalent contending forces of love and hate that possess him in the depths of his being. The need for this emotional orientation is connected with the peculiar features of development of human sexuality and affective life.

Man's sadistic or destructive impulses and phantasies in his love-life are characteristically accompanied by the compensatory phantasies of "restitution" or "reparation," as these are called by Melanie Klein and John Rickman respectively. There is a genetic connexion between the pain due to destructive impulses and the paramount need to create lasting goodness and wholeness from what had been in phantasy injured and rendered bad. As the preservation and enhancement of the objects of attachment is the great concern of the libido, restitution or reparation should be considered as libidinal manifestation in spite of the fact that it owes its origin to the presence of destructive impulses. The urge to reparation is, according to Rickman, owing to the strange nature of human development, probably an internal part of creative activity; the horror of the "ugly" and the wish to change it is that *vis a tergo* which thrusts us into constructive work in art, in science, and even in the humble tasks of our

daily round.¹ Man can unburden himself of his load of anxiety and guilt, his agony that overwhelms him when he finds his loved ones threatened by his own destructive impulses fused with his libido, as he fulfils the compensatory urge to reparation.

This principle of reparation which arises from the depths of man's being underlies all human strivings after truth, goodness, and beauty. This is the chief reason why in romantic love, artistic expression, and mystical experience we find manifestations of exaltation and abasement, tenderness and cruelty, so strangely blended. Art, working through the principle of reparation, re-establishes the integrity, fullness, and wholeness of man's life and makes it triumph over mutilation and death, which he associates with ugliness. The term "ugly" is applied to objects in art work that represent an imperfect integration of these discordant impulses, objects that have not been lifted, so to speak, from their customary associations in man's inner life and external relations with mutilation and death. The distinction between pornography and art lies in this, that in the latter the nude is bodily taken out of its usual context and environment, and forms part of an expressive whole in which even the lure and passion of the flesh are retained and yet perfectly blend with other qualities, interests, and values, endowing them with altogether new meanings. It is thus that art can break through conventional prepossession and transfigure what is discordant, repulsive, or frightful. It is art alone which can fuse the incompatible and antagonistic impulses into a unity in which every impulse is retained without loss of its emotional content, the devices of art being such that those impulses which excite disgust or horror in the conscious mind seem necessary and even reasonable. Man would not have, to be sure, imaged his mind and externalized his discordant urges within him in art work but for the fact that his self is divided within itself and that his artistic expression of himself is the only way towards an integration and synthesis of impulses for securing his peace of mind. Thus we can comprehend artistic apprehension and expression better in terms of the integration or harmonious blending of the various primordial unconscious urges than as manifestations of single tendencies. In all great forms of art we have, indeed, a co-ordination of man's discordant impulses and their reconciliation in an ordered single response. It is this reconciliation or integration which not only supplies an effective and enduring relief from emotional stresses and strains and thereby gives the artist sanity, insight and joy, but also directs the overmastering energy towards immediate expressive activities.

Integration involves the complex system of processes described in psycho-analytic literature as symbolization, phantasy-making, and sublimation. Art shows many feelings and emotions expressed in disguised form as phantasies. This disguise is often subtle, elaborate, and refined, but sometimes the repressed tendencies, though these reappear in their symbolic transformations, can clearly be discerned in their coarseness uninhibited by social influences and the traditions of art. Thus the painting of the nude which is sexual sublimation becomes pornography, or there is a more hidden but yet coarse rendering of the sexual motif as in some Surrealist pictures.

The difference between a neurotic, an unsuccessful artist, and a consummate master consists in the degree of achievement of freedom from inhibition and

¹ Melanie Klein, "Infantile Anxiety-Situations Reflected in a work of Art and in the Creative Impulse," *The International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*, Vol. X, p. 436, Part 3. See also John Rickman: "Nature of Ugliness and the Creative Impulse," in the same Journal, Vol. XXI, p. 294, described by the writer as a marginal note to the former paper.

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control of anxiety through the subjective creative processes. The neurotic segregates himself from society and in his inner life suffers from psychic segregation. There are the repressed instincts and desires which stand out in open rebellion against a feeble will. On the other hand, there are the neuroses of fear and anxiety, reminders of the power of the society or collectivity. The neurotic accepts neither the society nor his own personality, and his immediate expressions, the dreams and delusions, give us the picture of a will unable to control his instincts and desires that yet cannot run out their rebellious course. The artist overcomes the psychical conflict through an effort which may be described as æsthetic contemplation. This effort sets his creative expression above both society and ego. The phantasy which is the result of the artist's deliberate play and constructiveness lifts the constructed object out of the boundaries of his own ego and of the society. Thus what he creates out of mastering his inner stresses and strains becomes far removed from them, becomes objective, and universal. Therein lies the disinterestedness of all æsthetic experience. The artist refashions his wishes and emotions through fusion with his reason, judgment, and experience; the constructed object is characterized by impersonality, breadth, and distance. The creations of art exhibit both passionate intensity and dispassionate insight, concreteness as well as universality.

Now, the major cause of the psychic stresses and strains of both the neurotic and the artist is the rigidity of social codes and conventions which compel the individual to check the impulses by too drastic repression. Artists at the height of their achievement resolve the psychical conflicts in their ideological experiences in such manner as to offer many distracted individuals effective guidance in the choice of social values and personal adjustment and organization. The ideological experiences, because these are above the plane of day-to-day achievement, acquire an unusual, impersonal, and abstract character which endows them with a rich significance for myriads of people exhibiting a variety of moods, temperaments, and personality problems.

The social reference of the artist's phantasy and ideological experience is obvious although there may be artists who work in isolation and do not seek either the approval or disapproval of society. Even they wait for the judgment of a future generation or at least subconsciously desire immediate social recognition. The normal man craves for human sympathy and understanding. Personality problems arise in the social background, and their solution can become effective only in the real social situation or in the ideological transformation of social life and relations in art. The artist's intolerable anxiety-neurosis which leads him to creative activity is socially determined, while the resolution of his self-created neurosis in the form of the constructed object is, in form and content, socially inspired and in so far as it can win the approbation and understanding of society also gives him profound satisfaction. The hope of sympathetic audience, real or imaginary, keeps alive the artist's creative activity by satisfying his desires for social communication and approbation. The mental adjustment of a neurotic and of an artist differs in degree, and not in kind, and it is not to be expected that all art will have a social reference. The mental activity governed by the artist's subconscious desires and phantasies, which are in conflict with other tendencies in his own self or with the prevalent social pressure, may develop images, rhythms, and automatic pictures, such as delusions and hallucinations of a paranoiac which may have no meaning for anybody and have no social aspects. As a matter of fact, in contemporary art eccentric and arbitrary creations which

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do not serve as social symbols nor arouse the sympathy or understanding of fellow-beings, except a small coterie of critics and dealers, are becoming more pronounced than ever before. But in art history as a whole, while social influences engender psychic conflicts in the individual calling for sublimation and integration, the symbolical transformations of the former in æsthetic contemplation themselves become the foci of constructive social changes in the life of the people. Thus art has been through the ages an indispensable and powerful agency of social suggestion, control, and guidance.

Art is an end-product of the creative activity of imagination that springs from the give-and-take between the individual and society, and involves at every stage personal-social adjustments. It is a universal social reality that is at once an expression of the summit of the individual's creative will and aspiration and of the vitality and achievement of a whole tradition or civilization. Art is an integrated total experience brought about by the fusion of the individual's feelings and strivings with social values, judgment, and experience. It is through art that the solitary or rebellious individual restores himself to the community, socializes himself, and that society becomes a constant presence in the fluctuating life of feelings and emotions of the individual. In art the individual accepts the social norm as his own wish, and society accepts the individual's feeling and expression as its own legitimate dream or aspiration. All this can only be clarified by distinguishing between:

- (1) the social and the ideological background of the artist;
- (2) the individual artist's original or novel achievement and the art tradition;
- (3) the form, motif, or theme of art and the precise social-historical situation, and
- (4) the intrinsic excellence and acceptance or popularity of the art object.

These separate fields of enquiry comprise the subject-matter of the sociology of art.

Each artist is largely socially conditioned. His social contacts and cultural relationships govern his achievement at each stage of his career. Both the subject-matter and form of art are derived by the artist from selection out of the raw materials of myth and metaphysics as well as the contemporary social environment and the symbols and patterns in which the art is found.

Primitive art was closely associated with economic toil, magic, religion, and war and entirely subserved social ends of primitive communities. Their dances of sowing, harvesting, and war, their magical rites and ceremonies and their funeral observances, were all provoked by their most intense needs and experiences. Rhythm and decoration here subserved the all-important function of introducing social values into such integral tribal experiences in the manner that was most attractive and impressive. The appeal to the senses and to the sensuous imagination aroused emotional thrill, wonder, admiration, or awe according to the situations and tided the primitive group over psychological strains and crises.

Dance and chorus, pageant and drama, arose in the history of civilization in rituals and observances that dominated the interests of a social class or of the whole community. For long periods in the history of culture, in Egypt, in India, in Greece, and in Christian Europe, sculpture and architecture served a religion that captured the imagination of a people and expressed certain universal moods, aspirations, and values. The evolution of art is thus the evolution of mankind's social values and aspirations, as these are objectified and visualized in works of art.

In ancient Hellas as contrasted with mediæval or modern Europe religion

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caused less inhibitions and repressions and more fulfilments, and Greek art was relatively less fettered in expressing the generic biological values of human life. Similarly, in ancient and mediæval India there was also less repression of sex, and consequently we find Indian art portraying the universal physical or biological motivations and values, unlike the art of the Christian European world which witnessed a rigorous repression of fundamental desires and interests. While European art either became largely compensatory for the inhibited urges, or showed more of a revolt than moralized repression and sublimation, Indian art not only dealt frankly and sanely with the unconscious urges of human nature, but also revealed a transcendent and metaphysical sublimation. Thus the revelation of universal values by art, in the higher ranges of culture, may be direct and structural or indirect and compensatory, according to the strength of the mechanisms of expression and repression in society. The artist's own attitude towards expression or sublimation is in short determined by the compulsives of his age and cultural environment.

But the artist also refashions and interprets moral codes and social values and leads the protest against the rigours and repressions that religious, moral, and social codes impose upon the masses of mankind. All true art work is characterized by tranquillity, the outcome of complete integration of the dominant instincts and emotions of the individual and his geographical and historical milieu. The individual artist, in order to find this poise, sometimes has to protest against the turbulence and emotional excesses of his age as in the work of Phidias and Michelangelo, or the religiosity and passivity of the surrounding crowd as in the frescoes of Ajanta and the bas-reliefs at Borobodur and Angkor Vat. Neither the serenity of the statues of Phidias nor the moral grandeur of the style of Michelangelo can be understood without pondering over the civil disorder and confusion in Hellas and in Athens in particular or the crassness, vulgarity, and depravity of morals in the Italian cities. Similarly the voluptuousness of the flower-garlanded female devotees at Borobodur and of the dancing apsaras at Angkor that appear endlessly on every wall can only be appreciated against the background of asceticism and abjuration of all desires and emotions of Buddhism and Sivaism. The persistent revolt of the human spirit against the commonplace emotions and values of the age is also powerfully expressed in the art of Rembrandt, where we find at once the frugality and homely virtues of the wealthy Dutch burghers and the cry of the poor, diseased, and the oppressed of the slums and ghettos of Amsterdam.

Great works of art show in this manner an almost divine sense of proportion of values, a feeling for the universal and impersonal, that make these the cherished treasures of all epochs and countries. A people or civilization, great or undistinguished, leaves behind in its art not its most persistent and its most real desires, interests, and passions but these as reordered and reoriented in the larger and more profound conscience and intelligence of humanity. It is in this sense that a people, epoch, or civilization is immortalized in its art.

DURHAM CITY ¹

By DOROTHY SYLVESTER

DURHAM CITY is one of the smaller county towns of England, having a population of only 16,223 in 1931. At the centre of its county, on the main rail and road route between London and Edinburgh, and county town of one of the most densely peopled industrial and mining counties, it has nevertheless failed to retain the pre-eminence which it once had as capital of a Palatinate Principality and as queen of its region. Unlike such old county centres as York and Norwich, it has no recent history of lively growth and economic adaptation despite many comparable and some superior advantages. But because of its centrality it has retained and extended its cultural and administrative functions and so at least avoided the eclipse suffered by some old county towns, such as Alnwick and Lancaster. It has, in fact, the advantages of centrality and (unused) resources but the disadvantage of a central and inland location in a county where population expanded in the nineteenth century in the north-eastern quarter (i.e. the area of the coalfield) and on the periphery where the sea coast and the navigable lower stretches of Tyne, Wear, and Tees concentrate all the major population centres of the county. Inland towns, apart from Durham City, are either country market towns, such as Barnard Castle and Bishop Auckland, or comparatively small industrial and extractive centres, such as Consett and Billingham.

Originating as an urban centre in Norman times, only two periods of real expansion have succeeded the mediæval: the eighteenth century and the middle and end of the nineteenth century. The intervening periods were characterized by stagnation, decline or, at best, an ill-rewarded struggle to make headway. The site of the city is in part responsible for this uneven development: admirably suitable for a mediæval fortress, a cathedral centre, an eighteenth-century residential town of small dimensions and a local market, it has revealed its disadvantages in relation to the vicinal area where nineteenth-century building has taken place or, alternatively, left significant gaps. The newer parts of the city lack individuality and mediæval and eighteenth-century Durham is still not only characteristic but dominant.

Durham lies in the centre of the county of that name at the mid-point of the line of valleys which carry the main north-south road and railway routes across it from Darlington to Gateshead. Pennine tributaries from the west here join the River Wear but the Browney is the only one of even relative importance and neither Weardale nor the Browney Valley contributes much to the flow of traffic which converges here. Movement eastward toward the coast is rendered difficult, though not actually blocked, by the 600-foot high escarpment of the Magnesian Limestone Plateau which extends from the Team and the middle Wear Valleys to the sea. Workable coal beds lie on the flanks of the Pennines which terminate as a relief feature at this same valley line, and are continuous across and below these valleys and below the Magnesian Limestone Plateau. The principal mining area extends from the Tyne in the north to Bishop Auckland in the south, and so Durham City lies fairly near to the southern boundary of the field. More precisely, its site is in the valley of the middle Wear where an incised river meander

¹ Note: The original of this paper was read to the Institute of Sociology Summer School at Durham in 1943. Since then Mr. Thomas Sharp's plan for the city has appeared under the title *CATHEDRAL CITY, A PLAN FOR DURHAM*.

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all but encloses an asymmetrical and roughly oval peninsula about a mile in length. This peninsula rises sharply to a tabular summit area 200 feet above sea-level and 100 feet above the river. The long axis of the peninsula is north-south, and northwards it drops to a low isthmus measuring only 200 to 250 feet across at its narrowest. The isthmus is the focus of routes entering the city and all but one are carried by the two chief road bridges, Framwellgate and Elvet. Originally they formed a defence as well as a link, and the defences of this, the weakest part of the natural stronghold, were completed by the Castle which overlooks it from the south and by an outer wall which completes its encirclement on the north. The rest of the peninsula is surrounded by the steep, wooded river gorge. The Sunderland road reaches isthmian Durham from the north-east without crossing the river and this approach was formerly guarded by a gate at the foot of Claypath. A third, relatively modern, bridge (Prebends') links the high banks at the southern end of the peninsula but the public may only use it as a foot bridge. This blind bridge and land ownership are together responsible for the fact that the inner city still faces south to open country. An "insectiform" plan results in which the peninsula is the body, the isthmus the head, the arterial roads converging on the isthmus the legs, while, to west and east, lie the "wings" formed by the housing areas of the last fifty or sixty years.


Brilliantly adapted by mediæval planners, this river-girt peninsula is a perfect background for the beautiful old city. But beyond the peninsula on all sides is a terrain ill-suited alike to modern communications and traffic and to industrial expansion. The valley is deep and enclosed and the surrounding country rolling or hilly; and on the western side of the town runs a long deltaic ridge of soft sand¹ rising sharply from 100 to 200 feet above the land on either side. The main L.N.E.R. route now follows it north and the Great North Road out of the city is gently graded through its easily cut sands, but for a long time its presence limited building on the west side of the city and the early railway by-passed Durham two miles to the east, so doing it a further disservice. The river banks are for the most part steep and they are broken by one or two deep-cut tributary valleys, equally difficult to bridge or to settle. Where the high banks swing back from the river north of the town, it is flanked by a marshy flood plain as at the Sands.

The river was mainly useful as a natural moat to mediæval Durham, though two weirs were constructed to provide mill races and to improve the fishing. Drinking water was long drawn from wells within the city, e.g. St. Cuthbert's and St. Oswald's wells below the Cathedral and St. Oswald's church respectively. The castle and many houses in the Bailey also had their own wells. In 1450 water was brought to the market-place and a fountain erected for public use. The present supply is from Burnhope Reservoir in the Pennines.

The site saw some earlier occupations than the Norman, but traces are poor. The first authenticated occupation of the peninsula was in 995, when the congregation of St. Cuthbert, seeking a resting-place for the saint's mortal remains, were guided to "Dun-holm," finding here a maiden milking a dun cow which was the sign they sought. The Norman cathedral encloses the shrines of both St. Cuthbert and the Venerable Bede and was a great place of mediæval pilgrimage.

Durham was besieged in 1006 by Malcolm and in 1040 by Duncan. Thus

¹ Part of a long ridge running from south of Ferryhill to north of Chester-le-Street and deposited in a pro-glacial lake.



DURHAM FROM THE SOUTH

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its stormy later history was foreshadowed even in the days of the Anglian settlement. But the true foundation of the fortress city dated from the visit in 1069 of William the Conqueror who, realizing its strategic possibilities, ordered a castle to be built there. It was begun in 1072 and in 1149 consisted of a keep¹ surmounting a 45-foot high mound. The Great Hall and other portions of the building were added in the late thirteenth and the fourteenth centuries. The Cathedral was planned at the same time as the Castle and from its inception the Norman city combined temporal and spiritual power. It was made the centre of the great marcher earldom created to block the Scots on their road into Eastern England. So Durham City became the centre of a Palatinate Principality and of a bishopric with special powers—a unique combination—for the buttressing of Northumberland and the Border. The county retained its palatine rank until the nineteenth century for administrative purposes, the bishop's temporal power only lapsing in 1836 and Durham Castle remaining the principal seat of the Bishop of Durham until its transference to the University founded in that year.

The defences of mediæval Durham were completed by a wall which ran along the top of the inner river bank, so making the peninsula doubly impregnable. By 1314 the walls enclosed all the isthmian area, but an earlier wall only enclosed the peninsula proper, i.e. reaching north to the Castle. Some stretches of the wall remain, particularly the western portion. The plan of the inner city and its buildings is magnificent. The whole of the centre and west side of the plateau is occupied (in order from north to south) by the Castle, Palace Green (formerly Place Green), the Cathedral and its cloisters, and beyond these the "College" or Cathedral close with its canonical residences. On the east side and running the length of the peninsula is the only communicating road, the Bailey. Formerly the street which housed the Prince Bishop's retainers, its houses have been rebuilt from the fifteenth century onwards, but despite this, an extraordinary harmony pervades this narrow and lovely street as it winds down from the site of the old Queen's Gate, to the arch of the Water Gate at its southern end. The houses which back on to the river have the typical enclosed gardens of mediæval small towns running down to the tow-path. The College may also be reached from the Bailey through a massive oaken gate beneath a gatehouse which houses many of the Cathedral archives. Two narrow and steep lanes, Dun Cow Lane and Owengate (Queen Street), lead from the Bailey to Palace Green. The Bishop's Mint is reputed formerly to have stood on Palace Green and this and two mediæval churches (St. Mary-le-Bow and St. Mary the Less) complete the list of the more important features of the inner city.

The outer city grew on the isthmus and across the river beyond Framwellgate Bridge on the west and Elvet Bridge on the east in the quarters bearing those names. Elvet Bridge is one of the oldest surviving road bridges in the country, dating from 1195, and originally two chapels and a turret were built on it. The present Framwellgate Bridge dates from the late fourteenth century and its inner end was formerly surmounted by a gateway with a tower, barbican, and draw-bridge which divided the fortress city from the merchants' quarter of Framwellgate. The market-place, which is also the focal point of roads entering the city, is on the isthmus, not, as is more usual, in the shadow of the Cathedral, but of the Castle—presumably of less matter in a city where temporal power was identified with spiritual. Another church, however, overlooks the market, suitably dedicated to St. Nicholas, and on the north side of the market-place are the Guild Hall

¹ The existing keep is modern.

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(now the Town Hall) and the Market Hall. Only one main road reaches this central point without a river crossing—the road from Sunderland—entering as Claypath (formerly Cluerport) and guarded by a gate until the nineteenth century. The earliest expansion of the city was along this road and beyond the two road bridges in Framwellgate and Elvet.¹ Each had its Norman church which formed the nucleus of a sub-centre of parochial settlement.

Apart from a very slow growth throughout mediæval times and a series of alleys probably of Tudor date behind and between the major roads, the place changed its plan and size but little until, in the eighteenth century, it bloomed again as a fashionable resort. Its old inns revived and new ones were built. Large and beautiful town houses were erected, as in the Bailey, South Street, and Elvet, and assembly rooms in the Bailey opposite a hostelry on the site of which Hatfield College now stands. Even the eighteenth-century city, however, extended less than a mile from Palace Green except, perhaps, along the Sunderland road where Claypath was reaching up towards "Gilesgate," probably an old rectangular village, served by the Norman church of St. Giles. In the middle of the eighteenth century new industries arose, though the attempt to industrialize Durham was in the end to prove abortive and few survived a century. Some of the older industries were: mustard making, brick making, tanning, grease making, lead-sheet making, gun making, pewter making, gloving. In addition there were curriers, spurriers, cutlers, and others to provide for the needs of eighteenth-century society, but attempts to establish a textile industry failed. In 1928 there still survived tinplate manufacture, carriage building, iron founding, and rope making (all on a small scale), and such tradesmen as cartwrights, whitesmiths, brass-smiths, millers, and coopers.

By the early nineteenth century this brief revival was over, and as the city fell back in status the fashionable world passed it by. Its declining fortunes and provincial character were further emphasized by the rising tide of the mining and manufacturing industries in the surrounding coalfield and of commerce in the growing sea-ports of the Durham coast. Its chief distinction, apart from its status as a palatinate county town and the seat of a bishopric, seems then to have been as a road centre. In 1827 it was the pivot of a system of coaching roads along which sixteen coaches reached or left the city daily, linking it with London, Leeds, Lancaster, Sunderland, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, and Edinburgh. Coaching inns, such as the Three Tuns, flourished on every main road entering the city. Roads were improved, the filthy unpaved lanes of the old city, "soft as an Irish bog," were cobbled and some macadamized. In 1824 the whole city was lit by gas, and electric street lamps have still not come to replace the mellow light of the gas lamps which illuminate the façades of the Bailey houses and are reflected as smudges of gold in the river below Elvet Bridge. The minor boom of the late eighteenth century, which might have carried Durham into a phase of industrial expansion comparable with that experienced by York or Norwich, resulted only in a broken, untidy ring of workshops and artisan quarters, e.g. behind Claypath and New Elvet and between North Road and Allergate. But instead of extending, many of the industries soon began to die out. Perhaps the lack of level land and the unsuitability of the river for commercial craft were the main reasons for this rapid decline, or perhaps the city preferred not to be disturbed from its ancient

¹ It is believed by some that the place-name Elvet may indicate a settlement older than that on the peninsula.

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peace by the uncongenial hustle of an industrial age with which it was so utterly out of tune.


It was not to become, it seemed, either an industrial or a commercial centre, but as the bad days of the early nineteenth century slipped away, new developments began which were to call forth again its peculiar genius. The Assize Courts, the Gaol, the University, theological colleges, teachers' training colleges and schools¹ were founded as the century advanced. The task of county administration increased as the population of the now flourishing coalfield grew apace and the large Shire Hall at present employs upwards of a thousand people. In the later nineteenth century three successful factories were started and were still flourishing at the outbreak of the Second World War—two organ factories and a carpet factory. A few smaller trades are still carried on. The railway reached the town as a branch line in 1842 and the main line was completed in 1857. Hospitals and indifferent entertainments are among the more recent amenities which the city offers. The result of these various new activities was the rise of a new professional and artisan group and the extension of the group engaged in personal and other services. Public buildings, schools, colleges, lower middle class and artisan housing were put up, the last resulting in two "wings," to the west and east of the two road bridges, which have filled up gaps in the old city and extended it appreciably. Meantime, mining villages had sprung up like black mushrooms almost at the city boundaries and some of these are now virtually joined to it by undesirable ribbon building. The steep, narrow, curving streets of the inner town are inadequate for the volume of modern traffic for which it is not even the goal and a by-pass has now been made which carries the Great North Road past the City a mile or so to the west on more level ground through a string of suburbs for which it is partly responsible. Thus the outer city becomes more irregular.

Only its historical character and development could adequately explain many features of Durham City. Some of its functions are old and some new, but those which survive and are successful are alike in that they are in tune with its age-long rôle of shrine, fortress, and administrative centre. They are mainly functions resultant on geographical centrality and by which, therefore, it serves a wider region, whether they be ecclesiastical or administrative, industrial or commercial, social or medical, legal or judicial, or concerned with serving tourists and visitors. Of all the new functions it acquired in the nineteenth century, perhaps that of University centre is most in character, especially as here the tradition of collegiate life tends in some degree to perpetuate the cloister.





Its population, though never large, grew steadily during the nineteenth century, the 1901 population of 16,151 being considerably more than double that of 1801. The maximum population recorded at a census was 17,550 in 1911, since when it has suffered from the decline of industry and from the economic depression which, in the late 'twenties and early 'thirties, affected the north-eastern industrial and mining area as a whole.

An analysis of the occupational figures for Durham City confirms it as belonging to the administrative and cultural type of town and as being a route centre. The number of unoccupied and retired people is not exceptional (just over 40 per cent). Of those occupied over fourteen years of age, the percentage in manufacturing and allied industries is only 9.9 per cent as compared with

¹ The Grammar School is the only old educational institution in the City.








THE GROWTH OF DURHAM CITY.

-  PLAN OF
MEDIAEVAL
DURHAM.
-  OTHER BUILDINGS
SHOWN ON
MAP OF 1754.
-  OTHER BUILDINGS
SHOWN ON
MAP OF 1890.
-  BUILDINGS ADDED
LATE 19TH & EARLY
20TH CENTURY.
-  --- MEDIAEVAL
DEFENCE LINE.




THE GROWTH OF DURHAM CITY.



-  PLAN OF MEDIAEVAL DURHAM.
-  OTHER BUILDINGS SHOWN ON MAP OF 1754.
-  OTHER BUILDINGS SHOWN ON MAP OF 1890.
-  BUILDINGS ADDED LATE 19th & EARLY 20th CENTURY.


--- MEDIAEVAL DEFENCE LINE.


1000 1500





MAIN ELEMENTS IN THE PLAN OF DURHAM CITY.

 UNIVERSITY
AND TRAINING
COLLEGES

 OLD PARISH
CHURCH.

FOR EXACT
DISTRIBUTION
OF BUILT UP AREAS,
SEE MAP SHOWING
THE GROWTH OF
DURHAM CITY



DURHAM CITY

19·8 per cent in York and 37 per cent in Crewe. But in Durham 11·3 per cent of the occupied group is engaged in mining and quarrying and most of these are colliers who go out daily from the city to the nearby coal-mines in the villages. At one time Durham had its own mine, the shaft opening on the site now occupied by the University Science Laboratories. The roar of passing traffic on the Stockton by-pass testifies to the undermined ground and there is a row of cottages, Anchorage Terrace, at the southern end of Church Street, which at one time housed the colliery workers, and ventilation shafts can be seen on the river banks nearby. The 1831 census recorded a population increase in Hall Garth due to the progress of the collieries there. Now, however, the colliers all go out of the city to their work.

TABLE OF OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS, 1931 CENSUS
(Persons over 14 years of age)

<i>Occupation</i>	<i>Durham City Per cent.</i>	<i>York Per cent.</i>	<i>Crewe Per cent.</i>
1. Personal service	18·7	13·2 (1)	8·7 (5)
2. Commercial and financial occupations	13·6	11·3 (3)	9·7 (3)
3. Mining and quarrying	11·3	·1 (14)	— (14)
4. Building and allied trades	9·6	6·2 (5)	5·4 (7)
5. Transport workers	7·5	9·9 (3)	13·5 (2)
6. Clerks, typists, etc.	7·4	8·2 (4)	6·7 (6)
7. Professional occupations	7·1	4·1 (9)	2·6 (8)
8. Public administration and defence	2·8	4·5 (6)	·4 (13)
9. Metal workers	2·6	6·1 (5)	24·5 (1)
10. Makers of textiles, dress, etc.	2·3	1·9 (12)	8·8 (4)
11. Wood and furniture workers	1·9	3·8 (10)	2·3 (9)
12. Makers of food and drink	1·8	5·6 (7)	·8 (11)
13. Agricultural occupations	1·4	1·4 (13)	·9 (10)
14. Printers, bookbinders, etc.	1·3	2·4 (11)	·6 (12)
Minor and undefined groups	10·7	21·3	15·1
	100·0	100·0	100·0

(The figures in brackets after the York and Crewe group percentages indicate the order of importance of that group in its respective town.)

In the above table the principal occupational groups are arranged in order of numerical importance for Durham City. As in many tourist centres and residential towns, personal service occupies the largest number. In Durham, this group is now further swollen by the domestic staffs of the colleges and schools. Another series of groups includes those workers associated with the city's educational, administrative and comparable functions, i.e. professions, the administrative group, the banks, printing and office work. These account for many of the workers under 2, 6, 7, 8, and 14, which together total 32·2 per cent or almost one-third of the total occupied group. The two other considerable groups are the builders and transport workers, where again Durham numbers are increased because it functions centrally for a wide area.

The significance of these occupational figures can perhaps be seen better by comparing them with other towns. York has been selected as being a town which was very similar to Durham in function and history until the nineteenth century, then built on to its mediæval woollen manufactures (which Durham lacked) an impressive superstructure of modern manufactures, including engineering and light industries. It is, further, a route centre of much greater importance than Durham. Thus the groups of metal workers, wood and furniture workers,

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and makers of foods and drinks rank much higher than in the Durham list, but, lacking a University, the professional group is smaller. Apart from these important differences, there is a clear comparison between the two, and of the six groups of greatest numerical importance in Durham five are included in York's first six. Crewe, a railway-industrial centre with some subsidiary industries and only a hundred years of urban history, has some points of comparison with York (an industrial railway centre) but, apart from being a route centre, is in complete contrast with Durham. It is included here to emphasize the character of the administrative-cultural type of town as distinct from the industrial. In the latter, personal service, the professions, and the administrative group all rank low numerically. Industrial occupations account for 37 per cent of the total occupied in Crewe; the educational, administrative and allied groups (Durham's 2, 6, 7, 8, and 14) only account for 20 per cent of the workers as compared with 9.9 per cent and 32.2 per cent for the corresponding groups in Durham.

The plan of Durham City is related more clearly to its history than to its occupational and functional composition. The principal divisions hold good as between the peninsula (professional), the isthmus and bridge zones (commercial and industrial), and the outer city. But the outer city, apart from one or two exceptional cases (such as the administrative quarter of Old Elvet with the Shire Hall, Assize Courts and Gaol; and the riverside workshop zones below Framwellgate and Elvet Bridges) is not clearly cut into districts. There are areas of artisan terraced housing which weekly wage earners of many groups inhabit, and suburban housing estates associated with the black-coated workers. But the rest of the city, notably the old quarters outside the peninsula, are characterized by the extraordinary mixing of social and occupational types and of good and derelict housing. Slum adjoins excellent house property in the Crossgate area and the types are almost as indiscriminately mixed in the New Elvet-Church Street district.

The morphology of Durham City and the aspects of its various streets and quarters reflect in varying degree its site, its history, its functions, and its social character. Confronted on Prebends' Bridge or in South Street with one of the finest urban views that England has to offer, charmed equally by glimpses of Cathedral and Castle from the narrow foreground of curving, mediæval streets in the inner city, the visitor is correspondingly depressed and surprised by the pervading air of shabbiness in its less fashionable, old quarters and by the very prosaic appearance of its artisan terraces and suburban villas. Two worlds are there. One is contained in the Durham of pre-industrial England where mediævalism is still lingering. The other is the rougher, workaday world of the newer parts, grotesquely embracing the old fortress-shrine and all its ancient parishes. On Saturday (market day and half-holiday) the outer world comes pushing into the shops, the markets, the cinemas, and the congested streets. Miners from the outlying villages, industrial workers, and tradespeople flood in to the isthmus, but the peninsula is rarely invaded except by the genuine tourist, and in the busiest hours of Saturday one can pass in ten yards from the crowd of the outer streets to the extraordinary calm of the inner city where few penetrate.

This cleavage is fundamental in the life of Durham City. The old city is a survival from a remote period and so distinctive as to be undisguisable. As such, it is anomalous in this particular age and region. The Norman City is the product of a countryside of softly wooded hills and vales, of rich meadows and northern farmsteads; of the cloistered thought and civic conceptions of mediæval

DURHAM CITY

times. As the coalfield was exploited and as mining and industrial villages and small towns sprang up around it in the nineteenth century, it was increasingly beleaguered, yet it remains what it always has been: a maiden fortress. It preserves itself though the inner city lies uneasily, unhappily, and somewhat arrogantly within the cramping collar of its artisan quarters, now choking it on all but the southern side, where alone it breathes congenial air. Church, university and school, and the dignity of legal and civil administrative functions should have been able already to have created an expanded urban area in harmony with its fine centre. Having demonstrated its inability to compete with the commercial and industrial towns which surround it, it has one clear course for the future: its development as a cultural and administrative centre on a scale commensurate with its past heritage and its present regional background.

BOOK REVIEWS

EVOLUÇÃO DO POVO BRASILEIRO. By Oliveira Vianna. Third illustrated edition, Companhia Editora Nacional, São Paulo, 1938.

EVOLUCION HISTORICA DEL URUGUAY Y ESQUEMA DE SU SOCIOLOGIA. By Alberto Zum Felde. Maximino Garcia, Montevideo, 1941.

These two books are examples of a sociological genre which has come into its own in Europe in the last few decades: the sociological analysis of a country's history, i.e. the analysis of the social forces which have made that history. The two Latin American contributions to the genre are of a quality which is a witness to the remarkable growth of sociological studies in the new continent, all the more so as they appeared originally in 1920 and 1922 respectively. They need not fear comparison with the best European examples of the genre such as Seignobos' *HISTOIRE SINCÈRE DE LA NATION FRANÇAISE* and Mirsky's *RUSSIA*.

Of the two books, that of Oliveira Vianna is perhaps of greater interest to European sociologists. A lengthy introduction provides the author with an opportunity to outline his sociological credo. It is significant that not a single American name figures among Oliveira Vianna's accepted masters. He takes as his starting-point the "modern concept of social evolution" based on Tarde's "initial heterogeneity" in opposition to the "initial homogeneity" postulated by Spencer, Darwin, and Hæckel. Having accepted human differentiation as his main theme, he proceeds to explain how it came about. As he is a native of a country where man is dwarfed by an exuberant and overwhelming nature, it is not surprising that his explanation is based on the interaction of man and physical environment, with a heavy emphasis on the latter. Nevertheless, he rejects the geographical determinism of Ratzel in favour of Vidal de la Blache's "possibilism." The theoretical dissertation is followed by a justification of local Brazilian studies as against general sociological analysis on the ground of their practical utility.

The main part of the book is devoted to the analysis of three trends of Brazilian history which the author regards as fundamental. They are, in his own words, "socially—the Westward trend of the population, towards the central plateaux; ethnically—the increase in the Aryan population and the progressive organization of miscegenated groups; politically—the march towards political and administrative centralization, the growing hegemony of the Union."

In the first part of the book, Oliveira Vianna seems to have done for Brazil what Turner did for the United States—he has reinterpreted the country's history in terms of its moving frontier. He traces, in fascinating chapters, the two main groups of Westward migrations: the first from c. 1670 to 1750; the second, starting in the late nineteenth century and as yet uncompleted. The second part is least valuable scientifically. The argument about the presence of "Aryans" among the early settlers and especially among the great internal colonizers, the "bandeirantes" of São Paulo, verges perilously on the Gobineau-Rosenbergian interpretation of history; but his thesis on the increasing Aryanization of Brazil is of some interest in view of the progressive absorption of (much smaller) non-white elements in neighbouring Uruguay and, to a smaller extent, in the Argentine. The third part deals with the alternate trends of centralization

BOOK REVIEWS

and decentralization in the successive governments of Brazil: colonial, imperial, and republican. It is full of revealing sidelights on the way in which the administrative machinery was adapted to the immense social and geographical variations prevalent in Brazil. To give but one example—the colonial government created different kinds of local administration adapted to the special needs of sugar-growing, cattle-breeding, and mining areas.

In Zum Felde's interpretation of the history of Uruguay, the emphasis is not, as with Oliveira Vianna, on the geographical environment, but on man. This may be to some extent due to the strong humanist tradition of Spanish culture, but also reflects the fact that in Uruguay, unlike Brazil, nature does not dwarf man but has been tamed and made use of by him. Hence, where nature appears in Zum Felde's book, it is as man's servant, as e.g. in the brilliant analysis of the "leather age" of Uruguay, a period in the late eighteenth century, when the whole economy of the country was based on the use of leather for everything from houses to weapons and cooking utensils, or in the no less brilliant interpretation of the influence of cattle-breeding on national character.

Also, unlike Oliveira Vianna, Zum Felde provides a continuous interpretation of his country's history. To appreciate the value of this interpretation fully, some previous knowledge of Uruguayan history is essential, for the author assumes that the reader possesses such knowledge. But even the reader who is not initiated into the details of Uruguayan history cannot but be struck by the brilliant powers of sociological analysis which Zum Felde exhibits in his work. Of particular interest is his analysis of the gaucho as an essentially nomadic cattle-breeding type who failed to adapt himself to a settled existence, and had to disappear from the Uruguayan scene with the march of progress. But the imprint left by the gaucho on the entire social structure of Uruguay is none the less visible and strong. Of more immediate interest to the European reader are Zum Felde's analytical studies of the growth of political parties, and of the democratic institutions for which Uruguay has become famous; of the peculiarly Hispanic type of political leadership known as "caudillaje," and last but not least, of "Batllismo." "Batllismo," named after President Batlle y Ordóñez, was a social and political movement based on his belief that social conflicts can be prevented by the setting up of social relief institutions and socialization of important industries before such measures are made imperative by inflamed social passions. It is to "Batllismo" that Uruguay owes its remarkable social stability, and its achievements—and defects—are well worth studying at a time when the Beveridge Plan is holding attention throughout the world.

Fortunately for the reader of Zum Felde's book, his analyses are presented in a clear and simple language, abounding in passages of an artistic beauty. To give but one example: The battle of Masoller (1904) was a landmark in Uruguayan history. It ended the last civil war of the old type and assured the victory of the new political and civilian leadership over the old military "Caudillo." Zum Felde presents this victory of the "doctor" over the "general" in a long passage contrasting the way in which the defeated general, Saravia, died, fighting on horseback at the head of the troops, while the new kind of leader, Batlle, directed strategic operations from his office, and was pacing up and down the room, waiting to hear the news of the battle on the telephone.

I. A. LANGONAS.

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WORLD PENAL SYSTEMS. A Survey by Negley K. Teeters, Temple University. Introduction by Dr. Hermann Mannheim. *Pennsylvania Prison Society, Philadelphia, 1944. Pp. 220.*

In the last chapter of this book Professor Teeters writes, "Any work of so wide a scope will find critics. In anticipation of their strictures, it might amiably be suggested that they too might write their own world surveys." The anticipation is less reasonable than the retort, for the difficulties in the way of the surveyor of the penal systems of the world are formidable. First, there is in many countries no adequate comprehensive account of their own systems. Secondly, most systems are constantly changing. Belgium, Norway, England, New Zealand, and the Federal Government of U.S.A. have for instance all made important legislative and administrative changes in the treatment of offenders between the wars, while the U.S.S.R. has experimented with far-reaching reforms and shown in this field, as in others, a readiness to learn by trial and error which rules out any possibility of a static system. Simultaneously, the penal methods of Germany have been reversed and the emphasis transferred from re-education to punishment. The recorder needs to produce a motion picture, not a portrait, for the subject does not sit still.

For this reason Prof. Teeters is wholly right in his insistence on the need for "a periodic report on the work being currently accomplished by the various countries of the world on curbing crime and readjusting criminals." He adds, "A post-war plan of this sort should be developed by the International Penal and Penitentiary Commission. The material collected should be published in every language so as to ensure its assimilation by all who are charged with the organization and maintenance of prison systems."

Even if this were done there would still be room for surveys compiled by authors like Prof. Teeters, free, unofficial, critical, human, and imaginative. No official account of a prison or reformatory is likely to show the whole thing, "warts and all."

What does this survey give us? It is based on descriptions given in numerous books, reports, and articles all written in English and on information furnished to the author by experts or knowledgeable people in various countries. Obviously the limitation of the written sources to publications in English is a serious one, freely acknowledged by the author. The survey occupies twelve chapters and groups the subject as follows:

1. *The Development of the British Penal System.* ("British" should have read "English," for the recent developments in England have no parallel in Scotland, and Scottish prisons are not mentioned or Saughton Prison at Edinburgh would have been noticed for its modern architecture and sanitation.)
2. *Penal Theory and Practice in the British Empire.* This covers all Dominions (except Eire), India, Ceylon, and the African Crown Colonies.
3. *The Philosophy and Administration of Prisons in Latin Europe.* This includes Belgium, a pioneer state in the treatment of antisocial citizens, France (omitting the Penal Settlement in Guiana), Italy, Spain (from Alfonso XI in 1829 to Franco), and Portugal.
4. *Penology in Holland and Scandinavia.* (There is practically nothing about Norway.)
5. *Penal Law and Prisons of Germany, Austria, and Switzerland*
6. *Russian Penology under the Czars and the Soviets.* (With a catholic selection

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of descriptions by authors both sympathetic and unsympathetic to the Soviets and a useful note on the judicial framework of the U.S.S.R.)

7. *Prisons of Eastern Europe*. Dealing with Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary.

8. *Prisons in the Balkans and Near East, including Turkey, Egypt, and Iran*. Here the complete contrast between Miss Margery Fry's account of Bulgarian prisons, crowded, insanitary, with dark cells and Governors paid a salary of £3 a week, and a glowing account of the same prison system by a Bulgarian Professor of Law shows how delicate a task it is to assess the realities of a situation. For Greece the sole authority is Prof. Olof Kinberg of Sweden, who visited the prisons in 1937 as a member of the Howard League's delegation visiting the Balkans. He found a lively interest in penology, prisons in Athens presented by wealthy philanthropists, and institutions with "little air space, no recreation, inadequate food, and no work to amount to anything." It is all very baffling.

9. *Penology in the Far East*, including Japan, China, Thailand, and the Philippines. An example of exciting things to be found in this book is the quotation from Professor Gillin (who visited Japanese prisons): "Japan stands out as the one country which devotes itself to the training of prison officials. The two sets of courses which she forces all her prison officials to take are of the very greatest significance. If we had not heard a cool factual account of the resulting prison administration from a master of understatement who had served a term in a Japanese civil prison lately, we might have believed in this. There follows a forthright description of Japan's despotic police methods.

10. *Latin American Countries and Penology*. This chapter was prepared in the main by the Commissioners and Deputy Commissioners of the Institute of Vigilance and Protection of the Child in Panama. It shows an active and growing interest in penal reform, evidenced by the regular holding of Congresses of Latin American Criminologists, to which U.S.A. experts are invited. It shows, in Chile's new penal code, revolutionary concepts—an attempted crime has the same penalty as an accomplished crime, and because the code reflects unwillingness to enter into the controversy between free will and determinism "crime is no longer defined": so there is no criminal responsibility, and all sentences are indeterminate. Bold, logical, and interesting indeed, but one wonders what becomes of individual liberty. Fines are fixed in terms of units and 30 units for a man with £3 a week may be assessed by the Judge at one-third of the 30 units fine for a man with £9. Here is a brave attempt to act on the principle stated in the English Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879, but very poorly observed in the English Courts.

11. *Current Penal Philosophy and Treatment in the U.S.A.* Here Professor Teeters is on his own ground and he gives a brilliantly compressed account of the complex problems and machinery of justice and penal administration in the U.S.A., not attempting to whitewash sepulchres such as the County Jail but giving invaluable information about the progressive work of the Federal Bureau of Prisons and the practice of Parole, Probation, and the development of social case work and the proposed Youth Correction Authority.

The final chapter sums up the lessons which Professor Teeters thinks America may learn from a world view of penology. A Briton reading it will feel some twinges of conscience, but will have some consolation in finding that in scientific classification, and in Borstal, we can teach as well as learn.

Perhaps statesmen may be persuaded to take note of the fact that Belgium's

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pride of place as a pioneer in a humane and scientific approach to its criminal problem is due largely to the courage and initiative of a few great Ministers of Justice, who led and educated public opinion.

This book is a mine of information and Professor Teeters always quotes his authorities. We should be grateful to him for his magnificent attempt to achieve the impossible.

CECILY M. CRAVEN.

IN QUEST OF FOSTER PARENTS. By Dorothy Hutchinson. Published for *The New York School of Social Work by Colombia University Press, New York*, 1943. 11s. 6d. net. Pp. 145.

Mr. Howard W. Hopkirk in his INSTITUTIONS SERVING CHILDREN recommended this book to the American reader as being one of the most valuable publications on foster-family care. To the English reader it brings home very forcefully the fact that child placement is carried out by American social agencies at a level of insight and understanding that is far beyond anything generally attained or even hoped for yet in this country. But the book, unlike many other American publications in this field, is written in comparatively simple and unassuming language and with such warm human sympathy that the reader, far from becoming depressed, may well be stimulated and encouraged.

The chapter headings, "The Wish for Parenthood," "Introduction to a Foster Mother," "Refusing Foster Parents," "Homefinding in War-time," "In Praise of Foster Parenthood," give some idea of the scope and nature of this comparatively short work. The standards set are high: in fact to the over-worked, underpaid, and badly housed social worker in England they may seem at first reading to be exasperating and perfectionist. And yet the difficulties are not minimized and the problems of the worker are analysed acutely.

Unlike other social workers, the home-finder has something to get from her client, a home for the child in her charge, and the temptation to accept that home too easily is strong. The writer outlines the more obvious difficulties experienced by the worker in refusing a foster mother and also brings out clearly the hidden factors that lie in her psychology. For the case worker in home-finding is influenced by her early feelings about her own parents and these feelings are bound to bias her selection of foster parents unless she can see and acknowledge the colouring effect of her own situation.

The offer of homes is sometimes refused on obvious grounds, such as old age, material inadequacies, etc. But the writer stresses that "the crux of the matter is to select normal families—those in which the major basic qualifications have been met in love and achievement."

She goes on, however, to add that the requirement that foster parents shall be normal does not "necessarily mean that they must have a certain degree of wealth or high position or perfection of manners or speech or adequate child-guidance information or that all foster parents should have children of their own. It does mean that these people should have made reasonably satisfactory adjustments to the everyday demands of life—people who, although they want and need a child, actually have enough satisfaction in their lives so that they could go on without one."

For it seems that children, especially little girls, are to the foster parent and to the adoptive parent the emblem of love. Now the fact that the foster parents

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are searching for love, or more love, or a different kind of love, is not in itself disqualifying, but when that demand for love becomes rigid, compulsive, and exacting, then the child cannot sustain the burden of the symbol he carries, and failure and unhappiness result. Hence it is immensely important that the homemaker should understand the unconscious incentives of prospective foster parents. If a child is wanted as "treatment" for another child, or to remedy an unhappy marriage or as vicarious fulfilment of frustrated ambitions, the outlook for the future is not very hopeful. But the book ends with a generous appreciation of the successful foster mother, that woman who must have a "capacity for non-natural relationships," who has to deal with abnormal difficulties that are not of her own making, and who must be content to wait for the trust and confidence of the child in her care, only too often to have to give him up before her job is finished.

The book is illustrated throughout by detailed records of interviews that are very illuminating. It is true that the subject is only a small corner of the social field, but perhaps enough has been quoted to show that most case workers could profit from this sensitive study of human relationships and situations that are accompanied by feelings of such intense significance.

A. D. FIELD.

THE IDEA OF NATIONALISM. A Study in its Origins and Background.
By Hans Kohn. Macmillan, New York, 1944.

Professor Hans Kohn, now of Smith College, is well known as the author of several excellent books on problems of nationalism. His Austrian origin and contact with nationalist movements in many countries of Europe and Asia have provided him with unusual experience of nationalism, and have stimulated his interest in a comparative study of its phenomena. The present book treats the subject from the period of Ancient Israel and Greece to the time before the outbreak of the French Revolution. A second volume will deal with the subsequent development up to our time. The author gives a very comprehensive picture, including not only great nations but also many small ones. This wide scope has the great advantage of showing the interconnexions and parallels between the various nations. All national aspirations exhibit, indeed, many similarities. Many nations have, at some time in the course of their evolution, believed that they were the chosen people entrusted with a divine mission.

The book is a history of ideas. It describes with extraordinary scholarship and penetrating judgment the development of ideas on nationality and the nation-state. It is a masterly performance and will be recognized as a classic in this field of study. The wealth of significant facts and illuminating comments, however, makes it difficult to summarize it in brief. Students of nationalism, in studying this book, will find it a most reliable guide and a source of inspiration for further investigations.

Sociologists are also much indebted to Professor Kohn for his constant care in tracing the social background of the ideas which form the subject of his work. The emphasis, however, is on the ideas, and one wishes that the author could supplement his book on *The Idea of Nationalism* by another on *The Reality of Nationalism*. The history of ideas naturally pays special attention to the views on nationalism of great thinkers, poets, and scholars, though Kohn also includes a few statesmen. The distance between the ideal and reality is particularly great in

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this field. The great heralds of nationality—Rousseau, Herder, Fichte, Mazzini—would have been horrified if they had been able to see the fruits of the seed they sowed. No greater contrast could be imagined, for example, than that between Fichte's idea of a future German nation and the Nazi interpretation of his teachings. It is a perplexing problem why all the noble visions of great thinkers should have at last only served as a smoke-screen for the development of a nationalism which is the greatest menace to our whole civilization.

The author begins his book with an introduction discussing the nature of nationalism. Though many of his observations are acute and illuminating, he does not attain a satisfactory solution. Nationalism is, indeed, a most elusive thing. This is its particular danger because most people are unable to realize the destructive forces behind its attractive surface exterior. They cannot draw the line between the innocent, and even beneficial, forms of national consciousness and its devastating manifestations. National pride almost imperceptibly becomes national arrogance and ruthlessness, and national self-defence suddenly assumes the character of aggression. It is hardly noticed when the borderline is transgressed, and soon a retreat is impossible and fate takes its course. I have suggested elsewhere that the misleading use of "nationalism" for "national sentiment" peculiar to English and American usage should be abandoned and that the use of the term "nationalism" be restricted to the inordinate striving for national power and prestige as supreme aims.

Professor Kohn employs the word in the wider sense. He defines nationalism as a state of mind of a group recognizing the nation-state as the ideal form of political organization and nationality as the source of all creative cultural energy and of economic well-being; implying that the supreme loyalty of man is due to his nationality. This definition, however, does not seem very satisfactory. The Welsh, the Scots, the French Canadians, and many other peoples certainly claim to be nations or at least to have a national consciousness called "nationalism" by Kohn. But the majority of them do not seem to demand a nation-state of their own. Moreover, it seems to be a vicious circle to define national consciousness as a striving for the nation-state and then the nation-state as a political organization based on the nation—namely a group possessing national consciousness. In my own book on nationality I have tried to show that national consciousness has a very complicated psychological structure, and have given an analysis of it.

The moving force in national consciousness is primarily the striving for collective prestige, and the longing for unity, liberty, and originality is mainly serving the same purpose. Many other motives are also involved, but the wish for prestige is the strongest. It is, moreover, a kind of prestige determined by the whole history of the nation, and by its relations to other nations; in brief by the national ideology. The ideas of great thinkers and writers have certainly influenced this ideology, but they were rivalled by other influences, and have only been accepted after a radical reinterpretation which was often a complete perversion. Kant's idea of a rigid sense of duty was, for example, identified with the discipline of the Prussian army, though this was absurd, and the absolute opposite of what Kant really meant. This remark shows that the development of thought in a higher sense on nationality does not explain all the phenomena of national sentiment, but is, of course, of great significance. Professor Kohn's book, in particular, should be carefully studied by every historian and sociologist and also by every politician wishing to acquire a deeper understanding of the greatest political problem of our time.

FREDERICK HERTZ.

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MAN AND HIS WORKS. By Edward Lee Thorndike. *Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1943.* Pp. 205.

Professor Thorndike's latest book consists of the William James lectures he gave at Harvard in 1942, and is essentially a review of the contribution which his own experiments and researches have made towards a better understanding of social processes. It is similar in plan and purpose to his larger volume, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, covering much the same ground in about one-tenth the number of words.

The main thesis of the book is one which will command the assent of most social thinkers; it is best expressed in the form of a quotation: "We cannot rest content with a political science that expects that every individual will be a good, not to say the best, judge of his own interests, and takes it as axiomatic that a person at least knows what he wishes, if not what is to his interest. Or with a science of law that operates with such alleged entities as responsibility or intent, and esteems personal testimony far above circumstantial evidence. It is not right that the human sciences and arts should be built on foundations of false or inadequate psychology."

On the basis of this belief that economics, law, political theory, and sociology would all benefit by a sound foundation only to be derived from a more adequate understanding of modern psychological contributions, Thorndike proceeds to advocate the views which have been identified with his school for a large number of years. He begins by stressing the genetic component of human nature, reiterating and bringing up to date much of what he wrote in 1913, in his book on *The Original Nature of Man*. From that foundation, he goes on to consider the problem of learning, particularly in relation to the action of "satisfiers" and "annoyers." In thus emphasizing the efficacy of "rewards," he can be seen to have travelled a long way from the original view of learning as due to trial-and-error processes stamped in by means of "recency" and "frequency"; this change in emphasis can best be studied by comparing the position "reward" plays in his earliest book on *Animal Learning* with that it occupies in his recent *Psychology of Wants, Interests, and Attitudes*. Almost the only connecting link between the two views lies in the retention by Thorndike of the concept of the S-R (stimulus-response) bond; this concept also, however, has been changed from an elementaristic to a gestalt view.

Having thus developed very briefly the essentials of his system of psychology, he proceeds to apply it to certain social topics: the Psychology of Language, the Psychology of Government, the Psychology of Punishment, and the Psychology of Welfare. Of these applications, it is difficult to give an appraisal not coloured by one's own psychological point of view, or one's own social theories. The chapters on language, criticizing the major current theories and developing Thorndike's own "babble-luck" theory, suffer from the same defects as most writings on the subject—they are largely theoretical, and lack empirical foundation. The chapter on welfare, on the other hand, is extensively documented from Thorndike's book *Your City*, and is convincing in its main conclusions, although some of these conclusions may perhaps be considered tautological. Whatever the final verdict on that point, the factual material is well worth studying, and similar researches on British towns might with advantage be undertaken.

The chapter on punishment attempts to relate the evidence from extensive laboratory experiments on the effects of rewards and punishments to the problems of criminality. It remains difficult to assess the possibility of thus extending

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experimental data of limited validity to a wider field; to this difficulty Thorndike is, of course, thoroughly alive. His main conclusion, viz., that rewards are much more likely to be effective in creating desirable S-R bonds than are punishments in destroying undesirable S-R bonds, certainly poses a definite problem to society, and its application to the treatment of criminals should be made the subject of large-scale social experimentation. Only in this way will it be possible to assess the general validity of this law proposed by Thorndike with a wealth of experimental detail.

The chapter on government is perhaps unsatisfactory in the sense that it discusses certain psychological problems (such as that of the right of experts to govern) in an abstract manner which seems to lay little stress on practical political and social difficulties. In fact, this criticism is one which many readers will probably make of other chapters of this book as well. It could be contended that a book of 200 pages is too short to include the qualifying phrases and the practical considerations which might appear in a longer volume. However, similar criticisms have been made of the 1,000-page *Human Nature and the Social Order*. The answer would rather appear to be that the psychologist is not immediately concerned with practical reality; it is his job to point out that the psychological basis of much of our current legal practice, for instance, is false, and to provide a more realistic foundation. It is not his job, *qua* psychologist, to face the practical difficulties of carrying out the changes which he considers necessary.

A more pertinent criticism of the book as a whole might be that it is concerned almost exclusively with the contribution which Thorndike himself has made to social psychology, and neglects many areas of outstanding importance. However, it was presumably the author's intention to give a summary and a résumé of his life's work in these pages, and once the intention is taken for granted one cannot but admit that the execution is fully up to the standard of scientific and literary skill one has come to expect from the Dean of American psychologists.

H. J. EYSENCK.

TRAINING FOR SKILL IN SOCIAL CASE WORK. Edited by Virginia P. Robinson, Pennsylvania School of Social Work (affiliated with the University of Pennsylvania). *University of Pennsylvania Press*, Philadelphia, 1942. Price 12s. Pp. 126.

A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO FAMILY CASE WORK. Edited by Jessie Taft, Pennsylvania School of Social Work (affiliated with the University of Pennsylvania). *University of Pennsylvania Press*, Philadelphia, 1944. Price 15s. 6d. Pp. 208.

The American literature of social case work has often been criticized on the score that, valuable and illuminating though it is, it is spoilt by its polysyllabic, abstract, and rather pretentious language. English readers have felt irritated, for instance, when the process they think of as bringing about a change in circumstances has been called "environmental manipulation." But this charge of pompous language can now seldom be fairly levelled. American books of this type, it is true, are still difficult to read, but this is because the authors are trying to formulate what is not often put into words. What they are trying to describe is usually a process of handling situations in relationship; in the present instance, the recognition, acceptance, and overcoming of resistances towards taking help within a client-worker relationship. But there is a real effort to

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break away from jargon of any kind. American social case-work philosophy has so much to teach us that it will be a pity if we refrain from reading it through fear of an irritation that we may seldom meet.

These two volumes in the Social Work Process Series together throw light on the problem that must be haunting most case workers. When, on the one hand, the State is taking over so wide a responsibility for the provision of material need, and on the other, when psychiatric teams have developed professional skills in effecting a change in individual personality, what is left as a function for the social case worker? Is she to join a statutory service and think in terms of categories of need, thereby largely relinquishing her concern for the individual? Or must she now train as a psychiatric social worker, thereby narrowing her interests to some extent? For years this question has faced the professional case worker both in England and America, but in America she seems to have been more aware of her dilemma and has evidently come through it with the power to delimit and therefore to define her function and rely on her unique skills with confidence. This effort to define function and skill has evidently been arduous and only after much struggle has she been able to relinquish her former rather ambitious and confused pretensions to responsibility.

At one stage in this struggle the case worker in America seems to have believed that nothing short of the actual experience of undergoing a Freudian analysis herself would enable her to help her clients, so great was the emphasis on the analysis of unconscious drives in evaluating personality. Later, largely owing to the teaching of Otto Rank, she has been able to see her function as different from the psychiatric rôle, but valuable in its own right. She is now willing to forgo her feeling of total responsibility for her client, her desire to meet his total needs, to understand his total personality, but concentrates instead on the actual demand he makes for help in a given social situation. And that demand she is only ready to meet within the limitations imposed by the agency she serves. This limitation immediately sets up some degree of resistance in the client, and the process of recognizing, meeting, and accepting resistance to help within the client-worker relationship can be very influential in effecting change when requisite professional skill is brought to bear upon it. But how is this very subtle skill to be developed if not by psychotherapy? By subjecting the student herself to this same process, not of psychological analysis, but of taking help. Through submitting herself, as a student in the field of case work, to getting help from a professional supervisor, she learns at first hand how alarming it is to be expected to change and how resistance to taking help in order to change invariably arises. But through the support of the student-supervisor relationship, she eventually gains sufficient confidence to overcome her own resistance and to allow herself to change, i.e. to grow.

This, shortly, is the sum of theory in these two volumes. Of the various papers contributed, those by Virginia P. Robinson and Jessie Taft tackle most courageously the difficult problems of definition. But fascinating questions are dealt with in other papers. One describes how a certain agency established a consultation service and charged a fee to those who wished for case-work help. The service appears to have been popular, but the fact that clients paid for it produced at first the most surprising feelings of inadequacy even in experienced professional workers. Another writer describes work with refugees and the difficulties experienced by the case worker in trying to help clients who had sometimes enjoyed education and status superior to her own. But perhaps the

most illuminating paper for the English reader is that by M. Robert Gomberg on the Specific Nature of Family Case Work. In this, he says, "the fact that the agency has a responsibility to the whole family would make itself felt for every worker in such questions as these: 'Is the request which the client is making related to a problem which normally falls within his rôle in the family? If not, does the member of the family who normally deals with this problem know about the request and desire the service?'" In illustration of his point that it is important to emphasize the rôle assumed in the family configuration by the client, he gives a series of very fully recorded interviews which starts by an embittered wife asking for money to help with family needs and ends five months later with a couple who are not only firmly set on the road to moderate prosperity, but are reconciled and respectful of each other's function within the family. And this successful outcome was largely due to the insistence of the worker that before considering help, he must see the husband, as the natural provider for the family. This insistence at first produced an explosion of temper from the wife. Though an attractive and essentially feminine personality, she had been driven through her husband's lack of initiative to assume the dominating rôle in the family and clung convulsively to it, though with secret resentment. The worker allowed her to express fully both her contempt and pity for her husband, but maintained steadily that by asking for financial help she was asking for a supplementation of her husband's wages, and that before he could agree to grant this he must interview the man himself. By helping the wife to forgo to some small extent her excessive domination, a chance was given to the husband, which he gradually developed courage to take, to assume more of a normal rôle in the family.

Tutors will find most useful the volume called *Training for Skill in Social Case Work* and case workers will be more interested in *A Functional Approach to Family Case Work*. But before either teachers or workers can get real help from these essays, our own house must be set in order, and a more strenuous effort made to define what exactly is the function of social case work in England to-day.

A. D. FIELD.

ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN RELIEF IN EUROPE, 1918-1919.

Publication No. 20. The Hoover Library on War, Revolution, and Peace.

Documents selected and edited by Suda Lorena Bane and Ralph Haswell Lutz. *Stanford University Press*, 1943. 36s. Pp. xxi + 745.

Mr. Herbert Hoover's introduction to this "source book" of documentary history, the inclusion of a reprint of his articles to *Colliers* (of 1942) entitled "We'll have to feed the world again," no less than the date of publication in November 1943, reveal a determination to urge preparedness for peace. The Council of U.N.R.R.A. met for the first time in that month in Atlantic City and no better text-book could have been devised for these planners than this description of the first experiment in large-scale international relief to Europe.

Now that responsibility for post-war rehabilitation, especially concerning displaced persons and refugees, will fall more upon U.N.O., through the Social and Economic Council, its sub-committees and sub-sub-committees, and less upon U.N.R.R.A., the book assumes importance again as a guide for a different type of administrator. It should be read by all students and practitioners of relief work. There is an excellent index for selective reading.

This large volume evokes in the reader a somewhat nostalgic feeling for the

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past. For instance, bread was not a problem and Mr. Hoover was able to report to the President in November 1918 that the shortages were in the main confined to fats and sugar. The Far East was then a source of supply. Less than a year from the Armistice the period of acute distress was considered over, and after the harvest of 1919 it was possible to report to the Supreme Economic Council that the office of the Director-General of Relief in Paris could be closed down and that Europe had been carried through "the greatest famine since the Thirty Years' War without appreciable loss of life." The ratification of peace only nine months after the cessation of hostilities in Europe made possible the renewal of communications and of commercial life. The newly established governments of liberated peoples, it was believed, were in a position to organize their own economic problems. Relief work was over and reconstruction could begin.

The situations described, however, are in the main painfully familiar. There is the American colonel in charge of a coal district who promises to raise the production rate of miners by 20 per cent. if \$25,000 worth of tobacco can be sent, because they have not had a smoke in three years. A message comes from the American representative in Galicia asking Mr. Hoover for instructions as to how many eggs should be paid per locomotive from Austria. He replies the man on the spot must decide and be "guided by the age of each"! A complicated barter system, complete breakdown of transport, frequent appeals to the Powers for international control of the craft on the great rivers, black markets, profiteers, and so on and so on. Man learns but slowly.

There is much of political interest. From beginning to end President Wilson insists that in relief, as in the war effort, the U.S.A. is an "associated power," not an "ally." The United States Food Administrator, Mr. Hoover, retains a certain independence of action from allied committees and there is some resistance to allied proposals for government controls, or government buying agencies for essential products. A certain suspicion and impatience of international committees (especially of subordinate Ministers) and their necessarily slow action is evident. "In every important matter," writes Mr. Hoover, "I soon found it was necessary for me to go to Messrs. Wilson, Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Orlando."

The practical humanitarianism of this great experiment, however, is best seen in the efforts, which are here documented, to persuade the Allies to lift the blockade. It took two months before the military authorities could be persuaded to lift the blockade from neutral and liberated countries; four and a half months before a partial relaxation of the blockade on enemy countries was accomplished.

The Children's Relief Programme is another glorious page added to the history of America's liberal tradition. It was operated through the governments of the countries concerned and with the approval of national voluntary committees, mostly women. The Americans provided food and clothing, the national governments arranged inland transport and distribution. Colonel Carlson's final report from Paris to Mr. Hoover in August 1919 is illuminating. "The work has been most successful in German Austria and probably least successful in Poland. . . . I feel our work has kindled the sacred fire in some men and women in each country, who will see to it that it does not die out. . . . There are many representatives of the educated classes, principally in the Slav countries, who actually believe it is better for the nation to let the children of families who cannot support them die out. These people are forgetting that for every child who dies of starvation, poverty, and neglect, several continue to live on who will be inferior men and women and hence a burden rather than an asset to the State."

BARBARA BLISS.

OUR BIRMINGHAM: THE BIRMINGHAM OF OUR FOREFATHERS AND THE BIRMINGHAM OF OUR GRANDSONS. Published by Cadbury Brothers, Limited, Bournville. *University of London Press, Ltd.*, 1943. Oblong 8vo, 52 pp., stiff cover, price 1s.

"The aim of this book is to stimulate the interest of the young people of Birmingham in the past growth of their city and particularly in its future development." This statement appears on the first page, and gives a reviewer a convenient measuring rod: will the publication serve its declared purpose?

Many points may be noted in its favour. It makes free use of visual material (pictures, maps, and diagrams); it is written in simple, clear language; it proceeds by selection and does not attempt comprehensiveness; it appeals to different kinds of interest, such as that in mechanics, the other in houses and gardens, and the other again in administration. The example of a school survey included at the end may inspire many other schools to attempt similar studies.

On every page, however, issues arise which are important for the future of local studies in schools, and one value of the book, outside its intended use, may be that it gives occasion to define these.

Thus—selection is necessary, but how far must it be carried and on which principle? Here it almost converts the book into a scrap-book, with the scraps arranged roughly in chronological order. Is it agreed that the scrap-book is the best form for the purpose? That it is a useful form is not in doubt.

Again—in the scrap-book form it is important that each unit should be complete and self-explanatory. Here the first section on the Manor of Birmingham (p. 2) leaves vague several points arising on the Domesday record. On p. 4 are interesting quotations from Leland and Timmins, but some of the old words in these are not translated. Many pictures and maps have legends explaining what they show; in some cases further explanations are given in the text, in some not, and in some explanation and picture are several pages apart. A greater difficulty is the reduction in the size of old engravings, which blurs the detail and makes careful study impossible. No map shows a North point, and all have different orientation; some pictures are without indication of the direction of vision. There is no modern map of the central portion of the city for comparison with the older plans.

Assuming the suitability of the method used, is the selected material well balanced? The first five pages cover the period from the beginning of the Manor to the eighteenth century. In later periods much more emphasis seems laid on commerce and industry than on culture. In the biographies there is a tendency to give space to telling anecdotes and to over-condense information on the major themes; surely a mistake where adolescents are in view?

It would be ungracious to carry these comments further; they show the elementary stage of our achievement in the field of method, rather than faults of the authors. And mention should be made, in closing, of the effective presentation of facts and ideas about the present and future of the city in the later pages: the scrap-book method here reaches a high level of effectiveness. Some of the credit should perhaps go to the compilers of *WHEN WE BUILD AGAIN*, which has provided our authors with a rich store of materials assembled by good research methods.

ALEXANDER FARQUHARSON.

